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The basic materials industries are a cornerstone  
of Europe’s economic prosperity, increasing  
gross value added and providing around 2 million 
high-quality jobs. But they are also a major source 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Despite efficiency 
improvements, emissions from these industries 
were mostly constant for several years prior to the 
Covid-19 crisis and today account for 20 per cent 
of the EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions.
A central question is therefore: How can the basic 
material industries in the EU become climate-neutral 
by 2050 while maintaining a strong position in a 
highly competitive global market? And how can these 
industries help the EU reach the higher 2030 climate 
target – a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions  
of at least 55 per cent relative to 1990 levels?
Key conclusions at a glance:
1
Given the new paradigm of achieving climate neutrality by 2050, current climate and industry 
policies will lead to investment leakage or risk stranded industrial assets. Industrial companies 
understand: The EU objective of climate neutrality by 2050 has clear implications for industrial 
reinvestment in the 2020s. Carbon-intensive technologies have lifetimes of up to 70 years. 
Reinvestments into long-lived assets will not be made unless there is an investment framework  
to deploy climate-neutral technologies.
2
With a new policy framework, the basic materials industries can support the increased EU  
2030 climate target of at least -55 per cent. Key low-carbon technologies are available and  
can be deployed well before 2030. The CO2 abatement potential of key low-carbon technologies 
in the steel, chemicals, and cement sectors alone amounts to 145 Mt of CO2 by 2030, exceeding  
the required emission reductions from industry under the EU ETS. Their deployment will represent  
a breakthrough in Europe’s industrial sector and ensure it a leading global role.
3
By 2030, 30 to 50 per cent of existing assets in cement, steel, and chemicals will require major  
reinvestment. New policies are needed now to create a business case for breakthrough technologies. 
Key low-carbon technologies are available, but their abatement costs are still in the range of 100 to 
170 €/t of CO2. The EU should adopt policy instruments to cover the gap between these abatement 
costs and the EU ETS price as soon as possible. 
4
Europe needs a Clean Industry Package in 2021 to kick-start breakthrough investments and 
protect existing assets. By refining existing carbon leakage protection instruments it will be 
possible to protect existing plants until they can be replaced. At the same time, decisive support 
for investments in breakthrough technologies is needed. This should come in the form of carbon 
contracts-for-difference, planning and financing for clean-energy installations and infrastructure, 
and standards to create markets for climate-neutral and circular products.
  
In the EU policy debate on the European Green Deal, 
many suppose that the basic materials industries can 
do little to achieve deep cuts in emissions by 2030. 
Beyond improvements to the efficiency of existing 
technologies, they assume that no further innova-
tions will be feasible within that period. This study 
takes a different view. It shows that a more ambitious 
approach involving the early implementation of  
key low-carbon technologies and a Clean Industry 
Package is not just possible, but in fact necessary  
to safeguard global competitiveness.
We hope you enjoy reading this study. 
Dr. Patrick Graichen, 
Executive Director, Agora Energiewende
Prof. Dr. Manfred Fischedick
President, Wuppertal Institute 
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 * Steam crackers are normally maintained and modernised continuously so that they do not have to be replaced all at once. 
  Nevertheless, the graph provides a rough estimate of the reinvestment needs for existing facilities.
 ** Cement data represent numbers for Germany only. We estimate that the reinvestment requirements for the EU27 are in a similar range.
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Executive Summary
using best available technologies referenced in  
the Impact Assessment.5 
We believe that a more sustainable approach is to 
define the path for industrial transformation based  
on the 2050 climate neutrality target. Hence, in this 
study we identify strategies and investments that 
meet the increased 2030 target and achieve climate 
neutrality by 2050. To those ends, we recommend  
the rapid introduction of key low-carbon break-
through technologies that takes advantage of the  
EU’s industrial modernisation needs over the coming 
decade. During this period, some 48 per cent of the 
EU’s production capacities in the steel industry,  
53 per cent of its capacities in the chemical industry, 
and 30 per cent of its capacities in cement production 
will need replacing or refurbishing. Reinvestment6  
in traditional production processes, even if the best 
available technologies are used, is not an option so 
long as those processes are not easily convertible  
to zero-carbon or carbon-negative operation. 
Though the necessary breakthrough technologies 
exist, their deployment will require appropriate 
policies. In this regard, the EU is at a crossroads: 
either institute breakthrough technologies aligned 
with the European Green Deal and a sustainable 
recovery from the Covid-19 economic crisis, or face  
a high risk of accelerated deindustrialisation,  
job losses, stranded assets, and carbon leakage. 
This paper presents concrete strategies and  
pathways that capitalise on opportunities for break-
through development in European industry. We opt 
for a dual approach that deploys breakthrough 
technologies for industrial capacities in need of 
5 See Impact Assessment, 2020.
6 Reinvestment refers to investments that are required to 
maintain production capacities when existing produc-
tion capacities reach the end of their lifetime.
1 Introduction
Under the European Green Deal and the  
2030 Climate Target Plan, the European Commission 
has recommended that the EU reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions by at least -55 per cent by 2030 
(relative to 1990 levels) and achieve climate neutrality 
by 2050.1 European industry has a vital role to play  
in delivering this target. Direct industrial emissions 
accounted for 719 MtCO2eq in 2017, equivalent to 
approximately 20 per cent of annual net greenhouse 
gas emissions in the EU27 (Eurostat, n.d.).2
By 2030, EU industry will therefore need to  
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the  
range of 22 to 25 per cent compared with 2015 levels.  
To achieve climate neutrality by 2050, the EU will 
need to reduce its combined industrial emissions  
by approximately 95 per cent and offset residual 
emissions with carbon sinks.
So far, discussions have focused mostly on  
measures for meeting 2030 objectives. Based on  
the European Commission’s Impact Assessment  
that accompanied the 2030 Climate Target Plan 
Communication3 for industry, the targets represent  
a reduction of between 168 and 188 MtCO2eq , i.e.  
25 to 28 per cent of emissions in 2018.4 According  
to the European Commission, this can be achieved 
1 This summary of the full study was published in 
November 2020 prior to the EU Council decision in 
December 2020 to adopt an EU 2030 climate target of 
-55 per cent GHG emissions reduction. 
2 The figure excludes emissions from  
energy sectors such as upstream power and  
heat production, refining, and solid fuel production. 
3 In the following this will be simply referred  
to as the Impact Assessment.
4 Since industrial GHG emissions have grown  
in recent years, the gap is larger for 2018 than for 2015.
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markets, and standards that align with the new 
climate-neutrality paradigm.  
2.2  Opportunities and challenges for industry 
to achieve higher climate ambition in 2030 
and climate neutrality in 2050
The EU has set itself the goal of achieving climate 
neutrality by 2050. This means that all sectors, 
including the so-called “hard-to-abate” industries 
such as steel, chemicals, and cement, will have to 
become virtually climate-neutral within the coming 
three decades. In addition, the European Commission 
recommended in its 2030 Climate Target Plan 
Communication from September 2020 to increase  
the EU’s greenhouse gas reduction targets from  
-40 per cent to at least -55 per cent by 2030  (relative 
to 1990 levels). On 7 October 2020 the EU parliament 
even voted in favour of increasing this greenhouse 
gas reduction target for 2030 to -60 per cent. A final 
decision on the EU 2030 climate target has not been 
taken yet, but is expected in December 2020. 
An EU climate target of at least -55 per cent would 
require heightened emission reduction efforts for  
the industrial sector. Despite reductions during  
the 1990–2010 period through energy efficiency 
measures, industrial greenhouse gas emissions have 
stayed mostly constant since then (see figure ES.1).  
In 2015, emissions began to rise along with economic 
growth. Though energy efficiency continues to be 
important, it alone will not suffice for a -22 to  
25 per cent reduction by 2030, as indicated in  
the European Commission’s Impact Assessment. 
Moreover, there is a risk that pressure or incentives 
to invest in efficiency measures for GHG-intensive 
assets with long lifetimes offers only a marginal  
GHG abatement benefit while increasing capital 
allocation and operational lifetimes. The result would 
be that short-term mitigation conflicts with the 
long-term climate neutrality objective.  
This is why the introduction of key low-carbon 
technologies is needed for industrial plants when 
they are scheduled for replacement or refurbishment. 
reinvestment while allowing industrial assets with 
traditional processes to continue operation until they 
are scheduled for replacement. 
The goal of this study is to define a Clean Industry 
Package at the EU and member-state levels that 
mobilizes investments that are compatible with 
meeting an EU 2030 climate target of at least  
-55 per cent while laying the groundwork for long-
term climate neutrality and economic prosperity. 
2  Where do the EU basic materials 
 industries currently stand?
2.1 The role of industry in the economy
Basic materials industries are a cornerstone of  
the EU’s economy and prosperity. In addition to 
making a major contribution to GDP, they directly 
provide over 1.8 million high-quality jobs.7 As the 
starting point of Europe’s industrial value chains, 
they provide basic materials such as steel, chemicals, 
and cement that are essential to every-day life today 
and the climate-neutral infrastructure of the future. 
These industries are also the fundament of several 
millions of indirect manufacturing jobs and the 
foundation of regional industrial clusters that often 
extend beyond the borders of individual member 
states. Naturally, the EU wants to preserve the 
competitiveness and strategic role of these sectors 
while reducing their GHG footprint. This means 
preventing market share loss and carbon leakage  
and maintaining the integrity of European value 
chains to ensure resilience against future crises.  
To do both, the EU needs a technology transition  
that puts its basic materials industries on a steady 
and sustainable path to climate neutrality.  
A transformation based on smart policies and key 
low-carbon technologies will ensure long-term 
economic prosperity, jobs, and income, and it  
will position the EU as a leader in technologies, 
7 The employment numbers for 2017 are based  
on Eurostat 2020.
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manent, as with ArcelorMittal’s Krakow plant  in 
Poland. The risk is that productive capacities will be 
eliminated and that the crisis will accelerate the 
relocation of industrial capacities to other countries. 
And because most other countries have more 
GHG-intensive production methods than Europe, 
this will lead to carbon leakage. 
At the same time, the crisis has also created  
opportunities. For instance, the unprecedented 
amount of public funding for economic recovery such 
as the Next Generation EU Facility and the national 
rescue funds can be used to give public investment 
support for the industrial transformation. Next 
Generation EU provides members states 750 billion € 
to be spent during the 2021–2025 period; 30 per cent 
must be spent on climate-related measures. This 
funding is in addition to the general EU budget (the 
Multi-annual Financial Framework or MFF) and the 
These technologies can make up for the stagnating 
emission reductions of the last decade and initiate  a 
steady path to climate neutrality. 
Currently, the EU’s basic materials industries are 
preoccupied with the immediate economic effects  of 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Due to lockdowns and 
significantly decreased economic activity in virtu-
ally all EU member states, it is clear that the demand  
for basic materials such as steel, cement and some 
chemical products will be significantly lower in 2020 
than in previous years. For instance, the steel 
industry in Europe was particularly affected by 
decreased demand from key sectors such as car 
manufacturing and machinery production and 
cement companies faced a decline in construction 
activity. It is uncertain when and if demand will 
return to pre-crisis levels. The difficult economic 
environment has already started to force some 
companies to make temporary plant closures  per-
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on data from Eurostat, 2017, European Commission, 2020b & EEA, 2021
Note: Data are for CO₂ emissions only. They exclude non-CO₂ emissions from industry, from refining, solid fuel production for energy and 
non-energy uses.
* To achieve climate neutrality, residual emissions will have to be oset by negative emissions technologies, many of which could be   
 developed in the industrial sector such as BECCS. By capturing and using CO₂ from other non-industry sectors, industry can provide   
 net-negative emissions. 
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CO2 emitted by the EU27 industrial sector from 1990 to 2018 
and proposed sector targets for 2030 and 2050 
Figure ES.1
Agora Energiewende | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe
14
Such pledges are not limited to countries. 
In September 2020, ArcelorMittal, the world’s  
largest steel producer, announced its commitment  
to company-wide carbon neutrality by 2050.  
Thyssenkrupp Steel Europe, the EU’s second-largest 
producer after ArcelorMittal, has vowed to make  
itself climate-neutral by mid-century. LafargeHolcim 
and HeidelbergCement, the world’s number one and 
two cement producers by volume, have announced 
targets of carbon neutrality by 2050 backed by the 
science-based target initiative. 
Because industrial assets have long lifetimes –  
40 years on average – the investments in new 
production capacities need to be assessed based  
on their compatibility with respective climate or 
carbon neutrality targets. Therefore, the transition  
to a climate-neutral industry in China and other 
major industrial economies will need to start well 
before 2030. In fact, it would not be surprising to  
see the first signs of this paradigm shift to carbon 
neutrality in China’s 14th Five Year Plan (2021–2025). 
These announcements do not only open the door for 
international cooperation on the transition to climate 
neutral industry; they also herald the creation of  
large future markets for climate-neutral basic 
materials and key low-carbon technologies.  
The EU must not miss the opportunity to position 
itself as a global leader in this unprecedented  
transformation. The key low-carbon technologies  
to achieve climate neutrality are either already 
available or nearly market-ready – with many  
of them being developed in and by EU companies.
2.3  A portfolio of climate-neutral  
technological solutions in the offing
Technological solutions that could be harnessed to 
make energy-intensive basic materials industries 
almost entirely climate-neutral are already known. 
Some solutions, such as the production of green 
hydrogen from renewable energies, are nearly 
market-ready and are set to be scaled up during  
the coming years. Other examples of key low-carbon 
technologies include: the direct reduction of iron  
new EU Innovation Fund.8 The question now is how 
these funds can be best allocated to maximise 
long-term benefits as well as short-term economic 
recovery. As a principle, it is important that the funds 
are used to accelerate the energy transition across all 
sectors. This means that investment support should 
target innovative solutions that are compatible with 
climate neutrality and readily available for deploy-
ment. Moreover, they must offer sustained green-
house gas abatement and other economic benefits. 
From the perspective of the industrial  
transformation, it is important to create an adequate 
regulatory framework for investment in key 
low-carbon technologies. With the effective use of 
Next Generation EU funding, the EU and its member 
states could kickstart a green industrial revolution in 
energy-intensive sectors. Besides compensating for 
the immediate economic impacts of the Covid-19 
crisis, the development and commercialisation of  
key low-carbon technologies during the coming 
decade would put European companies at the fore-
front of growing domestic and international markets 
for clean basic materials, production technologies, 
and climate-neutral consumer products. 
Climate neutrality is emerging as the new  
paradigm not only in the EU but also at the interna-
tional level. China, the largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases and producer of energy-intensive basic 
materials, has announced a plan for carbon neutrality 
by 2060. Japan, the world’s third largest economy,  
and the Republic of Korea, another heavyweight in 
energy-intensive industries, have also announced 
net-zero targets for 2050. Moreover, the designated 
US president Joe Biden has pledged that his 
 administration will make achieving climate 




STUDY | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15
manufacturing processes. Furthermore, the additional 
costs cannot be passed on to customers because of 
fierce international competition. To stimulate  
investment in these breakthrough innovations now, 
the government needs to create concrete policy 
proposals signalling to industry actors that it will 
actively support the transformation.
2.4 European industry at the crossroads 
Because of the long lifetime of productive assets, the 
European basic materials industries stand at the cross-
roads: between now and 2030, roughly half of the EU’s 
primary steel manufacturing and steam cracker 
facilities and an estimated 30 per cent of its cement 
production plants will reach the end of their lifetimes. 
ore with natural gas or hydrogen in the steel industry 
(instead of conventional reduction in coal-fired blast 
furnaces); the chemical recycling of plastics (instead 
of their production from virgin fossil fuels and  
the incineration of the resulting waste plastics);  
and carbon capture and storage (CCS) for cement  
emissions. Figure ES.2 describes 13 key technologies 
that can significantly reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the steel, chemical, and cement industries. 
Other promising key low-carbon technologies such 
as smart crushing for cement recycling, recarbona-
tion, circular economy and material efficiency 
measures also have much potential for reducing 
industrial greenhouse gas emissions.  
At present, the key low-carbon technologies are  
still significantly more expensive than conventional 
Overview of possible key technologies for nearly carbon-neutral basic materials industries Figure ES.2 
Steel Key technology Earliest possible market readiness
Direct reduction with hydrogen and smelting in the electric arc furnace
before 2025  
(initially with natural gas)
Alcaline iron electrolysis 2040 – 2045
HIsarna® process in combination with CO₂ capture and storage 2030 – 2035
CO₂ capture and utilisation of waste gases from integrated blast furnaces 2025 – 2030
Chemicals Key technology Earliest possible market readiness
Heat and steam generation from power-to-heat From 2020
CO₂ capture at combined heat and power plants 2030 – 2035
Green hydrogen from renewable energies 2020 – 2030
Methanol-to-olefin/-aromatics route 2025 – 2030
Chemical recycling 2025 – 2030
Electric steam crackers 2030 – 2040
Cement Key technology Earliest possible market readiness
CO₂ capture with the oxyfuel process (CCS) 2025 – 2030




2020 – 2030  
(depending on product)
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2020
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must be relined every 20 years or so. A relining in 
2025 can extend a plant’s operational lifetime to 2045 
and in theory is still compatible with the EU’s 2050 
climate-neutrality target. But relining conventional 
blast furnaces runs the risk of making them stranded 
assets, representing a lost opportunity for building  
a steady path to climate neutrality. Under the  
more ambitious EU 2030 climate target of at least  
-55 per cent, the European Commission’s Impact 
Assessment projected that the share of coal will 
represent no more than 2 per cent of the EU’s 2030 
power mix. By 2035, conventional blast furnaces 
would be some of the last coal-based, high-emitting 
assets in the entire EU economy. In such an environ-
ment, continued operation until 2045 would be 
questionable. Such an asset would face increasing 
carbon prices, stricter environmental regulations, 
Since the lifetimes of these industrial assets range 
from 20 to 70 years (see figure ES.4), the reinvestment 
and location choices that companies in the steel, 
chemical, and cement sectors make during the next 
decade will create long-lasting path dependencies. 
Against the background of the 2050 climate neutral-
ity target, this means that from now on all major 
investment must be focused on technologies that can 
operate with zero- or net-negative carbon emissions, 
if stranded assets (i.e. the premature shutdown of 
well-functioning plants) and high economic losses 
are to be avoided. 
A special case is the relining of blast furnaces in the 
steel industry. While new and integrated steelworks 
have a technical lifetime of 50 years, blast furnaces –  
which make up the core operation of steel plants – 
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2020
 * Steam crackers are normally maintained and modernised continuously so that they do not have to be replaced all at once. 
  Nevertheless, the graph provides a rough estimate of the reinvestment needs for existing facilities.
 ** Cement data represent numbers for Germany only. We estimate that the reinvestment requirements for the EU27 are in a similar range.
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Figure ES.3
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beyond 2030 for major reinvestments in the basic 
materials industries. Moreover, the use of technologies 
that do not allow zero-carbon or carbon-negative 
operation (or that cannot be easily converted to 
provide such operation) would also represent a lost 
opportunity in preparing for the broader transition to 
climate neutrality. Any rationally acting company 
and financial investor in Europe will foresee the 
long-term risks of stranded assets and will be 
reluctant to make reinvestments in CO2-intensive 
assets in the 2020s. Besides, the promise of future 
conventional plant conversions to use clean hydrogen9 
or carbon capture and storage may prove elusive, 
especially for reinvestments in regions where access  
to clean hydrogen or the transport of CO2 to sites for 
carbon capture are unlikely to be developed. 
9 “Clean hydrogen” includes both “green hydrogen”  
(produced from water electrolysis with renewable  
electricity) and “blue hydrogen” (produced from fossil 
fuels with carbon capture and storage) as well as  
“turquoise hydrogen” (from methane pyrolysis with  
storage of the resulting carbon black). 
pressure from NGOs, and declining demand for its 
high-carbon products both domestically and abroad. 
Moreover, the transition to a climate-neutral indus-
try is about more than replacing individual assets.  
It is also about transforming the logic of existing 
industrial clusters and the related energy infrastruc-
ture, a process that requires much time and planning. 
At the same time, it is important to transform the 
skills and capacities of the industrial workforce,  
the service providers, and the equipment industry. 
However, this reality is not yet widely understood. 
For example, in its Impact Assessment, the European 
Commission largely focused on the deployment of 
conventional best available technologies to achieve 
the required industrial emission reductions under  
the EU ETS for an increased EU 2030 climate target  
of at least -55 per cent. While this may, in theory,  
be a sound strategy to achieve the CO2 abatement 
requirements of 2030, given the long lifetimes of 
industrial assets and the 2050 climate neutrality 
target, this would not be a sustainable strategy 
Technical lifetime of selected primary production plants in the steel, chemical, 
and cement sectors scheduled to receive reinvestment in 2025 Figure ES.4
Agora Energiewende / Wuppertal Institute, 2020 
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and integrated value chains, the loss of jobs, carbon 
leakage, and increased global greenhouse gas emissions.
Based on this analysis, there are two possible path-
ways for the future of individual assets and industrial 
sectors. Depending on the specific situation of each 
installation and member state, different pathways 
may and will occur, of course. However, the objective 
of an adequate regulatory framework under an  
EU Clean Industry Package must be to optimize the 
outcome from an economic, social, and environmental 
perspective. Figure ES.5 illustrates two scenarios: 
 → Scenario 1: New investment outside Europe 
(carbon and investment leakage), without dedicated 
policy intervention
 → Scenario 2: Green investment under the EU Green 
Deal, with a Clean Industry Package investment 
framework
 
Which pathway the basic materials industries will 
take will be determined by the investment choices  
in the 2020s which will have a major impact on 
innovation, climate ambition, the economy, and 
hundred thousands of jobs in the EU’s steel, chemical, 
and cement sectors (see figure ES.5). These choices, in 
turn, will be shaped by regulatory conditions. While it 
is clear that scenario 2 is the most desirable option, the 
situation today of the EU basic materials industries is 
closer to scenario 1. Rational companies will foresee 
the long-term risks for reinvestment  in conventional 
CO2-intensive technologies, but because they do not 
have a credible business case for investment in key 
low-carbon technologies, they may decide not to 
reinvest in Europe at all. The result would be a 
creeping decline of the basic materials industries in 
Europe. What is worse, the stark economic conse-
quences of the Covid-19 pandemic have already put 
immense pressure on basic materials companies in 
virtually all EU member states, making them more 
reluctant to make unsafe bets in Europe.
For all that, scenario 2 is still within reach,  but 
requires an adequate investment framework  for key 
Whether a particular investment or technology  
does or does not provide a solid foundation for the 
steady path to climate neutrality depends of course 
on the sector, process, and site. Ultimately, it will be 
up to industry and financial investors to decide on 
the best course of action. But state aid guidelines and 
policy instruments should be optimized to ensure 
effective investment incentives. The regulatory 
framework should promote technologies that have 
demonstrated their compatibility with climate 
neutrality by 2050, are readily available for deploy-
ment, and offer sustained greenhouse gas abatement 
and other economic benefits. At the same time, there 
must be clear policy guidance at the EU level that both 
limits the risk of high-carbon technology lock-in and 
reduces the possibility of future state aid for “bailing 
out” GHG-intensive investments that are clearly 
incompatible with the climate neutrality goal.10 
In the absence of a sound Clean Industry Package to 
steer a steady path to climate neutrality by 2050, the 
EU basic materials industries remain in limbo. Right 
now, there is no viable business case for investments 
in key low-carbon technologies. At the same time, 
investing in conventional assets that are marginally 
more efficient from the perspective of greenhouse gas 
emissions but create a certain level of carbon lock-in 
and therefore risk being stranded under increasingly 
stringent greenhouse gas abatement targets and 
carbon prices is not a viable option, either. As a result, 
many companies may decide not to invest in the EU 
and move their production to other parts of the world 
with less climate ambition. 
If the uncertainty continues, it is very likely that 
Europe will lose productive capacity, resulting in 
reduced GDP, the destruction of industrial networks 
10 One possible way to do this is via the establishment  
of climate-neutral technology standards under, say,  
the Industrial Emissions Directive, and which would 
apply to major investments with lifetimes beyond 2030  
(see Section 5.2).
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under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).11 
Based on the European Commission’s “MIX” scenario 
in the Impact Assessment, a -55 per cent economy- 
wide climate target for the EU by 2030, we have 
assumed a 65 per cent reduction of the greenhouse 
gas emissions cap for the EU ETS relative to  
that in 2005 (see figure ES.6). 
This would represent an ambitious reduction  
target for current EU ETS sectors and would  
require gradually reducing the emissions cap from 
1,295 MtCO2eq in 2019 to 722 MtCO2eq in 2030. 
Following the Impact Assessment, we assume that 
by 2030 the power sector will have reduced its 
emissions by 71 per cent and that refineries will 
11 The significant greenhouse gas emission reduction 
potential in non-ETS industry sectors was not included 
in this study.
low-carbon technologies. As the next section demon-
strates, meeting the urgent reinvestment requirements 
with a swift deployment of key low-carbon technolo-
gies in the 2020s will allow  EU industry to meet an 
increased EU 2030 climate target of at least -55 per 
cent. In contrast to  reinvestment in conventional best 
available  technologies, this will put the EU’s industry 
on  a steady path to climate neutrality. 
3  Breakthrough technology pathways  
for climate-neutral industry
3.1  How much do EU ETS industries  
need to contribute to higher  
EU climate ambition 2030? 
To meet the increased EU 2030 climate target, 
significant emissions reductions have to be delivered 
by the energy-intensive basic materials industries 
→ Reinvestment requirements: 
 are met with key low-carbon technologies
→ Climate ambition: complies with
 EU 2030 and 2050 climate targets
→ Economy: innovation in key technologies; 
 technology export likely
→ Employment: future-proof green jobs 
 in the medium- and long-term; 
 just transitions within incumbent companies
Today Medium-term (2030) Long-Term (2050)
Today Medium-term (2030) Long-Term (2050)
→ Reinvestment requirements: are not 
 met in Europe because there is no 
 business case for either conventional 
 or low-carbon technologies 
→ Climate ambition: massive carbon leakage 
 as industry production moves to other parts 
 of the world with less climate ambition 
→ Economy: loss of gross value added, 
 increased import dependency
→ Employment: high job losses in 2020s, 
 high uncertainty for 2040-2050
Two scenarios for new investment in the 2020s and their implications for climate change, 
the economy, and employment in the EU  Figure ES.5
Agora Energiewende, 2020
Scenario 1:  New investment outside Europe (carbon and investment leakage), without dedicated policy intervention
Scenario 2: Green investment under the EU Green Deal, with a Clean Industry Package investment framework
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3.2  GHG abatement needs can be met with key 
low-carbon technologies
The strategic deployment of key low-carbon  
technologies in the basic materials industries has 
great potential to significantly reduce CO2 emissions 
by 2030 and prepare the path to climate neutrality. 
Indeed, the required CO2 reductions for industry 
under the EU ETS, for an EU 2030 climate target  
of at least -55 per cent, can be achieved by a  
decisive deployment of key low-carbon technologies 
in the steel, chemical and cement sectors alone. 
Overall, the abatement potential of these three 
sectors amounts to 145 MtCO2 and thus exceeds the 
required emissions reductions of all industry sectors 
under the EU ETS (see figure ES.7). Further significant 
emission reduction potential exists through 
cross-cutting strategies such as biomass use, energy 
have lowered their emissions by 25 per cent  
(both relative to 2015 levels). 
This latter assumption is derived from the required 
emission reductions of the transport sector (approxi-
mately 20 per cent relative to 2015 levels) and from 
the assumed partial adoption of more efficient 
technologies to limit EU ETS compliance costs12.  
For industry sectors covered by the EU ETS, this 
would mean a need to reduce emissions by 27 per 
cent relative to 2015 levels, or a total of 142 MtCO2eq 
relative to 2019 levels. 
12 See pages 178 and 213 of the Impact Assessment.
Agora Energiewende, 2020, based on data from European Commission, EEA, and Eurostat. 
Note: Emissions that relate to industrial processes such a coking plants and power plants for industrial use are accounted for in the industry sector 
and not in the transformation sector. ETS emissions in 2005 are notional base-year emissions with respect to the 2030 target, i.e. they account for 
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Expected emissions reductions from EU ETS industry for the EU's 2030 -55% climate target, 
along with decarbonisation levers to deliver those reductions  
Figure ES.6
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certain key low-carbon technologies if deployed in 
the industrial sector based on their effective or 
projected technological availability by 2030. Green-
house gas abatement potential was calculated based 
on the 2017 asset base and production levels. 
In the scenarios below, we apply only technologies 
that would be available with high confidence for 
large-scale deployment by 2030. Accordingly, we 
ignore a host of supply-side key low-carbon innova-
tions that could nonetheless further contribute to the 
transition to climate neutral industry beyond 2030. 
Furthermore, our estimates do not include demand-
side measures to increase recycling rates and quality 
or to improve material efficiency in final products. 
Hence, our estimates are somewhat conservative in 
what they assume about total mitigation potentials by 
2030 and for the path to climate neutrality by 2050. 
efficiency, and circular economy measures in other 
industry sectors of the EU ETS. 
By contrast, the Impact Assessment greatly relies on  
a switch to conventional best available technologies 
to meet GHG abatement requirements for 2030.  
The problem is that these technologies are not always 
compatible with the climate-neutral objectives for 
2050. We have thus devised a scenario that focusses 
on climate neutrality as defined by the European 
Green Deal to spur innovation and green investment 
and secure future-proof industrial jobs and economic 
resilience. 
For this vision to become reality, industrial 
 c ompanies will require a framework for investing in 
key-low carbon technologies, an infrastructure for 
clean hydrogen and CCS, and a sufficient and stable 
supply of green electricity (see sections 4 and 5).  
Our estimates are not based on a modelled scenario, 
but, rather, illustrate the CO2 abatement potential of 











CO2 abatement potential of selected key low-carbon technologies in the steel, 
chemical, and cement sectors by 2030  Figure ES.7













































Agora Energiewende | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe
22
retrofits. For 2030 we assume that, on average,  
DRI plants will run on 65 per cent green hydrogen and 
35 per cent fossil natural gas, for an emissions reduction 
of -89 per cent relative to the blast furnace route. 
Compared with natural gas DRI, this produces an 
additional CO2 abatement of 17 MtCO2 by 2030  
(see figure ES.7, DRI with additional hydrogen).  
The required amount of green hydrogen (ca. 50 TWh) 
in the steel industry is equivalent to 15 per cent of the 
planned green hydrogen production (333 TWh) within 
the EU by 2030, as described in the EU Hydrogen 
Strategy. To date, steel companies in Sweden (1x), 
Germany (3x), Romania (1x), and Italy (1x) either  
have planned or operate DRI pilot and demonstration 
plants or have announced concrete plans to produce  
DRI steel on a commercial scale before 2030. 
Electric arc furnaces for secondary steel production: 
Another low-carbon transformation strategy in  
the steel sector in line with climate neutrality is  
to increase the share of secondary steel, replacing 
primary steelmaking with coal-based blast furnaces. 
Studies have shown that the share of secondary steel 
production in the EU could rise from ca. 40 per cent 
today to between 60 and 70 per cent by 205013. We 
conservatively assume that 10 per cent of the primary 
steel production capacity that requires reinvestment 
before 2030 will be converted to electric arc furnaces, 
equivalent to an increased production of 4.6 Mt  
of secondary steel in 2030. The specific emission 
reduction per ton of crude steel is 1.68 t of CO2  
(-93 per cent), which translates into emission 
reductions of 8 MtCO2 for 2030. The Swedish steel 
company SSAB has already announced plans to replace 
approx. 1.5 Mt of conventional steelmaking capacity 
in Oxeloesund with electric arc furnaces by 2025. 
3.2.2  Key low-carbon technologies  
in the chemical sector 
In the chemicals industry the key low-carbon technol-
ogies that are already available or can become available 
13 Material Economics. (2019).  
Industrial Transformation 2050.
3.2.1  Key low-carbon technologies  
in steelmaking
In line with the EU Green Deal’s overarching vision of 
innovation, future-proof investments, and increased 
climate ambition, we assume that there will be no 
new investment in conventional coal-based blast 
furnace technology. Instead, the 48 per cent of 
primary steel capacity that requires relining or 
reinvestment before 2030 will be replaced with key 
low-carbon technologies that are already available 
and that are compatible with the climate neutrality 
target. Based on these criteria, we selected the 
production of direct reduced iron as a technology  
for primary steelmaking and the electric arc furnace 
for secondary steelmaking.
Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) for primary steel  
production: DRI with clean hydrogen is the only key 
low-carbon technology close to market readiness  
that can significantly reduce emissions in primary 
steelmaking – by up to -97 per cent relative to the 
blast furnace route. Moreover, the technology is 
sufficiently mature, so that it can be deployed in the 
2020s to meet reinvestment requirements in the EU 
steel industry. It can be initially fuelled by natural gas, 
which will reduce emissions by approx. -66 per cent 
compared with the conventional blast furnace route 
(1.8 t of CO2/ t of crude steel). The residual emissions 
can be largely eliminated by substituting natural gas 
with increasing shares of clean hydrogen. With its 
capability and flexibility, DRI can serve as an anchor 
for increasing investment in the production and 
transport of hydrogen and so contribute to the creation 
of clean hydrogen-based industrial clusters.
We therefore assume that 90 per cent of the conven-
tional blast furnaces that reach the end of their lifetime 
before 2030 will be replaced by DRI reactors. Until 
enough clean hydrogen is available, DRI plants will 
operate with natural gas. For the envisaged production 
of 41 Mt DRI steel with natural gas, the CO2 abatement 
potential is 49 MtCO2 (see figure ES.7, DRI with natural 
gas only). Later, increasing amounts of clean hydrogen 
can replace fossil gas in the DRI plants without major 
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To determine the GHG abatement potential for 2030, 
it is necessary to estimate the specific greenhouse 
gas intensity of the future electricity mix. For this 
purpose, we relied on the modelling results of an 
accelerated coal phase-out scenario that is compatible 
with the -55 per cent target of the Impact Assessment 
(Agora Energiewende 2020, forthcoming). Based on 
this modelling we assume an average grid emission 
factor of 76 g CO2/kWh for the EU27 power mix.  
We also factored in the specific average grid  
emission factors for Germany (113 g CO2/kWh), 
Poland (154 g CO2/kWh), the Czech Republic  
(119 g CO2/kWh), and Spain (46 g CO2/kWh).  
CO2 emissions can be reduced by 25 MtCO2 compared 
with when supplying steam demand from natural 
gas-fired boilers with a greenhouse gas intensity  
of 223 g of CO2/kWhth. The additional electricity 
required for this strategy will amount to 148 TWh, 
with 11 TWh for heat pumps (with a coefficient of 
performance of 3) and 137 TWh for electrode boilers 
with 100 per cent conversion efficiency. 
Considering the flexibility of PtH, this analysis is 
somewhat simplistic but its estimates of the green-
house gas abatement potential are conservative.  
In reality, PtH would operate mainly in times  
when renewable electricity is cheap and abundant.  
The specific greenhouse gas intensity of electricity 
during those times is lower than on average,  
generating an even higher reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions. Moreover, PtH will cease when 
renewable power generation is scarce and the 
greenhouse gas intensity of grid electricity is high, 
because industries will rely on conventional heat 
sources from CHP and natural-gas boilers. Thanks  
to this flexibility, PtH in the chemical industry  
can efficiently use renewable electricity when it is 
abundant and compensate for its lack when wind  
and solar generation is low. To make effective use of 
this solution and its benefits for the power sector and 
the economy, it will be necessary to establish market 
mechanisms that align with cost efficiency and 
minimise GHG emissions. 
on a commercial scale in the 2020s are power-to-heat, 
clean hydrogen, and chemical recycling. These tech-
nologies can contribute to a significant reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions before 2030.
Power-to-heat (PtH): In light of the accelerated  
EU coal phase-out under the increased 2030 climate 
target of at least -55 per cent and the efficiency  
gains over clean hydrogen, PtH technologies are 
particularly attractive from environmental and 
economic perspective. In the -55 per cent scenarios 
of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment, 
coal accounted for a mere 2 per cent of the European 
power mix in 2030. As a result, electricity generation 
will have to be based on a significant expansion  
of renewable sources. Specific greenhouse gas 
emissions per kWh of electricity will be comparably 
low, offering a convenient opportunity to substitute 
the use of fossil fuels for heat production. 
Based on country-specific data for low- and  
medium-temperature heat in the chemicals sector  
(i.e. steam demand of up to 500°C), we assume that a 
total demand of 342 TWhth can be supplied by an 
evolving mix of technologies. Today, heat demand in 
the chemicals sector is supplied by a combination of 
combined heat and power plants (CHP) as well as 
natural gas-fired boilers with a greenhouse gas 
intensity of 223 g of CO2/kWhth. Starting from this 
baseline, we assume a gradual evolution with 
increasing shares of PtH. 
For lower temperatures, we assume the use of 
high-temperature heat pumps, corresponding to 
about 10 per cent of total heat demand. Another 
40 per cent of total heat demand can be supplied  
by electrode boilers. The remaining 50 per cent of 
heat in 2030 will continue to be supplied with natural 
gas-fired boilers and conventional CHP plants, as is 
largely the case today. When assessing the green-
house gas abatement potential for these technologies, 
we make the simplified assumption that both PtH 
technologies operate at 8,000 full-load hours. 
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The commercial proof of concept indicates that the 
share of chemical recycling can be increased after 2030. 
Moreover, the greenhouse gas reduction potential can 
be further increased through technological optimisation 
such as the electrification of steam crackers and the 
gasification of the heavy fuel oil fractions coupled 
 with methanol-to-olefin technology. The emission 
reduction potential of this fully integrated chemical 
recycling route amounts to 93 per cent (4.2 of CO2/t of 
HVC) relative to conventional processes. 
3.2.3  Key low-carbon technologies  
in the cement sector 
An array of measures to reduce emissions along  
the value chain is available for the cement sector. 
Demand-side measures such as efficient design  
can reduce the amount of concrete needed, lowering 
demand for cement. The total amount of cement  
per unit of concrete, in turn, can be lowered by the 
more efficient application and packing of granules. 
Furthermore, the clinker content of cement can  
be reduced by substituting a portion of the clinker  
with other binders, such as so-called limestone 
and calcinated clay substitutes (“LC3” solutions). 
Another promising approach is based on the  
principle of material circularity: concrete from  
demolition is crushed and the aggregates are sepa-
rated and then either re-used as cement substitute 
directly (unhydrated cement) or brought back to 
cement plants for recarbonation and recycled  
to be used to produce new recycled clinker. 
But even with recycling, the industry will still need  
to produce new cement clinker in the future. Roughly 
one-third of the emissions from clinker production 
(energy-related emissions) can be avoided in the future 
through the use of biomass or the electrification of kiln 
heating. The remaining two-thirds of process-related 
emissions, however, will require carbon capture 
technologies if the cement sector is to achieve climate 
neutrality and possibly even negative emissions.
Hydrogen use in the chemical industry: By 2030,  
the EU chemicals industry will be among the largest 
users of clean hydrogen (AFRY 2021, forthcoming). 
The European Commission’s Hydrogen Strategy for  
a Climate-Neutral Europe envisages by 2030 a total 
production of 333 TWh of renewable electricity- 
based green hydrogen within the EU borders, another 
333 TWh of imports from countries such as Ukraine 
and Morocco, and a significant amount of blue 
hydrogen. We estimate that the chemical industry 
will use around 115 TWh of green hydrogen in the 
production of ammonia (91 per cent) and methanol  
(9 per cent). Producing 115 TWh of green hydrogen 
via electrolysis can reduce 31 MtCO2 relative to 
conventional hydrogen production based on the 
steam-methane reforming of natural gas with 
specific emissions of 9t CO2/t of H₂. 
Chemical recycling: The recycling of plastic waste 
with chemical methods is an important opportunity 
for material substitution because chemically recycled 
plastic waste can serve as a substitute for petrole-
um-based naphtha. By replacing this fossil source,  
it closes the carbon cycle and avoids greenhouse gas 
emissions. While the technology has not yet been 
implemented on a commercial scale, we assume that 
this will be possible over the coming years, provided 
that the appropriate policy incentives are introduced. 
We assume that by 2030 five per cent of chemical 
raw materials for the production of two million tons 
of high-value chemicals (HVC) can be supplied by 
feedstock generated from the chemical recycling of 
plastic waste. This will replace an equivalent volume 
of petroleum-based naphtha in plastic production 
and avoid the CO2-intensive incineration of plastic 
wastes. Conventional petroleum-based plastics 
production and the subsequent incineration of  
plastic waste generates about 4.5 t of CO2 per t of HVC. 
Chemical recycling by the pyrolysis of plastic waste 
and the use of pyrolysis oil in conventional steam 
crackers will enable GHG emission reductions  
of 3.1 t of CO2/t of HVC, or 69 per cent relative to  
the status quo. In 2030, this will amount to a  
CO2 abatement potential of 6 MtCO2. 
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or about 10 to 14 per cent of the best available 
conventional technology potential in the Impact 
Assessment. We have not quantified here the 
potentials of circular economy and material  
efficiency measures because our focus was on  
the development of supply-side breakthrough 
technologies. Nevertheless, the potentials in these 
areas point to the many technical levers that EU 
ETS-compliant industry sectors have at their 
disposal for reaching a -65 per cent ETS cap in 2030.  
To realise this breakthrough scenario and embark  
on the path to climate neutrality, the EU’s industry 
will require a comprehensive framework for invest-
ment in key low-carbon technologies that must be 
created as soon as possible.
Industry-wide transformation at scale depends  
on the fulfilment of certain basic conditions along 
the entire industrial value chain. This is one reason 
why the EU doesn’t need a magic bullet policy to 
unlock industrial transformation; it needs a Clean 
Industry Package. In this chapter we explain the 
importance of introducing such a package as soon  
as possible. 
4  A Clean Industry Package to 
 kickstart industrial transformation 
4.1  Insufficient policy action will lead to 
 deindustrialisation and carbon leakage 
Due to the upcoming modernisation requirements 
and the long lead times for the licensing and  
construction of new plants (typically 5 years or 
more), companies in the basic materials industries 
will soon have to decide which reinvestment to  
make in Europe. The current regulatory framework 
does not create a business case for investment in 
conventional CO2-intensive technologies, which are 
likely to lead to stranded assets; nor does it create  
a business case for investments in key low-carbon 
technologies, which are significantly more expensive 
than conventional CO2-intensive technologies.  
Oxyfuel CCS: Oxyfuel CCS can play a key role in 
delivering significant emission reductions. CCS 
infrastructure in coastal areas could be developed  
by 2030 for cement as well as for the production of 
blue hydrogen. We assume that by 2030 eleven cement 
plants that are close to the Atlantic Ocean or navigable 
rivers could be connected to long-term CO2 storage 
sites that are being developed in the Netherlands and 
Norway. This will require an infrastructure to 
transport CO2 via pipelines or ships. Compared with 
the conventional production of cement with specific 
emissions of 0.61 t of CO2/ t of cement, Oxyfuel CCS 
can capture and store 90 per cent of CO2 emissions. 
By 2030, this technology can cut emissions by a total 
of 9 MtCO2. Bio-energy coupled with CCS, known as 
BECCS, can achieve even better results. For instance, 
a 25 per cent share of biomass in the fuel mix coupled 
with Oxyfuel CCS can make a cement plant climate 
neutral; higher shares of biomass have the potential 
to produce negative emissions. 
Further reduction levers: 
Significant reduction potentials also exist in  
EU ETS industry sectors outside steel, chemicals,  
and cement. Moreover, a number of additional 
options such as energy efficiency, biomass use,  
and circular economy measures can be used across  
all the sectors. The Impact Assessment of the  
European Commission has shown that by solely 
relying on an ambitious deployment of best available 
conventional technologies, the industry sectors under 
the EU ETS could reduce emissions by 144 MtCO2  
by 2030. Though our scenario rules out most  
conventional best available technologies in steel, 
chemicals, and cement because of CO2-intensive 
lock-in, cross-cutting technologies such as pumps, 
drive systems, compressors, and ventilators can  
still do much to lower emissions generally.
Power-to-heat applications in EU ETS industries 
other than chemicals, biomass, and further circular 
economy measures also have great potential.  
We conservatively estimate a combined CO2 reduc-
tion potential of at least 15 to 20 MtCO2 by 2030,  
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and storage technologies in the cement sector can be  
deployed well before 2030. Provided an  appropriate 
regulatory framework and necessary infrastructure 
are in place, the introduction of key-low carbon  
technologies for needed reinvestment alone will 
ensure that EU ETS industries can meet the 2030 
reduction target. 
4.2  Carbon pricing and border carbon 
 adjustments alone will not be sufficient
The costs of key low-carbon technologies are 
significantly higher than today’s conventional 
technologies. Even under optimistic assumptions 
(lower bounds for 2030), the estimated CO2-abate-
ment costs of key low-carbon technologies are  
well above he carbon price range of 45-60€/t of CO2 
that the Impact Assessment projects for the EU-ETS 
through 2030, as shown in the European Commis-
sion’s 2030 Climate Target Plan (see ES.8). 
The regulatory limbo demands a breakthrough 
strategy with a more ambitious vision than that 
offered by the European Commission’s Impact 
Assessment, which neglects the large CO2 reduction 
potentials of truly transformative low-carbon 
technologies. While the Impact Assessment shows 
that industries governed by the EU ETS can achieve 
the EU’s 2030 climate target of -55 per cent by 
adopting the best available conventional technolo-
gies, this is not a sustainable strategy for climate 
neutrality in the steel, chemicals, and cement sectors 
given the inevitability of carbon lock-in and 
stranded assets. 
However, the EU is ready to begin investing in  
a portfolio of key low-carbon technologies during  
the next 5 years. Key low-carbon technologies  
such as direct reduced iron in the steel sector;  
green hydrogen, power-to-heat, and chemical 
recycling in the chemicals sector; and carbon capture 
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2020
Note: CO₂ abatement costs depend very much on assumptions about electricity costs. For the calculation of these values, electricity costs of 60 euros per MWh were 
usually assumed. The estimates here are based on Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institut, 2019 and represent the lower bound of CO₂ abatement costs in 2030. 
Higher CO₂ abatement costs are to be expected before 2030 than after 2030 because the technologies must still undergo learning curves for cost reductions. 
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Estimated CO₂ abatement costs of selected key low-carbon technologies 
versus today‘s conventional reference process for 2030
Figure ES.8
STUDY | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
27
If these basic conditions along the value chain 
are not fulfilled, the industrial sector will not  
invest in key low-carbon technologies. A cement 
producer will not invest in the installation of  
carbon capture technologies unless the government 
has committed to CO2 infrastructure (upstream).  
And even if the cement plant can be connected to  
a CCS infrastructure, the company will not invest  
in key low-carbon technologies unless there are 
mechanisms to cover the significant additional costs 
of low-carbon cement at the stage of production 
(midstream) and at the final sale of the product 
(downstream). 
The new European Commission has started to 
propose policies that, if properly implemented,  
will address some – though not all – of the industrial 
sector’s specific needs. These policies include the 
Hydrogen Strategy, the Sustainable Products Policy 
Initiative, and the Circular Economy Strategy. However, 
in some key areas such as industrial infrastructure 
planning for key industrial clusters, implementing 
instruments to support the high operating costs of 
low-carbon technologies, or creating new markets for 
ultra-low carbon products, the European Commission 
has yet to make concrete proposals. Accordingly,  
key gaps still need filling.
Our proposed Clean Industry Package for Europe  
aims at comprehensively and adequately addressing 
the basic conditions along the entire industrial value 
chain. It consists of policies that both preserve the 
business case for existing industry assets until  
they reach the end of their lifetimes and create a 
framework for new investments compatible with  
the 2050 climate-neutrality target.  
Figure ES.9 provides an overview of the 11 policies. 
The next section describes them in more detail. 
In fact, the CO2 abatement costs of these tech-
nologies are likely to be even higher before 2030. 
First-of-a-kind plants still face certain unique 
project risks, because of the learning curve for  
new technologies and the need for proof of concept 
on a commercial scale. This means that even  
assuming the EU can overcome the many obstacles 
to swiftly implementing a well-functioning border 
carbon adjustment mechanism in the 2020s,  
the expected CO2 prices are not sufficient to create 
a viable business case for investment in key 
low-carbon technologies. The combination of  
higher carbon prices and border carbon adjustments 
alone will not create a sufficient investment  
framework for these key technologies. 
4.3  Only a coordinated set of policies across 
the value chain will enable the necessary 
investments
To incentivize investment in key low-carbon tech-
nologies in the basic materials industry certain basic 
conditions along the entire industrial value chain 
need to be met. 
 → Upstream: The industrial sector needs reliable 
access to clean energy (renewable electricity and 
clean hydrogen) and raw materials at competitive 
prices along with the required infrastructure, such 
as power grids, hydrogen production and transport, 
CO2 transport, and CCS. Pan-European solutions 
will be required to develop, plan, and finance the 
necessary infrastructure.
 → Midstream: The industrial sector needs the right 
economic and financial conditions to develop, 
implement, and operate investments in key 
low-carbon technologies. Moreover, policies are 
needed to address the risks of carbon leakage in a 
sustained manner.
 → Downstream: The industrial sector needs demand 
and scalable markets for decarbonised and circular 
products, markets that have internalised the higher 
costs of decarbonised products, and incentives to 
integrate the circular economy and resource 
efficiency along the value chain.
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  Such feed in premiums may also be awarded  
through hydrogen contracts-for-difference and 
possibly be auctioned. They might also be appropriate 
for supporting early stage investments in greening 
existing hydrogen production, i.e., the switching 
from GHG-intensive fuels to clean sources for 
industrial processes that already use hydrogen.  
This will encourage the creation of supply for  
other green hydrogen applications as well.
 → carbon contracts-for-difference (CCfD) for the 
production, transport, and use of clean hydrogen. 
The additional costs of clean hydrogen can also  
be covered by financing its use in industrial 
production applications. This would channel  
clean hydrogen directly to no-regret-use sectors 
such as steel (e.g. direct reduction with hydrogen)  
and chemicals (e.g. low-carbon ammonia).
 → A clean hydrogen quota can be applied on  
sellers of maritime and aviation fuels. In this way, 
the private sector absorbs the cost of blending  
a share of renewable fuels in the end product  
5  The Clean Industry Package:  
11 policy instruments for the  
entire value chain  
5.1 Upstream policies
 
1)  Support instruments to create  
a business case for clean hydrogen 
To mobilize the required investment in clean 
 hydrogen production and infrastructure, a reliable 
business case for the production and transport of 
clean hydrogen must first be established. There are 
three main options for instruments to establish the 
required incentives: 
 → A feed-in premium for hydrogen can close  
the price gap between the production of clean 
hydrogen and conventional hydrogen (produced 
from the steam reforming of natural gas). 
Agora Energiewende, 2020
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5.2 Midstream policies
4)  An EU policy framework  
for carbon contracts-for-difference (CCfDs) 
By covering the price difference between conventional 
and key low-carbon technologies, CCfDs can provide a 
credible business case for investments that are compat-
ible with climate neutrality. Payments to these projects 
would be calculated based on the difference between 
the EU ETS carbon price and a pre-agreed strike price 
(that is, the breakeven carbon price to make this invest-
ment viable). Accordingly, CCfDs are critical for covering 
the cost gap that arises from the expected CO2 abatement 
costs of key low-carbon technologies, which in the 
2020s will be higher than the projected EU ETS carbon 
prices. In the medium term, CCfDs could also comple-
ment a border carbon adjustment regime to guarantee 
investors a sufficiently high CO2 price above the 
carbon price defined by the border carbon adjustment.  
5)  De-risking instruments for capital expendi-
ture in first-of-a-kind, large-scale investments 
CCfDs can be supplemented by financing instruments 
that address the capital investment risk that results 
from large-scale deployment of new, unproven,  
and often highly capital-intensive technologies. 
Funds such as the EU Innovation Fund and InvestEU 
already exist for this purpose. They are relatively 
small, however. The EU Innovation Fund must support 
all sectors of the entire energy system and the size of 
InvestEU was dramatically lowered during the EU’s 
recent recovery and budget negotiations.  
To boost these instruments, the EU must devise 
additional funding mechanisms. Potential options  
are an EU-wide climate surcharge on products with 
large amounts of basic materials that are sold in the 
EU market or the extraction of new revenues from 
ETS auctions.  
(e.g. airplane tickets). This option may not be appro-
priate for general industry because the higher cost 
of hydrogen blending would make it difficult to 
compete with foreign competitors that do not use 
renewable hydrogen. 
 
2)  A robust sustainability framework  
for clean hydrogen production and use  
To develop clean hydrogen that does not contribute  
to increasing emissions along the industrial value 
chain (scope 3 emissions), the EU will need to develop 
rules that classify hydrogen as “clean” and thus 
eligible for state aid. These rules could be part of  
a revised Renewable Energy Directive. Specifically, 
rules are needed to govern guarantees of origin for 
clean hydrogen and the “additionality” of renewable 
or decarbonised energy for clean hydrogen produc-
tion; to ensure that clean hydrogen is allocated to  
the most appropriate “no-regret” options (e.g. steel, 
chemicals, maritime, and aviation); and to govern the 
safety of hydrogen production, transport, and use. 
 
3)  Planning, financing, and regulatory  
steps to enable clean energy and  
a CO2 storage infrastructure
Current infrastructure planning varies greatly from 
member state to member state. For the development 
of a pan-European hydrogen, electricity, and CCS 
infrastructure, future National Energy and Climate 
Plans (NECP) must explicitly include the planning and 
financing of strategic industrial infrastructure. The 
plans could then serve as a reference point for other 
planning and EU financing instruments such as the 
Trans-European Networks for Energy regulation 
(“TEN-E”), Regional Just Transition Plans, Projects of 
Common Interests, and state-aid approval requests.
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energy-intensive basic materials industries.  
The second is the possibility of state-aid payments  
to compensate for higher electricity prices. But these 
solutions need to be revised in light of projected 
increases in carbon prices and decreases in free 
allowances. In the short run, free allocation must 
be continued at the full technology benchmark but 
adjusted based on true output (“output-based  
allocation”). Moreover, state-aid guidelines should  
be reformed to enable maximum aid levels for 
electro-intensive industries once the carbon price 
rises above 30€/t of CO2 (full power-price compen-
sation). Border carbon adjustments or carbon product 
requirements must be prepared carefully and gradually 
implemented for relevant sectors (see figure ES.10). 
Depending on the specific design of certain policies 
further reforms may be needed. 
5.3 Downstream policies 
 
8)  A climate surcharge on  
material-intensive final products
Some of the policies at the upstream and midstream 
levels such as carbon contracts-for-difference require 
6)  Set standards for production processes 
compatible with climate neutrality
The EU needs standards that dissuade new invest-
ment in industrial plants and technologies that are 
incompatible with achieving climate neutrality by 
2050. Appropriate standards can prevent the intro-
duction of more CO2-intensive conventional technol-
ogies and “half-way solutions” that reduce emissions 
in the short run but lock in technologies with relatively 
high emissions. They can also clarify eligibility for 
state aid, identify specific criteria for the use of 
policy instruments such as CCfDs, and facilitate the 
creation of lead markets for climate-neutral materials 
(e.g. through green public procurement).  
7)  A reformed anti-carbon leakage system, 
robust to higher carbon prices 
Under existing policies, the EU ETS Directive  
provides two main measures for tackling the risk of 
“carbon leakage,” i.e. when production, jobs, and emis-
sions move to countries with less climate ambition. 
The first is the free allocation of emissions allowances 
to sectors at risk of carbon leakage, which include 
Agora Energiewende, 2020
State aid for indirect CO₂ costs 
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a refinancing option to cover additional funds. One 
option would be a climate surcharge on certain final 
products containing large amounts of basic materials 
(cars, plastic bottles, houses). The climate surcharge 
would be applied to the final product (e.g. car) regard-
less of its origin (EU, non-EU) or the production 
process (conventional steel, low-carbon steel) and 
would thus be compatible with WTO rules. The 
additional cost increases in the final product are  
small (e.g. <1–2 per cent of final product price).    
9)  Requirements to improve recycled  
material quality and material efficiency  
in manufacturing and construction
One of the biggest barriers to boosting the circular 
economy for basic materials such as steel, non- 
ferrous metals, and plastics is the degraded quality  
of secondary scrap and plastic. This limits the share 
of recycled materials that can be used to replace new 
virgin materials and a share of energy-intensive 
primary production processes. One option to incen-
tivise the improvement of material quality would be 
the introduction of stronger incentives for material 
conservation and minimum recycled content 
requirements. A second option would be an EU ban, 
tax and label products with low recyclability or poor 
material efficiency. This would ensure that  
products such as vehicles, machines, and buildings 
are designed with longevity and ease of disassembly 
in mind. A third option would be the adoption of 
minimum requirements for end-of-life dismantling, 
sorting, and tracing; and of tighter regulations for 
buildings and construction waste and for vehicle 
shredding.  
10)  Climate-neutral product labelling  
and eco-design requirements for  
embedded carbon in final products
Product labelling and eco-design requirements  
are a prerequisite for the creation of lead markets  
for low-carbon basic materials. One option is to 
create an EU-wide low-CO2 product label for basic 
materials to allow end customers to distinguish 
between green and conventional products. For  
example, a “climate-neutrality compatibility label”  
for low-carbon steel could be used by car manufac-
turers and other leading private-sector purchas-
ers who wish to advertise their green credentials. 
Another option are specific design requirements  
for final products via minimum requirements for 
embedded carbon in final products. This can help 
tackle the overestimation of material requirements  
in construction and inefficient manufacturing  
processes.
11)  Green public procurement  
requirements for basic materials 
 
EU public procurement legislation from 2014 already 
permits – but does not require – environmental 
criteria to be used in public procurement for the 
domestic market. One potential reform option is to set 
declining maximum CO2 limits on specific materials 
that are eligible for use in public projects. A second 
option is to introduce mandatory life-cycle CO2 
performance criteria for assessing projects that are 
based on harmonised European methodology. 
Figure ES.11 summarises the eleven policy recom-
mendations and maps them onto existing EU-level 
legislative instruments. The figure shows that, apart 
from legislation for carbon contracts-for-difference 
and border carbon adjustment legislation, nearly all 
the proposed instruments can be attained with 
reforms to existing legislative tools. 
The continuation of existing policies is not an option 
if EU industry is to be part of an EU Green Deal that 
spurs innovation and green investment while 
securing future-proof industrial jobs in a resilient 
economy. Moreover, border carbon adjustments alone 
will not suffice, because CO2 prices for EU ETS are not 
expected to be high enough to make key low-carbon 
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formation under the EU Green Deal. In tandem  
with other elements of the Clean Industry Package, 
they will help to spur necessary investment during 
the coming investment cycle and beyond.
technologies economically viable. With a good deal  
of industrial capacity slated for replacement or 
refurbishment in the 2020s, European industry needs 
policymakers to make a strong commitment to 
preserving industrial production in Europe,  
despite higher climate ambition for 2030. This entails 
maintaining a business case for existing conventional 
assets until they reach the end of their lifetimes  
(see instrument 7 on carbon leakage) as well as the 
introduction of a framework for investment in key 
low-carbon technologies. The protection of existing 
assets will ensure that companies have the financial 
vitality to handle transformational challenges, while 
the investment framework will need to create 
instruments (such as carbon contracts-for-difference) 
as well as new product standards and markets that 
can support the higher operating costs of key 
low-carbon technologies. Together, these measures 
will be crucial for kick-starting industrial trans-
Agora Energiewende, 2020
Note: CDW stands for Construction and Demolition Waste period.
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Policies and legislative instruments to implement the Clean Industry Package Figure ES.11
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Part A: Introduction
1  The role of the basic materials 
 industries in Europe
The basic materials industries1 play an important role 
in Europe’s economy. Basic materials are the founda-
tion of essential value chains in manufacturing and 
construction. In 2017, the basic materials industries 
generated approximately 176 billion euros in value 
added (Eurostat, n.d.), which is about 10 per cent of 
total value added by the EU manufacturing industry. 
They directly employ approximately 1.8 million 
people across the EU27 (Eurostat, n.d.). However, as 
the starting point for multiple integrated supply 
chains they are also the basis for several millions of 
1 Table A.1 provides an overview of Europe’s manufactur-
ing industries. This study focuses only on the key sectors 
of the basic materials industries: steel, chemical and 
cement sectors. Their process- and energy-related  
emissions account for the largest share of greenhouse 
gases released by the basic materials industries. Our 
recommendations in this report for transforming these 
sectors apply to the others as well. 
indirect jobs across diverse value chains. This data is 
summarised by sector in Table A.1.
The relevance of the basic materials industries to 
Europe’s economy can also be expressed in other 
dimensions. Basic materials are the foundation of 
regional industrial clusters that provide employment 
in non-metropolitan regions of many EU member 
states and therefore support local manufacturing 
economies. In many of these places, the workforce 
consists mainly of well-trained specialists and 
engineers with high-incomes that support the local 
economy. 
Basic materials will also be required in a climate- 
neutral future. While strategies such as a circular 
economy, increased resource efficiency, and new 
biobased materials are an important part of the 
solution, basic materials such as steel, aluminium, 
chemicals, and cement will remain essential to 
manufacturing and construction for the foreseeable 
future. In order to strengthen resilience against future 
Direct employees and Gross Value Added (GVA) in the basic materials industries in the EU27 in 2017 Table A.1
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021, based on Eurostat, 2017 * Data for EU28
Sector Employees GVA in billions of euros
Iron and steel (NACE C24.1) 300,000 23.7
Non-ferrous metals and casting of metals  
(NACE C24.4 and C24.5)
402,000 27.9
Basic chemicals (NACE C20.1) 519,000 80.4
Cement (NACE C23.5.1) 47,000 5.1
Lime and plaster (NACE C23.5.2)* 16,200 1.6
Glass and ceramic (NACE C23.1 and C23.3.1) 333,000 17.8
Pulp and paper (NACE C17.1)* 166,000 19.3
Basic materials industries specified in this study 1,783,000 175.7
Industry total (manufacturing industry) (NACE C) 26,900,000 1,830
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generate the highest volumes of CO₂ emissions, with 
188, 129, and 112 MtCO₂ respectively. Together these 
sectors are responsible for 60 per cent of Europe’s 
industrial emissions. 
The GHG emissions of the basic materials industries’ 
sectors listed in Table A.2 make up most of the EU’s 
industrial emissions – 545 MtCO₂ , or 76 per cent. In 
addition to steel, basic chemicals, and cement pro-
duction this includes non-ferrous metals and found-
ries, other non-metallic minerals such as lime, 
gypsum, glass, and ceramics production as well as the 
production of pulp and paper.
crises, it is important that the EU retains its capacity 
to produce basic materials for preserving integrated 
value chains and sovereignty. 
2  The climate footprint of the 
 manu facturing sector and the  
basic  materials industries
In 2017, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the EU27 
industry totalled 719 million tonnes of CO₂ (MtCO₂). 
481 MtCO₂ (or 67 per cent) were energy-related 
emissions, mostly from the production of electricity 
and heat in industrial power plants and boilers. 
Process-related emissions, which are generated by 
industrial activities such as iron-ore reduction and 
the calcination of limestone for the production of 
cement clinker, amounted to 238 MtCO₂ (or 33 per 
cent). The steel, basic chemicals, and cement sectors 
Greenhouse gas emissions of the EU27 industrial sector in 2017 in MtCO2eq  Figure A.1
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021, based on EEA GHG inventory data, 2021, and E-PRTR database, n.d.
* This includes the energy-related and process-related emissions of the iron and steel industry as specified in the EEA database. In addition to 
that, based on our own estimates another 35 MtCO2eq for the production of coking coal and the power plants of the steel industry in the EU27 
were added. Depending on who operates the coking plant and the power plant, these emissions are accounted under the categories ‘Public 
Electricity and Heat production’ and ‘Manufacture of Solid Fuels and Other Energy Industries’. As they are directly linked to the iron and steel 
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neutrality objective is in the process of being formal-
ised by the European Climate Law, proposed by the 
European Commission in March 2020 (European 
Commission, 2020), but it has not yet been jointly 
adopted by the Parliament and Council at the time of 
publication. In September 2020, the Commission 
presented the 2030 Climate Target Plan, which aims 
to increase the EU’s economy-wide CO₂ reduction 
targets from 40 per cent to at least 55 per cent by 
2030 (all relative to 1990 levels). This 55 per cent 
reduction target was subsequently adopted by the 
European Council in December 2020. It is now up to 
the European Commission to bring forth legislative 
proposals to implement this 55 per cent reduction and 
the 2030 Climate Target Plan in 2021.  
3  European and international 
 commitments to reduce emissions 
In 2015, the EU became a signatory of the Paris 
Climate Agreement, committing itself to limit global 
warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Achieving 
the objectives of the Paris Agreement requires 
industrial nations to achieve economy-wide climate 
neutrality by 2050 (Robiou du Pont et al., 2016). 
At the EU level, the goal of domestic climate neutral-
ity by 2050 was formally endorsed by 26 out of 
27 member states in the European Council in Decem-
ber 2019 (European Council, 2019). This climate 
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021, based on GHG emission data according to national GHG inventory data published by EEA GHG 
Inventory data, 2021, and own estimations; final energy consumption according to Eurostat energy balances, n.d.a, for cement according to 
for EU28 and the UK according to GCC Association, n.d.
* This includes the energy-related and process-related emissions of the iron and steel industry as specified in the EEA database. In addition 
to that, based on our own estimates another 35 MtCO2eq for the production of coking coal and the power plants of the steel industry in the 
EU27 were added. Depending on who operates the coking plant and the power plant, these emissions are accounted under the categories 
‘Public Electricity and Heat production’ and ‘Manufacture of Solid Fuels and Other Energy Industries’. As they are directly linked to the iron 
and steel industry, we included them here.
** Direct emissions of the cement industry were extracted from the E-PRTR database and the EEA database. Final energy consumption of 
the cement sector was calculated based on the GCC Association website.  
GHG emissions and final energy consumption  




Of which: process-related 
in MtCO2eq/yr
Final energy consumption 
in PJ/yr
EU27 UK EU27 UK EU27 UK
Iron & steel* 188 13 63 3 1,131 35
Non-ferrous  
metals & foundries
17 1 9 0 406 27
Chemicals 129 11 62 5 2,066 140
Cement** 112 6 72 4 501 31
Other non-metallic  
minerals
75 3 32 2 831 69
Pulp, paper & print 23 1 - - 1,362 76
Sectors of the basic materials 
industries listed here
544 35 238 14 6,297  378
Industry total  
(manufacturing industry)
719 68 238 14 9,977 952
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vision for a climate neutral economy in 2050 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2018). It showed that, on average, 
energy-related emissions from industry would need 
to be reduced by 2050 on the order of 95 per cent. 
Process emissions, depending on the specific sector, 
would need to be reduced by 60 to 100 per cent to be 
consistent with economy-wide climate neutrality. 
Since investments in energy- intensive industrial 
assets tend to have operating lives of between 20 to 
70 years, this requires that all investments to substi-
tute existing or build new production capacities must 
use technologies that are consistent with the 2050 
climate neutrality objective if stranded assets are to 
be avoided. 
Achieving the EU’s increased 2030 climate ambition 
will similarly require a redoubling of decarbonisation 
efforts. According to the Impact Assessment of the 
European Commission, to achieve an economy-wide 
55 per cent mitigation by 2030, industrial emissions 
4  Industry’s role in achieving the EU’s 
new climate objectives 
Meeting the EU’s new objective of domestic climate 
neutrality by 2050 and a 55 per cent reduction in 
GHG emissions by 2030 will require swift and 
substantial additional efforts to decarbonise indus-
trial processes and energy use. Studies show that 
climate neutrality for industry at the global level 
requires that, by 2060, virtually all energy-intensive 
industrial production will need to be based on either 
zero- or ultra-low-emissions technologies. More over, 
residual emissions that cannot be abated must be 
compensated by technologies that offer equivalent 
net-negative emissions (Bataille et al., 2018). 
At the EU level, climate neutrality by 2050 requires 
the basic materials industries to reduce its GHG 
emissions to zero within three decades. This was 
illustrated starkly in the EU’s strategic long-term 
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on data from Eurostat, 2017, European Commission, 2020b & EEA, 2021
Note: Data are for CO₂ emissions only. They exclude non-CO₂ emissions from industry, from refining, solid fuel production for energy and 
non-energy uses.
* To achieve climate neutrality, residual emissions will have to be oset by negative emissions technologies, many of which could be   
 developed in the industrial sector such as BECCS. By capturing and using CO₂ from other non-industry sectors, industry can provide   
 net-negative emissions. 
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emissions generated by blast furnaces are unavoida-
ble with this production route. In cement manufac-
turing, most CO₂ emissions are the result of the 
calcination process and cannot be avoided by chang-
ing the energy source. Moreover, chemical products 
such as plastics are mostly made from fossil hydro-
carbons today, which are released as CO₂ to the 
atmosphere when plastic waste is burned at the end 
of its lifecycle. Besides, because of the long lifetime of 
productive assets, future investment in conventional 
best available technology in Europe is at a high risk of 
becoming stranded in the long run. While energy 
efficiency will continue to be an important part of the 
strategy mix, addressing the stagnating levels of both 
energy- related and process-related emissions in the 
EU industrial sector will require other, transformative 
strategies (see Figure A.3).
For achieving climate neutrality in the basic materi-
als industries, a comprehensive use of innovative 
will have to be reduced by 22 to 25 per cent relative to 
2015 levels (European Commission, 2020b). Since 
industrial emissions have been stagnant since the 
economic crisis of 2009, significant additional efforts 
will need to be made during the next decade (see 
Figure A.2). 
A net-zero GHG emission level in many areas cannot 
be achieved with current technologies and produc-
tion processes. For one, the potential for further 
improvements in energy efficiency in the steel, 
chemical and cement sectors is limited because most 
conventional technologies and  processes have 
already reached a mature state of development. 
For another, some emissions from existing produc-
tion processes cannot be avoided by changing to a 
climate-neutral source of energy. Consider current 
steel production with blast furnaces, which requires 
coal-based coke as the reducing agent. The process 
Historical EU27 CO₂ emissions from all industrial sources broken down by type Figure A.3
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industries. A detailed analysis of these key 
 low- carbon technologies can be found in Part E.
Part C of the study discusses the necessary regulatory 
framework for the industrial transformation to 
climate neutrality. To this end, we identify a general 
toolbox of ten policy instruments and analyse them 
based on economic, legal, and political criteria. These 
instruments represent basic tools to forward the 
industrial decarbonisation and may – depending on 
the context – also be adapted and applied in other 
industrial economies. 
In Part D, we apply many of the instruments that 
were presented in Part C to the specific context of the 
European policy debate. We develop a Clean Industry 
Package that integrates eleven policy instruments 
across the entire value chain for swift and coordi-
nated implementation and describe all policy instru-
ments and their role in greater detail. 
Part E contains the study’s analytical section. It 
presents and analyses the key technologies for 
climate neutrality in the steel, chemical and cement 
sectors. The section’s fact sheets present projected 
production costs, respective CO₂ abatement costs, and 
the state of technological development. The fact 
sheets were created in consultation with scientists 
and businesses, some of whom are already operating 
low-carbon pilot and demonstration projects.
A publication with further information and details on 
the key low-carbon technologies in Part E, along with 
a description of ongoing pilot projects, is available as 
a separate online publication. The publication, carried 
out by the Wuppertal Institute, is titled “Detailed 
Presentation of Key Technologies in the Steel, 
 Chemical and Cement Sectors”.
“breakthrough” technologies and production 
 processes – referred to in this study simply as “key 
low-carbon technologies” – is indispensable. The 
challenge for Europe is to begin deploying these 
technologies during the 2020s. As explained in Part D 
of this study, this urgency has important implications 
for designing appropriate policy strategies. 
5 Context of the study
This study is largely based on “Climate-Neutral 
Industry: Key Technologies and Policy Options for 
Steel, Chemical and Cement.” Published in German in 
2019 in close cooperation with the Wuppertal 
Institute and supported by Navigant (Guidehouse), 
Becker Büttner Held (BBH), and the Institute for 
Climate Protection, Energy and Mobility (IKEM), it 
focused on the decarbonisation of the German 
industry. The aim of this publication is to draw on the 
insights of that study to discuss the decarbonisation 
of the European industry. General sections of the 
German study have been translated and slightly 
adapted for the European context. Other sections 
have been completely revised to reflect recent and 
specific developments of the debate on the European 
Green Deal, as well as the consequences of the 
Covid-19 crisis and the policies for economic recov-
ery. Based on a review of the global situation, we 
developed a set of new policy ideas and instruments. 
We aggregated these in our Clean Industry Package 
for Europe (see Part D).
6 Parts of the study
Part B of the study highlights the challenges and 
opportunities of the industrial transformation to 
climate neutrality. It also presents the fundamental 
CO₂ reduction strategies for each sector, an analysis 
of reinvestment cycles in the EU steel, chemical and 
cement industries and a selection of key technologies 
for climate-neutral production in the basic materials 
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Part B:  Climate-neutral industry – opportunities, 
policy needs, and strategies 
2 European industry at the crossroads 
Large parts of Europe’s basic materials industries are 
at the crossroads. By 2030 roughly 48 per cent of 
primary steel capacity, 53 per cent of steam cracker 
capacity, and an estimated 30 per cent of cement 
production capacity will reach end of their operating 
lifetimes (see Figure B.1). 
Due to the long operational lifetimes of industrial 
assets, the decisions on reinvesting these production 
capacities will have a massive impact on hundreds of 
thousands of jobs, the EU’s long-term economic 
resilience and import dependency, as well as its 
pathway to climate neutrality. 
Given the EU’s target of achieving climate neutrality 
by 2050 and a 55 per cent reduction of GHG emis-
sions by 2030 it is evident that all major industrial 
investments going forward must use technologies 
that can operate with zero- or net-negative carbon 
emissions if stranded assets (i.e. the premature 
shutdown of well-functioning plants) and high 
economic losses are to be avoided. It goes without 
saying that this applies not only to the EU, but to all 
economies that envision net-zero emission targets by 
mid-century. 
However, because a range of conditions need to be 
put in place along the industrial value chain to make 
them viable, an adequate regulatory framework is 
needed to foster investments with key low-carbon 
and circular economy technologies. To ensure that 
this framework is effective and efficient the respec-
tive policies should be included in a single Clean 
Industry Package (see Part D). 
In absence of such a regulatory framework, the EU 
basic materials industries will remain in limbo: 
1  Climate neutrality as the  
new  paradigm 
2020 was the year when climate neutrality emerged 
as the new paradigm. Japan, South Korea, South 
Africa, and the EU announced net-zero greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission goals by 2050. The US presi-
dent-elect Joe Biden announced that the US will 
re-join the Paris Climate Agreement and become 
climate-neutral by 2050, and China, the world’s 
largest emitter of GHG emissions, pledged carbon 
neutrality by 2060. This means that countries that 
represent around 79 per cent of the world’s GDP have 
already pledged net-zero targets.
The long-term target of climate neutrality has direct 
implications for mid-term climate targets and 
short-term industrial policies. In December 2020, the 
EU submitted an updated Nationally Determined 
Contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change reflecting the higher 
EU 2030 climate target of at least 55 per cent emis-
sion reduction relative to the previous 2030 reduc-
tion target of 40 per cent emission reduction against 
a 1990 baseline. In the run-up to the COP26 in 
Glasgow in December 2021, other countries are likely 
to follow suit and increase their respective 2030 
climate targets to prepare for climate neutrality by 
mid-century. 
This unprecedented paradigm shift will have major 
consequences for the basic materials industries. But 
what is the status quo and what are the opportunities 
associated with this paradigm shift? And what are 
the policy needs and strategies to achieve a cli-
mate-neutral industry in Europe? Some of these 
points will be discussed in the following section. 
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 * Steam crackers are normally maintained and modernised continuously so that they do not have to be replaced all at once. 
  Nevertheless, the graph provides a rough estimate of the reinvestment needs for existing facilities.
 ** Cement data represent numbers for Germany only. We estimate that the reinvestment requirements for the EU27 are in a similar range.
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Reinvestment needs by 2030 and direct employment in cement, 
steel and basic chemicals in the EU
Figure B.1
Technical lifetime of selected primary production plants in the steel, chemical, 
and cement sectors scheduled to receive reinvestment in 2025 Figure B.2
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2020 
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3  Opportunities and benefits of a 
 climate-neutral European industry 
An ambitious decarbonisation strategy for basic 
materials industries would make an important 
contribution to achieving Europe’s climate targets 
and provide an opportunity to lead the global trans-
formation of the industrial sector during the coming, 
decisive decade. 
3.1  Promoting a just transition and  
securing future-proof jobs
As described above, European industry is in a 
somewhat difficult situation of investment uncer-
tainty. As a result, companies may exhaust existing 
assets until they are forced to shut down, endanger-
ing European production, jobs, and the integrity of 
supply chains. This risk is amplified by the adverse 
economic context in which several basic materials 
industries find themselves. For example, the eco-
currently, there’s no viable business case for invest-
ment in key low-carbon technologies. At the same 
time, investing in conventional technologies with a 
level of GHG emissions that cannot be abated risks 
creating stranded assets under increasingly stringent 
GHG abatement targets and carbon prices. This 
difficult investment environment is aggravated by 
the negative economic effects of the corona pan-
demic. 
An EU regulatory framework that fosters investments 
in key low-carbon technologies before 2030 would 
provide a major opportunity to maintain current 
production levels and safeguard several hundred 
thousand jobs while meeting the requirements of the 
more ambitious 2030 climate target. Moreover, such 
an EU regulatory framework would allow EU industry 
to position itself in a growing market for key 
low-carbon technologies and carbon-neutral prod-
ucts in other regions of the world. 
→ Reinvestment requirements: 
 are met with key low-carbon technologies
→ Climate ambition: complies with
 EU 2030 and 2050 climate targets
→ Economy: innovation in key technologies; 
 technology export likely
→ Employment: future-proof green jobs 
 in the medium- and long-term; 
 just transitions within incumbent companies
Today Medium-term (2030) Long-Term (2050)
Today Medium-term (2030) Long-Term (2050)
→ Reinvestment requirements: are not 
 met in Europe because there is no 
 business case for either conventional 
 or low-carbon technologies 
→ Climate ambition: massive carbon leakage 
 as industry production moves to other parts 
 of the world with less climate ambition 
→ Economy: loss of gross value added, 
 increased import dependency
→ Employment: high job losses in 2020s, 
 high uncertainty for 2040-2050
Two scenarios for new investment in the 2020s and their implications for climate change, 
the economy, and employment in the EU  Figure B.3
Agora Energiewende, 2020
Scenario 1:  New investment outside Europe (carbon and investment leakage), without dedicated policy intervention
Scenario 2: Green investment under the EU Green Deal, with a Clean Industry Package investment framework
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production sites, making a just transition much 
easier.
3.2 Economic resilience and resource efficiency
The transition to a climate-neutral industry offers an 
opportunity for Europe to benefit from a more 
resource-efficient and circular economy. One way in 
which this can happen is by reducing the level of 
waste and pollution from the end-of-life disposal of 
industrial products. For example, Europe currently 
recycles only around 30 per cent of its annual 
consumption of plastics, with large amounts being 
either incinerated, landfilled, or released to the 
environment and waterways in the form of plastic 
litter and micro-plastic pollution (European Parlia-
ment, 2018). Similarly, construction waste, much of 
which consists of used concrete – containing CO₂- 
intensive cement – as well as steel and other energy -
intensive basic materials accounted for approxi-
mately 35 per cent of all European waste production 
by volume in 2016 (Eurostat, 2018). While the EU has 
set a target for a minimum of 70 per cent of construc-
tion waste to be recovered for recycling or incinera-
tion by 2020, a large share of this waste currently is 
either dumped or finds its way into landfill. More-
over, recycled construction waste is currently used for 
low value usages such as concrete aggregate, backfill, 
road base, or riprap and therefore does not facilitate a 
reduction of the various resources needed to produce 
new primary construction materials (Deloitte, 2017). 
nomic shock that resulted from the Covid-19 crisis, 
the threat of international dumping from excessive 
production capacities, and stagnant demand in 
mature European markets all add to these risks. 
But an adequate regulatory framework to decarbonise 
the basic materials industries offers an opportunity 
to respond to these challenges by providing much of 
the missing regulatory certainty. By providing a 
robust enabling environment for investment in 
low-carbon alternatives, the EU has a chance to foster 
economic activity, innovation, and productivity and 
by extension to secure jobs and production in the EU. 
Furthermore, by reinforcing its anti-carbon leakage 
framework, the EU can limit the incentives for firms 
to offshore production of certain basic materials due 
to climate policy differences, further reinforcing the 
investment case in Europe.
With regards to the importance of a just transition, 
the starting point for industries is different from 
other sectors. The transformation of the basic 
materials industry is likely to happen within incum-
bent companies. The development and implementa-
tion of key low-carbon technologies are capital- 
intensive and have synergetic effects with existing 
industrial clusters, a fact that provides a potential 
advantage to existing companies. With the right 
regulatory framework in place, both production and 
jobs can be maintained on many of the existing 
Agora Energiewende, 2021
Overview of the main opportunities of transforming the basic materials industries Table B.1
Promoting a just transition and securing future-proof jobs
Economic resilience and resource efficiency 
Developing critical infrastructure is the key to industrial transformation and competitiveness
Technological leadership is the key to future markets  
Setting examples and standards can catalyse global climate ambition 
Rising demand for imported green energy can transform energy-exporting countries 
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availability of reliable infrastructure for the transport 
and storage of CO₂. 
Hence, the development and planning of critical 
infrastructure for a climate-neutral basic materials 
industry is urgently needed to transform Europe’s 
strategic industrial sites (Lechtenböhmer et al., 2019).
3.4  Technological leadership is the  
key to future markets
An early adoption of key low-carbon technologies 
necessary for climate neutrality would allow the 
European industry to define standards and position 
itself as a global market leader. With net-zero pledges 
as the new paradigm in nearly all major economies, it 
is likely that there will be increasing demand and 
competition for their development and use. The 
European basic materials and equipment industries 
must not miss that opportunity to get a head start by 
achieving early cost reductions and competitive 
advantages.
An early adoption of low-carbon technologies would 
offer particularly important opportunities for the 
machine and equipment industry. As many of the key 
low-carbon technologies are currently being de veloped 
in Europe, their adoption and upscaling before 2030 
would drastically increase the likelihood that the 
European industry will supply these technologies to 
expanding global markets, providing domestic value 
creation and many quality jobs. 
3.5  Setting examples and standards can 
 catalyse global climate ambition 
The development of policies that drive the large-scale 
deployment of key technologies in Europe can 
establish technology and policy pathways for the rest 
of the world to follow. With climate neutrality 
emerging as the new paradigm, many countries will 
be looking for best practice examples regarding the 
technical application and integration of low-carbon 
technologies, as well as appropriate policies to create 
an investment case for their implementation.   
In the case of steel, as much as 25 to 30 per cent of 
new primary steel is lost as scrap during manufac-
turing processes, resulting in a significant waste of 
primary raw materials and increased energy demand 
for recycling (Material Economics, 2018). Further-
more, downcycling due to metals contamination 
during the product lifecycle tends to reduce the 
degree to which new virgin material can be substi-
tuted by recycled materials, thus limiting overall 
secondary to primary material production ratios. But 
there is much potential to reduce these phenomena 
(see Section B5.5 and B5.6). By increasing resource 
efficiency and by enhancing the quality and quantity 
of recycling, a climate-neutral industrial sector can 
reduce pollution and the strain on primary material 
resources. A more resource-efficient and circular 
economy also has the potential to reduce the depend-
ency of the European economy on imports of increas-
ingly scarce raw materials (European Commission, 
2020c). 
3.3  Developing critical infrastructure is  
the key to industrial transformation  
and competitiveness 
An early implementation of critical infrastructure 
projects for a climate-neutral basic materials indus-
try and a credible long-term plan for their expansion 
can bring a substantial advantage for Europe as a 
future industrial production site. It is critical to 
transform existing industrial networks in a way that 
builds on the synergies that define the competitive-
ness of today’s productive clusters. The smart 
transformation and expansion of infrastructure could 
ensure the transformation of existing production 
sites and attract new producers that have synergies 
with climate-neutral basic materials industries and 
their downstream businesses. 
For example, if the European steel industry can be 
certain of sufficient and cost-competitive hydrogen 
supply, it will be able to transform its production sites 
with reactors for the hydrogen-based direct reduc-
tion of iron. Likewise, the investment in CO₂-capture 
equipment by the cement industry will depend on the 
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decades and facilitate the global transformation in the 
industrial and energy sectors (Schmidt et al., 2019). 
Many regions that could supply Europe with 
 climate-neutral fuels are still economically depend-
ent on the export of fossil fuels. New demand for 
climate- neutral fuels can provide them with a 
stimulus to transform their own economies.
3.7 Section conclusion
While the transition to climate neutral industry is 
essential for Europe to meet its overarching climate 
objectives for 2030 and 2050, it also offers several 
potential co-benefits: 
 → enabling reinvestment decisions in line with 
climate neutrality will protect European industrial 
value chains and hundreds of thousands of related 
jobs; 
 → transforming existing industrial clusters and 
energy systems will ensure competitiveness in a 
climate-neutral global economy;
 → reducing dependency on scarce and strategic 
materials through greater materials efficiency and 
circularity will increase economic resilience; 
 → exploiting the need for massive reinvestment in 
strategic infrastructure will support the post-
Covid-19 economic recovery;
 → developing technological solutions and setting 
standards for climate neutral production will 
transform international markets and catalyse 
higher climate ambition in other economies; and
 → demand for the import of climate-neutral energy 
and fuels will support the transformation of other 
countries and their businesses. 
 
To exploit the opportunities that this transition 
presents, however, a new policy framework is needed 
that addresses the numerous enabling conditions dis-
cussed in Section B4 below. Part D of this document 
proposes a new framework and new policies that rise 
to these challenges. 
 
Although the share of Europe’s industry in global 
emissions is only around 12 per cent (IEA, 2018), its 
leadership in the use of key low-carbon technologies 
could catalyse climate mitigation activities in other 
economies that far exceed the EU’s own emission 
reduction potential. Europe’s leadership with the 
early development and scaling of renewable energy 
technologies has demonstrated its capacity to trigger 
transformational developments in other regions of 
the world.
Early investment – in commercial plants as well as in 
pilot and demonstration projects – will bring experi-
ence with new technologies and achieve cost- 
reducing effects. This will reduce the investment and 
operating costs for building similar plants abroad, 
making it more likely that other countries and regions 
will quickly follow suit. The EU can also accelerate the 
global transition by helping to kick-start global 
markets and supply chains for vital inputs for 
industrial decarbonisation, such as green hydrogen, 
low-carbon basic chemicals (such as green ammonia 
or green methanol), or higher quality scrap for higher 
value recycled materials. Furthermore, by defining a 
credible pathway to phasing out conventional, 
CO₂-intensive industrial products in its large, 
domestic market, the EU can help drive global supply 
chains away from the most CO₂-intensive products. 
After all, foreign producers will want to ensure that 
they do not lose access to the European market.  
3.6  Rising demand for imported green energy 
can transform energy-exporting countries 
Climate-neutral basic materials industries will have 
to cover part of their energy demand with imported 
renewable electricity, clean hydrogen, and climate- 
neutral synthetic fuels. An early transformation of 
Europe’s basic materials industries is key to develop-
ing partnerships with countries that can supply such 
renewable energy and climate-neutral energy 
carriers and help build sustainable business models 
and partnerships with companies abroad. Such 
pioneering projects can stimulate the creation of a 
world market for climate-neutral fuels over the next 
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climate constraints are becoming more stringent in 
the EU over time. However, if they do not have a 
sufficiently credible and supportive policy frame-
work to take the risk of (re-)investing in climate- 
neutral key low-carbon technologies, they will tend 
to put off these decisions. They may prefer to operate 
existing assets as long as they are profitable and shut 
them down when required by law or when carbon 
prices are too high. In a worst-case scenario an 
increasing number of sites would close rather than 
become low-carbon production alternatives. This 
would break Europe’s integrated value chains, 
increase the import of carbon-intensive products, 
and result in permanent job losses. Europe currently 
employs 870,000 people in the energy-intensive 
cement, steel, and basic chemicals industries. It is 
therefore imperative that the EU and its member 
states develop a synergetic and effective policy 
framework so that energy-intensive sectors are able 
to plan and implement investments in innovative, 
climate-neutral production processes and products. 
4.2  Innovative key low-carbon technologies 
must be brought to scale 
Many of the technologies needed to transform the 
basic materials industries to climate neutrality, such 
as hydrogen-based steelmaking, electrified steam 
crackers, or cement kilns with CO₂ capture and 
4  Policy is needed to decarbonise 
 Europe’s basic materials industries 
There are feasible mitigation strategies (Section B5) 
and technologies (Part E) for the transformation of 
Europe’s basic materials industries. But some gaps 
need filling before Europe can initiate an industrial 
transformation to climate neutrality. In this Section, 
we discuss the main policy fields that need to be 
addressed by the EU, before moving on to examine 
the necessary mitigation strategies.  
4.1  Policy is needed to address the  
upcoming reinvestment cycle 
As described in Section B2, the definition of an 
appropriate investment environment for the deploy-
ment of key low-carbon technologies is urgent 
because many existing plants will soon require 
renovation or replacement. This is a pressing problem 
because the lifespans of conventional production 
units, once implemented, can be anywhere from 20 to 
70 years (Rootzén/Johnsson, 2013). This means that, 
in general, major investments or reinvestments made 
during the 2020s will shape the productive capital 
stock through 2050 and possibly beyond. 
The risks associated with a business-as-usual 
approach are well-known: companies are aware that 
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Key policy needs to decarbonise Europe‘s basic materials industries  Table B.2
Policy must address the upcoming reinvestment cycle 
Innovative key low-carbon technologies must be brought to scale 
Climate-neutral industrial projects require support and the creation of lead markets
Green energy supply is key
Infrastructure must support climate neutrality
Circularity and material efficiency
A robust solution to the problem of carbon leakage is required 
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process of developing the necessary technologies and 
the supporting infrastructure for the generation and 
transport of renewables and hydrogen, as well as the 
transport and storage of CO₂. 
An important aspect of this evaluation is the question 
how the implementation and operation of key 
low-carbon technologies will reduce and shift GHG 
emissions along the value chain. The electrification of 
heat or the procurement of hydrogen, for example, 
will reduce direct emissions (so-called scope 1 emis-
sions) of an operation, but may increase  emissions at 
the level of electricity and hydrogen production 
(so-called scope 2 emissions). Moreover, the changes 
in the value chain will affect the CO₂ intensity of 
raw-materials and products (the so-called scope 
3 emissions), a dimension that will affect the defini-
tion of lead markets for CO₂-efficient or climate- 
neutral  products2. New standards for accounting are 
needed to capture these effects and define technolo-
gies, strategies and arrangements that are effective 
for GHG abatement in the short, and compatible with 
climate-neutrality in the long term (see climate- 
neutral production standards, Part D). 
4.3  Climate-neutral industrial projects require 
support and the creation of lead markets
The climate-neutral production of basic materials is 
more expensive than current, emission-intensive 
processes. This is illustrated below by Figure B.4, 
which compares the competitiveness of key low- 
carbon technologies to conventional technologies. It 
shows the level of the CO₂ price that is needed to 
2 According to the definition of the GHG Protocol, a 
 company’s GHG emissions are classified in three scopes. 
Scope 1 accounts for direct emissions from sources that 
are owned or controlled by a company, such as emis-
sions related to productive processes. Scope 2 accounts 
for indirect emissions from electricity, heat, or steam 
purchased and used by the company. Scope 3 accounts 
for other indirect emissions (not included in Scope 2) 
that occur upstream or downstream of the value chain 
of a reporting company. This scope includes emissions 
embedded in services, raw materials and feedstock, as 
well as the final products delivered to the client.
storage facilities, are not fully mature or have yet to 
be proven on a commercial scale. These technologies 
are at different stages of development and thus 
require different forms of policy support. 
First, for technologies that are ready for commercial 
scale investments, but lack sufficient track record, 
residual technological uncertainties represent an 
additional risk that is difficult to calculate for inves-
tors, increasing the challenge of financing such 
investments. Policymakers can address this problem 
with risk-mitigation instruments, such as public 
co-financing, loan guarantees, and support for 
large-scale demonstration plants (see Part D, 
De-risking instruments for unproven technologies).
Second, because important key technologies still need 
to be developed at sufficient scale and the amount of 
emission-free electricity and hydrogen is limited, 
bridging technologies can make sense to avoid 
reinvestment in emission-intensive plants and 
processes with long lifespans. For example, primary 
steel manufacturers could start to build plants for the 
production of direct reduced iron (DRI) to replace 
blast furnaces instead of extending their operational 
lifetime.1 Initially, these plants could run on natural 
gas. Later, natural gas could be replaced by increasing 
volumes of clean hydrogen without the need for 
retrofitting the DRI production facility (see Part E, 
Steel). With this two-step process, DRI plants can be 
an anchor for the development of hydrogen produc-
tion and transport facilities. Similarly, in the chemical 
sector, power-to-heat could quickly complement 
widespread natural gas-based heating facilities in a 
transition phase before they become the only unit for 
heat production (see Part E, Chemicals). However, a 
key challenge for policymakers and companies will be 
to sort out which intermediate solutions are genu-
inely compatible with climate neutrality in the long 
run and which ones are not. Moreover, it is important 
to pursue an efficient ramp up of the deployment of 
key-low carbon technologies to support the gradual 
1 This process is described in more detail in Part E.
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foreseeing carbon prices from 50 to 60 €/tCO₂ by 
2030 (European Commission, 2020b).
These facts, along with the high intensity of domestic 
and international competition in markets for basic 
materials, limit the potential of so-called first-mover 
strategies in the basic materials industries. Busi-
nesses that wish to secure long-term cost and scale 
advantages with an early introduction of key 
 climate-friendly technologies have little leeway due 
to the intense competition and because the higher 
production costs of climate neutrality would drive 
them out of business in the short term. This needs to 
be addressed by adequate support policies (see Part C, 
Carbon contracts-for-difference). 
At the same time, the government should actively 
push for the creation of lead markets for green basic 
materials. This would ensure a differentiation 
between clean and dirty end products, putting 
pressure on old technologies to be phased out of 
equalize costs between the respective technologies. 
Carbon prices of between 60 and 231 €/tCO₂ are 
generally needed to make these technologies 
 competitive.3 
By contrast, EU ETS carbon prices today are in the 
range of 25–35 €/tCO₂. While carbon prices are 
expected to rise in the coming decade in line with the 
EU 2030 climate target of -55 per cent, it is unlikely 
that they will increase to the level that is needed to 
make key low-carbon technologies competitive in the 
short term. For instance, in the scenarios that 
 modelled a -55 per cent EU 2030 climate target, the 
European Commission’s Impact Assessment4 is 
3 Further details on the expected costs in 2030 and 2050 
of the relevant technologies are summarised in Part E of 
this document.
4 The Impact Assessment accompanied the 2030 Climate 
Target Plan Communication. 
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2020
Note: CO₂ abatement costs depend very much on assumptions about electricity costs. For the calculation of these values, electricity costs of 60 euros per MWh were 
usually assumed. The estimates here are based on Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institut, 2019, and represent the lower bound of CO₂ abatement costs in 2030. 
Higher CO₂ abatement costs are to be expected before 2030 than after 2030 because the technologies must still undergo learning curves for cost reductions. 
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Direct reduction with hydrogen (Steel)
Direct reduction with natural gas (Steel)
CCU of waste gases of the blast furnace route (Steel)
Green hydrogen from electrolysis (Chemicals)
Methanol-to-olefin/aromatics route (Chemicals)
Carbon capture with the oxyfuel process (Cement)
Current CO₂ price: 27 €/tCO₂
Expected CO₂ price range in the EU ETS until 2030
Estimated CO₂ abatement costs of selected key low-carbon technologies 
versus today‘s conventional reference process for 2030
Figure B.4
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new technologies will increase electricity demand in 
various ways. One example is the switch from natural 
gas-based steam production to electric devices such 
as electrode boilers, high-temperature heat pumps, 
and other power-to-heat technologies (see Part E). 
Another example is the move from blast furnaces to 
direct reduction facilities (DRI plants) operated with 
green hydrogen in steelmaking.
The success of the transformation of the basic 
materials industry and other sectors hinges on the 
future availability of affordable green electricity and 
hydrogen. Among other things, this requires a 
significant increase in Europe’s renewable electricity 
production capacity in the coming years and decades. 
According to the 2030 scenarios from the European 
Commission (2020b), power generation from wind 
and solar will have to triple during the coming decade 
relative to the last decade to achieve an EU 2030 
climate target of -55 per cent (see Figure B.5).
future investments. Besides, it would leverage 
private- and public-sector willingness to pay for 
greener products and thus stimulate the deployment 
of a fuller portfolio of solutions and create the basis 
for scaling up key technologies beyond subsidisation 
in the longer term. 
To sum up, the right mix of policy instruments is 
required to compensate investors for higher produc-
tion costs and to create policy incentives that foster 
the demand and willingness-to-pay for climate-
neutral basic materials and subsequent products. 
Possible policy instruments are discussed extensively 
in Part C. In Part D, we develop specific policy 
recommendations.
4.4  Large amounts of green energy  
will be required
For many of the necessary low-carbon technologies, 
fossil fuels must be replaced with renewable electric-
ity or hydrogen. To establish climate-neutral basic 
materials industries, these alternative energy sources 
must be produced by low-carbon processes with an 
eye to near-zero emissions in the future. The use of 
Wind and solar growth must almost triple to reach EU climate target Figure B.5
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on Ember, 2021 and 2030 scenarios from European Commission's Impact Assessment 
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and the chemical industry) require infrastructure 
to transport the CO₂ to suitable storage facilities. 
This infrastructure can consist of pipelines or ships 
for the transport of CO₂ to marine storage locations.
 
Generally, there are long delays between the planning 
and completion of large infrastructure projects. 
Hence, policymakers need to start to assess and plan 
for the requirements early on. Infrastructure projects 
must begin soon, but parts of this infrastructure can 
be realised only with international cooperation. 
Already now, agreements with European and 
non-European partner countries (both supplier 
 countries for carbon-free energy or offtake countries 
for CO₂) are needed. Without enough certainty that 
the required infrastructure will be available in time, 
investors will not invest in the key low-carbon 
technologies that are required for climate neutrality. 
Moreover, it is important to include different social 
groups during the planning stages to avoid potential 
conflicts when building the infrastructure.
4.6 Circularity and material efficiency
In light of the significant challenges of developing 
sufficiently large-scale renewable energy, CO₂ 
storage, and transport infrastructure, strategies are 
needed to simplify the decarbonisation of energy- 
intensive industries and reduce its costs. The easiest 
way to do this is to create a more resource-efficient 
and circular economy. Fortunately, the economy has 
much potential for adding more resource efficiency 
and material circularity. An influential study by 
Material Economics (2018) suggests that by 2050 as 
much as 54 per cent of the required emissions 
abatement effort from the steel, plastics, and cement 
and concrete sectors can be delivered by circular 
economy measures alone. As we explain in Section B5, 
there are numerous technical pathways for enhanc-
ing resource efficiency, material substitution, and 
material recirculation (enhancing the quality and 
quantity of recycled materials). While these strategies 
do not obviate the need for new,  climate-neutral 
primary production technologies, they provide an 
important supplement.
At the same time, ambitious climate scenarios indicate 
that a portion of the electricity produced from renew-
able energy will be imported directly or indirectly in 
the form of hydrogen or synthetic fuels from regions 
with larger and more cost-effective renewable energy 
resources (Schmidt et al., 2019; Lechtenböhmer et al., 
2019). In order to secure suitable import levels starting 
in the 2030s, it makes sense to develop strategic 
partnerships at an early stage with potential produc-
ing regions (e.g. North Africa, the Near East, South 
America, Australia) so that infrastructure and produc-
tion plants can be built in time.
4.5  Infrastructure must support  
climate neutrality
A main challenge in transforming the basic materials 
industry is the need to build specific infrastructure to 
support key low-carbon technologies (Wuppertal 
Institute, 2018). The requirements differ depending 
on the technology and GHG abatement strategy:
 → New technologies that use large quantities of direct 
electricity (e.g. electrode boilers, electrical steam 
crackers, and electric arc furnaces in steel produc-
tion) will require improvements in Europe’s 
continental transmission infrastructure as well as 
local distribution networks, in addition to suffi-
cient quantities of climate-neutral electricity.
 → Technologies that require large quantities of 
hydrogen (e.g. hydrogen-based steel production 
and ammonia synthesis) depend on pipeline 
infrastructure that transports large amounts of 
hydrogen from areas of favourable production to 
demand centres.5
 → Technologies based on CO₂ capture and storage (for 
cement kilns and BECCS6 activities in steelmaking 
5 Alternatively, it might also be possible to produce the 
hydrogen on-site where it is needed. In that case, how-
ever, large amounts of electricity would have to be trans-
ported, requiring increased capacity in the transmission 
grids.
6 BECCS stands for “bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage”.
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can better protect against carbon leakage risks for 
existing and new climate-neutral assets. Part D of 
this study highlights a range of solutions that can be 
adopted to address this specific challenge. 
4.8 Section conclusion
Putting Europe’s basic materials industries on a 
pathway to climate neutrality by 2050 presents a 
range of policy challenges: 
 → addressing the urgency of deploying innovative 
key low-carbon technologies during the upcoming 
investment cycle; 
 → accelerating the development and broadening the 
portfolio of innovative key low-carbon solutions;  
 → creating new financial support mechanisms for 
commercial-scale production with key low-carbon 
technologies, which are more expensive than 
conventional technologies;
 → de-risking capital investment in first-of-a-kind 
technology projects through appropriate financial 
instruments; 
 → scaling up green electricity production to match 
the increased industrial demand for direct and 
indirect electrification;
 → developing relevant strategic infrastructure for 
electricity, hydrogen, and CO₂ transport and 
storage; 
 → developing incentives for industries to pursue 
increased use of circular basic materials in combi-
nation with a decarbonised primary production, 
while developing other innovative low-carbon 
materials; 
 → creating product design incentives to use materials 
– and especially CO₂-intensive materials – more 
efficiently in products; and
 → developing robust and sustainable solutions to 
carbon leakage, i.e. the risk that clean EU produc-
tion will be undercut by more carbon-intensive, 
but cheaper, international competition. 
 
In the aggregate, these policy needs represent the core 
enabling conditions that are needed to spur meaning-
ful changes in business strategies and the implemen-
A key objective for policymakers, therefore, must be 
to develop policy packages that unlock the full range 
of potential drivers of industrial decarbonisation. 
While carbon pricing is a fundamental element, it 
alone is not sufficient. Complementary policy 
packages must be designed. A coherent enabling 
environment with targeted incentives is needed to 
bring together resource-efficient and circular 
production, decarbonised primary production, key 
low-carbon technologies, and the competition 
between materials based on their embedded carbon 
content. These incentives are discussed in detail in 
Parts C and D of this study. 
4.7 A robust solution to carbon leakage 
In addition to competition from conventional 
high-carbon technologies at the local level, large parts 
of the basic materials industries also face intense 
international competition from outside the EU. This is 
particularly true of the chemical industry and (to a 
somewhat lesser extent) the steel industry. Chemical 
products are standardised and have relatively low 
transport costs, so global competition is fierce. 
However, the steel and non-ferrous metals sectors 
are also characterised by commodity products that 
are heavily traded in liquid international markets. 
As energy and GHG emissions are significant cost 
drivers for these industries, the resulting competitive 
pressure poses specific challenges to implementing 
ambitious climate policies. The risk that EU produc-
ers might lose market share to CO₂-intensive foreign 
competition, or even migrate to locations with less 
strict climate mitigation policies, is often referred to 
as “carbon leakage”. As we elaborate on in Part D, 
Europe currently has sector-specific policies in place 
to address carbon leakage. However, these policies 
are not sustainable and the current policy frame-
works leave significant additional uncertainty 
surrounding the economic viability of long-lived 
investments in carbon-neutral assets. A critical part 
of a robust enabling framework for investments in 
climate-neutral industrial products and processes is 
to reform the current anti-leakage system, so that it 
STUDY | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe | PART B 
51
and in building heating (heat pumps). But electrifica-
tion also has considerable potential for reducing CO₂ 
in the industrial sector (Lechtenböhmer et al., 2016; 
Schneider et al., 2018). Many sectors, especially the 
chemical industry, can replace much of the fossil fuel 
used for low- to high-temperature processes with 
power-to-heat technologies such as high-tempera-
ture heat pumps and electrode boilers. In the future, 
special solutions could be used to meet the high- 
temperature requirements of steam crackers, basic 
chemicals, and electricity-based cement manufac-
turing. The advantages of an electrification strategy 
in the basic materials industry includes the high 
overall energy efficiency of power-to-heat plants. 
This is particularly true of high-temperature heat 
pumps that use waste heat. Other power-to-heat 
technologies have high levels of energy efficiency 
and are more efficient than hydrogen (whose produc-
tion is associated with conversion losses). The use of 
electricity in some applications allows a more precise 
provision of heat compared with combustion pro-
cesses and can also contribute to efficiency gains. 
Moreover, because electrical and electrode boilers 
have fairly low investment costs, they can initially be 
deployed at relatively low costs, including for hybrid 
use, i.e. alongside existing conventional plants such 
as CHP plants in the chemical industry. This would 
tation of investment projects in decarbonised pro-
cesses and products. They therefore need to be 
addressed by a broad policy package, and coopera-
tively by both European and national decision-makers. 
5  Strategies to decarbonise the 
 European basic materials industries  
A set of strategies is required for transforming the 
basic materials industries to climate neutrality. Given 
the specific needs of different sectors, a combination 
of all of these strategies will be needed (see Figure B.6).
5.1 Electrification 
Electrification requires the replacement of fossil fuels 
with electricity. As long as this electricity comes from 
zero-carbon or low-carbon sources, CO₂ emissions 
can be significantly reduced or completely elimi-
nated. Due to decreasing costs for new renewable 
energy generation and the high potential for expan-
sion – both in Europe and everywhere else in the 
world – electrification is of great importance for all 
final energy sectors. 
Discussions of electrification are taking place 
primarily in the transport sector (electric vehicles) 
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One advantage of the hydrogen strategy is its flexi-
bility. Hydrogen can first be produced within Europe, 
but as demand rises in the medium to long term it can 
also be imported. As long as there is public accept-
ance, blue hydrogen can be produced from natural gas 
using CO₂ capture and storage.7 Installations to 
produce direct reduced iron are attractive because 
they can be built relatively quickly to replace older 
blast furnaces. Moreover, they can initially be 
operated with a high proportion of natural gas until 
sufficient quantities of hydrogen become available. 
The foreseeable demand for hydrogen in the basic 
materials industries incentivises investment in 
hydrogen production and the necessary infrastruc-
ture, and could help other sectors, especially shipping 
and aviation to reduce their emissions as well. An 
appropriate hydrogen infrastructure could also make 
the stabilisation of electrical production easier and 
cheaper (LBST, 2019). For example, electrolysis 
7 Methane pyrolysis represents another approach to 
 climate-friendly hydrogen production. This process 
manufactures hydrogen (H₂) and solid carbon (C) from 
methane (CH₄).
facilitate the introduction of these technologies and 
provides demand-side flexibility for the power 
system to integrate fluctuating output from renewa-
bles. The fundamental technological challenge of a 
widespread electrification is its significant demand 
for zero-carbon electricity, which requires a rapid 
expansion of renewable-energy capacity. In the 
medium to long run, however, direct electrification 
can reduce the demand for more electro-intensive 
energy carriers, such as hydrogen and e-fuels. 
5.2 Green hydrogen
GHG-neutral hydrogen will play a significant role in 
supporting climate-neutral basic materials industries 
(Lechtenböhmer et al., 2019). The use of green hydro-
gen for the production of heat can be sensible or even 
necessary even though certain production processes 
are less efficient than the direct use of electricity. 
This applies to hydrogen-based steel production with 
plants for the production of direct reduced iron. 
Furthermore, hydrogen is needed in large quantities 
as a feedstock in the chemical industry in order, say, 
to produce ammonia.  
AFRY, 2021
Note:The hydrogen demand for each process was based on the hydrogen required per ton of commodity coupled with a commodity demand 
projection based on Material Economics, 2019. For ammonia, a decrease in production due to more ecient use of fertilisers in agriculture was 
assumed. For steel, it was assumed that there are no reinvestments into coal-based blast furnaces from 2023 on and that 50 per cent of steel 
production would be met by direct reduced iron. Besides, it was assumed that refineries will be phased-out by 2050. 
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isation of this sector. Compared with other industrial 
plants, cement works are significantly smaller and 
often located in the direct vicinity of the extraction 
zones for limestone and clay. Costs for CO₂ capturing 
with oxyfuel technology are moderate, but such 
projects depend on an appropriate infrastructure to 
transport CO₂ to often distant appropriate storage 
sites. It might also be possible to use local geologic 
storage opportunities, but this depends heavily on 
local public support.
According to current estimates, a CCS strategy has 
comparatively low CO₂ abatement costs (see Part E) 
and generally a low requirement for green electricity. 
Furthermore, no extensive changes to existing 
production processes are required. That can be an 
advantage in the short to medium term, but the risk is 
that companies will be less rigorous in their pursuit of 
other innovative key technologies.
Moreover, CCS is not expected to capture 100 per 
cent of CO₂ (see Part E),9 and the residual emissions 
would have to be offset elsewhere. The use of fossil 
fuels also causes GHG emissions during extraction 
(e.g. methane slip) and during transport and causes 
regional pollution. Additional CO₂ emissions can arise 
from the energy required for the capture, transport, 
and storage processes. This is why when analysing 
the potential of CO₂ reduction from CCS technology 
one must consider the capture along with the 
upstream and downstream processes it involves. 
CCS is not limited to capturing fossil fuel emissions; it 
could also pave the way to achieve negative emis-
sions via BECCS. 10 Studies by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) show that negative 
emissions using BECCS could be necessary to achieve 
the international climate goals of the Paris Agree-
9 Even if it is technically possible to reach capture rates of 
100 per cent with some processes, the final percentage 
points come with significant costs.
10 CO₂ can also be removed from the atmosphere at 
 direct-air-capture plants.
companies in northern Europe could buy large 
amounts of electricity from wind power and then 
transport the hydrogen to the basic materials 
 industry.
There are several obstacles to the deployment of this 
hydrogen strategy. First, start-up costs are signifi-
cantly higher than those of fossil fuels. Second, it 
depends on the construction of new infrastructure to 
make large amounts of hydrogen available to indus-
try. Third, electrolytic hydrogen production requires 
large amounts of electricity. 
5.3 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
CCS is an alternative to switching from fossil fuels to 
carbon-free energy such as electricity or hydrogen. 
Instead, it captures and permanently stores energy- 
or process-based CO₂ emissions in geological forma-
tions such as empty gas fields or saline aquifers in the 
North Sea. In principle, CCS technology can be 
combined with various types of industrial processes. 
Plants that produce relatively large, highly-concen-
trated amounts of CO₂ are particularly suited to CCS 
in terms of economic viability and infrastructure 
costs. These include primary steel production8 and 
steam reformers for the production of hydrogen from 
natural gas. CCS could also be applied with steam 
crackers in the chemical industry and larger plants 
for the production of electricity and heat, such as 
CHP power plants, though the CO₂ concentration in 
the waste gas is comparatively low. However, for the 
above-mentioned cases, alternative processes exist to 
decarbonise the production of steel, basic chemicals, 
electricity, and heat through direct electrification or 
the use of green hydrogen in the future (see Part B 
Section 5.1 and 5.2).
Because alternatives for substantial CO₂-abatement 
in the production of cement clinker are not available, 
CCS processes will likely be needed for the decarbon-
8 In primary steel production, one option to use CCS is a 
change from conventional blast furnaces to the HIsarna® 
process (see Part E).
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chemicals or synthetic fuels from the exhaust of 
CO₂-intensive blast-furnaces in steelmaking (Part E, 
Steel) needs comparatively high levels of hydrogen. 
By contrast, the energy needed to bind CO₂ in mineral 
admixtures such as concrete is rather low (RWTH, 
2019) and is already practised by some cement 
manufacturers (CarbonCure, 2019). 
Second, the economy-wide CO₂ reduction of CCU 
applications depends critically on the lifespan of the 
product to which the CO₂ is bound. For example, fossil 
carbon from industrial processes in synthetic fuels or 
certain fertilisers would be emitted again after a short 
time, which is not compatible with the goal of 
creating a climate-neutral economy by 2050. These 
CCU applications are a comparatively inefficient 
strategy for reducing CO₂ given their high level of 
energy use.11 By contrast, binding CO₂ to concrete or 
similar long-term products such as mattresses12 may 
make more sense. Long-term CO₂ storage in building 
materials and consumer products has great potential 
to reduce CO₂ in the atmosphere. 
Third, the source of the CO₂ that is re-used matters. 
Biogenic or direct air captured CO₂ can have very 
different atmospheric warming potentials over the 
full product lifecycle than carbon from fossil energy 
sources. If fossil carbon from industrial processes 
continues to be used in the chemical industry for a 
transitional period,13 chemical recycling will be 
11 For example, a passenger car that runs on synthetic fuels 
based on CO₂ from industrial processes (CCU) would con-
sume five times the amount of electricity from renewable 
energy needed by a battery-electric vehicle (WWF, 2018).
12 Carbon2Chem, Carbon4PUR, and other projects have 
examined the use of CO₂ and other metallurgical gas 
components from steelmaking in the chemical indus-
try. Carbon4PUR studies the binding of CO₂ and carbon 
monoxide in polyurethane. This is the base material for 
mattresses and other products. The amount of CO₂ that 
can be absorbed by a mattress is very limited, however.
13 Non-fossil carbon sources include CO₂ from air separa-
tion in direct-air-capture plants and sustainably pro-
duced biomass.
ment. This involves removing CO₂ from the atmos-
phere by planting sustainable biomass crops and then 
capturing and storing the biogenic CO₂ they release 
when combusted (IPCC, 2018). This can only succeed 
with mature, market-ready CO₂ capture technology 
accompanied by suitable infrastructure and secure 
storage facilities. Possible applications for biomass 
include its use in cement kilns, provided that CCS is 
used to capture and store their emissions. From a 
climate-policy perspective, it makes sense to advance 
BECCS both nationally and internationally. 
Considering their potential to pave the way for 
negative emissions, a revival of the debate on the 
public support of CCS and BECCS technologies in the 
industry sector is necessary. 
5.4 Carbon Capture and Use (CCU) 
With CO₂ capture and use (CCU), CO₂ from industrial 
processes is employed as a raw material in other 
sectors and products. As with CCS, CO₂ capture is 
conceivable for large sources of emissions in the steel, 
chemical, and cement sectors. Potential applications 
for CO₂ include organic chemical products (e.g. 
plastics and fertilisers containing carbon) that will 
still need carbon in a climate-neutral world and 
synthetic fuels. (See the fact sheet on CCU of smelting 
gases from integrated blast-furnace works, Part E, 
Steel). As for the cement sector, a CCU strategy might 
be used in certain situations to store significant 
amounts of CO₂ in concrete, a particularly long-last-
ing product. (For more information, see the infobox 
“Recarbonation of building demolition waste”). By 
using captured CO₂ in concrete and other products, it 
is possible to reduce or even eliminate the need for 
CO₂ pipeline networks and CO₂ storage facilities at 
CCU sites. 
However, one must be clear-eyed about the limita-
tions of CCU and the necessary conditions for its 
application to become part of a strategy portfolio for 
achieving climate neutrality. First, the energy 
requirements of CCU applications vary considerably 
by sector and CO₂ use. For example, the production of 
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5.5 Circular Economy 
A circular economy is a system that reuses much of 
the materials already in existence. Recent studies 
have shown that it could contribute significantly to 
the reduction of CO₂ emissions in the basic materials 
industry in the medium to long term. An analysis by 
Material Economics (2018) found that 75 per cent of 
steel demand, 50 per cent of aluminium demand, and 
56 per cent of plastic demand in the EU could be 
covered by the recirculation of existing materials. By 
closing the carbon cycle, recycling reduces the CO₂ 
output considerably and requires appreciably less 
energy than the production of raw materials. In this 
needed to close the carbon cycle. Chemical recycling 
prevents fossil CO₂ from being emitted again after 
short periods. 
Finally, when evaluating CCU strategies, the amount 
of CO₂ saved compared with conventional processes 
is not the only important factor. It is also crucial that 
we compare them with alternative strategies for  
creating a climate-neutral industry. For energy-in-
tensive CCU applications – such as those in the steel 
and chemical sectors – it makes sense to compare the 
CO₂ reduction per kilowatt-hour of green electricity 
with that of other options.
Infobox: Recarbonation of building demolition waste (CCU)
After water, concrete is the most commonly used material in the world (World Building Council on Sustain-
able Development, 2009). Significant amounts of CO₂ emissions arise from the manufacture of cement, the 
main component of concrete (see Part E, Cement). According to scientific studies, concrete over the course 
of its lifetime can absorb a fraction – sometimes up to 25 per cent – of the total CO₂ produced (Heidelberg-
Cement 2019; Schneider, 2019; Andersson et al., 2019). This process takes place naturally and is called 
recarbonation. Under special conditions, the CO₂ absorption rate in the recarbonation of concrete can be 
increased with relatively low energy use (RWTH, 2019).
The CO₂Min project studies the manufacture of new construction materials through the recarbonation of 
recycled concrete from building demolition waste (HeidelbergCement 2019; RWTH, 2019). But recarbona-
tion technology is still in its early stages and it is uncertain whether it will succeed. If technology progresses 
quickly, however, it might be possible in the medium to long term to re-bind a significant fraction of the CO₂ 
emissions from cement clinker manufacturing to new “recycled” raw input materials used in new clinker 
cement manufacturing, thus creating a carbon loop for part of the CO₂ emitted. 
This process can also be enabled by new technologies that permit the “smart crushing” and separation of the 
constituents of concrete. In addition to allowing for possible circular uses of CO₂ in cement manufacturing, 
more efficiently recycling the coarse elements in concrete such as sand and gravel could create a material 
cycle that better preserves resources related to mining them. The success of this approach depends not only 
on technological advancements, an upgraded infrastructure for recycling demolition waste, and standards 
for the use of such products in construction (see Part D). The rate of flow of demolition waste to new con-
struction and the availability of CO₂ sourcing and related transport costs are also key factors. Therefore, it is 
still unlikely at this stage that recarbonation and the circular use of CO₂ will offer a magic bullet solution to 
cement emissions without the need for CCS. A range of additional solutions to reduce the inefficient use of 
CO₂-intensive cement types, coupled with CCS and other low-carbon cement technologies, will likely be 
needed as well.  
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early stages).14 These are nevertheless important 
elements of extensive and cost-effective CO₂ reduc-
tions. (For more, see the infoboxes “A circular econ-
omy in the steel industry” and “The recarbonation of 
building demolition waste (CCU)”).
14 Technologies that could make cement recycling  possible 
in the medium to long term are in an early phase of 
development (Bakker et al., 2015). For example, the 
manu facturer of SmartCrusher technology claims that 
it can enable the near complete recycling of hardened 
cement paste from demolition waste (Slimbreker, 2019). 
This and other processes could potentially be combined 
with the recarbonation of building demolition waste.
way, the circular economy can contribute signifi-
cantly to resource and energy efficiency. But strin-
gent recycling quotas also demand changes in 
product design, the dismantling of products at the end 
of their lifespans, improved recycling logistics, and 
possibly altered global material flows as well. This 
study discusses different chemical recycling technol-
ogies, electric steam crackers, and methanol-based 
processes for the production of olefin and aromatics 
that represent important steps towards establishing 
circular economy models in the chemical industry 
(see Part E). The analysis of low-carbon technologies 
in Part E does not emphasise recycling in the steel 
industry (secondary steel production is already an 
established technology) or in cement production 
(where research on the potential and the require-
ments of cement and concrete recycling are still in its 
Infobox: A circular economy in the steel industry
In principle, steel can be endlessly recycled. Every newly produced tonne of steel from primary production 
increases the (global) stock of steel. Processed steel is used for many end products such as cars, machinery, 
equipment, and the construction of infrastructure. At the end of their lifespan, the steel parts can be 
retrieved, melted down, and used again, creating a materials cycle. 
Recycling already plays an important role in the steel industry today. In Europe, approx. 40 per cent of the 
steel production in 2017 came from secondary steel (Material Economics, 2019) (see Part E, Steel.) The 
recycling process consists of melting scrap steel in electric-arc furnaces to produce new steel products. 
Compared with primary-steel production from iron ore in blast furnaces the secondary steel route requires 
significantly less energy (2 gigajoule versus 15 gigajoule per tonne of crude steel) (Wuppertal Institute, 
2019). The same goes for CO₂ emissions (0.3 tCO₂ versus 1.7 tCO₂ per tonne of crude steel).
Because the secondary steel route is based on electricity, indirect emissions can be avoided in the future by 
decarbonising the electricity mix, producing nearly GHG-neutral steel. However, a significant increase in 
secondary steel production brings with it several challenges. There are large differences in the quality of 
steel scrap. For one, much of steel scrap is contaminated with copper. Unlike many other added elements, 
copper cannot be separated from steel in electric-arc furnaces.  As a result, steel scrap contaminated with 
copper can often only be reused in reinforcement steel for concrete and in other applications where steel 
quality is not as important.
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This is called downcycling. In order to increase the quality of secondary steel, a range of interventions are 
required to prevent unnecessary contamination. This includes product design requirements, improved 
 end-of-life collection and sorting practices, and quality standards and tracing (see Part C, “Standards for 
recyclable products”). Because EU steel manufacturers cannot recycle all of the steel they produce (such as 
that used for cars sold abroad) and the total global steel demand continues to rise, primary steel production 
will remain necessary in the future. However, if the EU introduces a comprehensive circular economy in 
the steel sector, up to 70 per cent of European steel demand could be met by the secondary steel route by 
2050 (versus 40 per cent today) (Material Economics, 2019). The other 30 per cent would come from 
primary steel production (versus 60 per cent today). Near GHG-neutral processes such as direct reduction 
with hydrogen exist for producing primary steel (see Part E, Steel).
But a comparison of the two virtually GHG-neutral routes shows that the requirements for green electricity 
are significantly lower for secondary-steel production. Primary steel production using green hydrogen 
requires around four times the electricity per tonne of crude steel as the secondary steel route. In addition, 
the estimated CO₂ abatement costs of the secondary routes for 2050 are significantly lower as well (see 
Figure B.8). The projected estimate shows that both steel routes will be required in the future. The higher the 
share of secondary steel in the total production, the less additional green electricity will be needed for 
creating a GHG-neutral steel industry and the lower the costs will be.
Comparison of the primary steel route with direct reduction using green hydrogen and 
the secondary steel route (electric-arc route) for 2050  Figure B.8
Agora Energiewende, 2019, based on data from the Wuppertal Institut and Material Economics, 2019  * Average of a cost range
Assumptions: The CO₂ avoidance costs are calculated relative to the reference process (blast-furnace route with production costs of 391 euros per 
tonne of crude steel and the specific emissions of 1.71 tCO₂ per tonne of crude steel). As with Material Economics, 2019, we assumed a price of 
259 euros per tonne. Alongside the actual production costs, the costs contain an additional 13 euros per tonne of crude steel for reheating in the 
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output and emissions in the basic materials 
industry (Allwood et al., 2012).
 → Steps towards a circular economy:  
Increased recycling of products and materials 
increases material efficiency (see Circular Econ-
omy.) Some measures for increasing material 
efficiency may even yield negative CO₂ abatement 
costs. 
5.7 Material substitution 
In some areas, the use of substitute materials can 
reduce the emission intensity of products and 
services. One example is the use of wood for the 
(partial) replacement of concrete and steel in the 
construction of housing and certain buildings (see the 
infobox “Alternatives in construction”). Houses and 
structures that use wood instead of concrete and steel 
can have lower lifecycle emissions, assuming certain 
conditions are in place (Tettey et al., 2019; Skullestad 
et al., 2016; Hafner et al., 2017). Other possibilities for 
material substitution are bio-based, natural insula-
tion materials (see the infobox “Insulation from 
sustainable raw materials”) and a (gradual) switch 
from solid construction to lightweight construction 
(see the infobox “Carbon concrete”). But there are 
limits to material substitution when it comes to the 
sustainable use of wood and other crop plants as well 
as the suitability of replacement materials in certain 
applications. When evaluating individual measures 
for material substitution, companies should perform a 
comprehensive analysis of the lifecycle emissions for 
the materials being used. This is known as the 
cradle-to-cradle principle. 
5.6 Increasing material efficiency 
Another important way to make the basic materials 
industry climate neutral is to deliver the same 
functionality and services with less material. This 
reduces the demand for new production plants and 
the energy to power them. Moreover, it reduces the 
costs of the transformation to climate neutrality and 
increases public support. Increased material effi-
ciency can be achieved in a number of ways:
 → Reduce material losses in the manufacturing 
process:  
Manufacturing losses in turning raw materials into 
finished products are estimated at around one-
tenth for paper, one-quarter for steel, and two-
fifths for aluminium (Milford et al., 2011; IPCC, 
2014). The material wastes have to be recycled, 
which brings with it additional energy costs. Some 
options for reducing losses include modifying 
manufacturing processes and changing the design 
of individual components (Milford et al., 2011).
 → Reduce the material intensity of products: 
Carruth et al. (2011) show that optimal design and 
production could reduce weight of many products 
by around one-third without limiting their 
performance. One impediment to this approach is 
the relatively high labour costs compared with 
material costs in most areas. Exceptions include 
aerospace, where the costs for the design and 
manufacture of lighter products and components 
are offset by lower fuel consumption. In the 
building sector, many of the structural properties of 
components could be achieved with significantly 
less material (see “Changes in construction and 
product standards,” Part C and the infobox “Alter-
natives in construction”).
 → Use products more intensely: 
Intensifying product use means providing the same 
amount of service with fewer products. Some 
examples are the space-saving design of buildings 
and more durable product design. In addition, more 
emphasis on repairs could increase product 
lifespans, thereby reducing the demand for 
replacement products. This decreases production 
STUDY | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe | PART B 
59
Infobox: Alternatives approaches to construction
Wood construction (strategy: material substitution, circular economy): 
The overwhelming majority of construction materials used today – concrete, steel, bricks, glass, ceramic, 
plaster, and insulation materials such as polystyrene – are resource-, energy-, and CO₂-intensive. It is 
therefore important to try to optimise the CO₂, energy, and environmental resource intensity of the 
 materials for construction.  
In certain applications, one alternative is to use an increased share of organic materials, wood in particular. 
Assuming forests are harvested sustainably and depending on factors such as transport emissions, wood 
components typically emit less CO₂ during manufacturing and processing than cement, steel, and bricks. 
Moreover, wood absorbs CO₂ from the atmosphere during growth and stores it as carbon. When wood is 
used as a construction material, the carbon remains stored in the wood for the lifespan of the building. Thus, 
assuming the right conditions are in place, wood construction can be a fairly climate-friendly method for 
new construction, renovation, and urban densification (wood additions on existing buildings).
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that organic is not always and everywhere superior to inorganic 
materials. In some circumstances, the lack of sustainably harvested wood nearby, the short lifespan of 
structures, the need for additional reinforcing materials for large high-rise structures, or other issues such 
as sound insulation, thermal mass, or even fire safety can play a role in limiting the optimality of wood. In 
general, a location-specific and construction-wide assessment of lifecycle emissions (and other environ-
mental indicators) is needed for each case. Hybrid construction concepts that use multiple construction 
materials can help to optimise environmental performance. 
In Sweden and Austria, Europe’s leading countries for wood construction, the share of wood in new homes 
is 55 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively. In Germany it is just under 18 per cent, and it is even lower in 
many other EU countries. But given wood’s significant potential to reduce GHG emissions in construction, 
this represents a significant abatement opportunity. A study found that the use of wood for the supporting 
structure of buildings allows between 35 and 56 per cent less GHG than conventional construction methods 
for detached and semi-detached houses and 9 to 48 per cent less for apartment buildings (Hafner et al., 
2017).
Moreover, several projects indicate that the construction of high-rise buildings that fulfil the required 
technical requirements (such as fire protection) is possible. These projects consist of HoHo Wien (Vienna, 
Austria), the largest wood high-rise building in the world and the Garmisch-Partenkirchen tax office 
(Germany). From the standpoint of climate change, the sustainable cultivation of wood is an absolute 
requirement for increasing the share of wood construction.
Other approaches: 
On the next page are some additional alternatives to conventional construction.
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Insulation materials from renewable raw materials (strategy: material substitution, circular economy): 
Conventional insulation materials such as polystyrene, glass, and mineral wool are CO₂-intensive in the 
manufacturing phase and, to a lesser degree, in the disposal phase (e.g., the thermal energy recovery of 
polystyrene). Insulation from renewable raw materials such as flax, hemp, wood fibres, jute, sheep’s wool, 
straw, and cellulose represent climate-friendly alternatives to conventional materials as long as the cultiva-
tion of the crops meet sustainability criteria. Relative to conventional insulation, the alternative approaches 
can have a significantly better CO₂ balance in the areas of raw material harvesting, production, processing, 
and demolition (FNR, 2017).
According to manufacturers, many insulation materials from renewable raw materials exhibit heat conduc-
tivity that is similarly low to conventional insulation (approx. 0.04 W/(m·K)) while meeting the necessary 
construction requirements when properly installed, including fire safety (FNR, 2017). Today, natural 
insulation often costs more than conventional insulation, but the cheaper price of conventional insulation 
does not take into account its environmental damage from CO₂ emissions. In Germany, for example, the 
share of natural insulation materials in construction is still comparatively low – 7 per cent (DUH, 2016).
Loam construction (strategy: material substitution, circular economy): 
Loam is a widely available, alternative construction material. In contrast to many mineral-based building 
materials such as cement (concrete) and lime, loam does not have to be heated in an energy and CO₂-inten-
sive process; it hardens in the air. Generally, loam-based components can be simply converted back to 
natural loam after the usage phase, which makes circular use possible. In this way, loam has a better 
eco-balance than many other mineral building materials. In 2019, Europe’s largest office building made 
from loam (13,500 square metres, 500 employees) opened at the Alnatura Campus in Darmstadt, Germany. 
Its façade consists entirely of loam (Alnatura, 2018). An obstacle to the broad use of loam is its significantly 
higher cost, but these could fall considerably if the industrial production of loam-based components is 
initiated.
Building without basements (strategy: material efficiency and, if needed, material substitution): 
The building of a basement demands a comparatively large amount of concrete. One of the main components 
of concrete is cement, which produces large amounts of CO₂ during its manufacture. By foregoing base-
ments, the use of concrete in new constructions can be reduced.
This is already done in some cases today in order to save costs. If the loss of space is compensated by a taller 
construction, any increase in energy for heating and cooling must be taken into account. In urban areas, 
where living and storage areas are small and expensive, this probably does not represent an attractive 
option in the foreseeable future. In rural areas, however, it could be an option for a more climate-friendly 
way of construction.
Carbon concrete (strategy: material substitution):  
Carbon concrete is a relatively new construction material. It serves as a replacement for reinforced concrete 
and significantly reduces material use. Reinforced concrete is the most-used construction material in 
Europe (Celsa Group, 2020) and it is predominantly used in high-rise buildings and in the construction of 
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infrastructure such as bridges. Because steel corrodes on contact with rain and oxygen, the steel in rein-
forced concrete is generally surrounded with significantly more concrete than would be necessary for the 
structural properties of the component. A possible alternative is carbon concrete, also known as textile- 
reinforced concrete. It consists of a carbon fibre or textile fibre lattice surrounded by concrete (Carbon 
Concrete Composite, 2019; Fraunhofer WKI, 2018). Because the grid structure materials do not rust, up to 
75 per cent less concrete can be used. Moreover, textile-reinforced concrete has comparable or even better 
structural properties than steel-reinforced concrete (Carbon Concrete Composite, 2019). According to 
manufacturers, the use of carbon concrete in building construction and renovation can reduce emissions by 
almost 50 per cent (Carbon Concrete Composite, 2019). A further, important area of application is the 
modernisation of bridges built with reinforced concrete. Currently, there is still much uncertainty about 
whether carbon concrete is recyclable. Recent studies have shown the succesful recycling of carbon 
concrete under laboratory conditions (Carbon Concrete Composite, 2019). For the widespread use of carbon 
concrete, complete recyclability must be the goal. In 2020, the first house completely built using carbon 
concrete was built in Dresden, Germany. Some bridges have already been modernised using carbon 
 concrete. 
Cement substitution with lower-carbon cement (material substitution): 
Sometimes material substitution or material efficiency can be achieved within a given type of material. For 
example, there are many types of cement and concrete products that vary widely in terms of CO₂ intensity. 
This means that, in many instances, it is possible to substitute more CO₂-intensive cement and concrete 
types with much less CO₂-intensive ones.  
One of the ways this can be done is by better targeting different concrete types to different applications 
within a particular construction project. Often construction companies do not minimise the CO₂ footprint of 
the concrete they use because, to save on logistical costs, they will apply common cement types to a range of 
applications within a building, which in reality have very different structural performance and durability 
requirements. This barrier can be overcome, however, if specific incentives are put in place to encourage 
the optimal use of CO₂-intensive materials. For instance, labelling and/or regulatory requirements on the 
embedded CO₂ intensity of materials used in buildings and public works can help to shift these behaviours. 
Such measures are already being implemented in certain member states (see discussion in Part D of this 
study).  
Regulatory frameworks: 
There are many ways to incentivise the use of alternative construction materials and they cannot be set out 
in detail here. If the advantages and disadvantages of alternative construction materials are to be evaluated 
fairly, it is vital that regulations be adjusted to contemplate the lifecycle assessment approach in construc-
tion manufacturing, usage, and disposal. A first important step would be to take account of grey energy and 
grey emissions – i.e., the primary energy requirements and the CO₂ emissions arising in the manufacture of 
construction materials – when evaluating the energy efficiency and CO₂ balance of buildings and infra-
structure projects.
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carbon for the production of electricity-based 
synthetic gases. 
It must be noted, however, that the potential of 
biomass is limited and its extent is disputed (see also 
Klepper/Thrän, 2019). For example, the German 
Federal Environment Ministry has spoken out against 
the cultivation of biomass solely for use as an energy 
source because it would create “competition for use of 
areas for cultivation and have negative effects on 
water, soil, biodiversity and nature conservation” 
(UBA, 2019a). 
Moreover, biomass exhibits a high potential for 
reducing GHG emissions over its entire lifecycle only 
under certain conditions (Klepper/Thrän, 2019). For 
example, GHG emissions of biomass can be consider-
able over a lifecycle if many fertilisers and pesticides 
are used in its cultivation, if the transport routes of 
the harvested biomass are long and/or the conversion 
steps in the manufacturing process have high losses. 
So far, no political decision has been made about how 
to allocate available biomass to the industrial, trans-
port, conversion, and building sectors in the future.
6  Key low-carbon technologies in the 
steel, chemical and cement sectors 
(overview) 
The following overview briefly presents the 13 key 
technologies discussed in this study and assigns each 
to five of the nine CO₂ mitigation strategies we 
described in Section B5. Some of the key technologies 
can be assigned to more than one strategy. A compre-
hensive presentation of the individual technologies 
and processes can be found in the Sections on steel, 
chemicals, and cement in Part E of this study. The 
presentation of the key technologies does not make 
any claim to be exhaustive. They were selected by the 
authors of the study based on an assessment of their 
future prospects. The following short descriptions of 
the key technologies have been simplified to make 
them easier to understand.
5.8 Increasing energy efficiency 
Increasing energy efficiency is an important strategy 
for significantly reducing industrial GHG emissions. 
In contrast to energy efficiency in cross-cutting 
technologies15, energy efficiency in energy-intensive 
sectors is already approaching its physical limits. Due 
to process emissions, it is clear that energy efficiency 
alone is insufficient to create basic materials indus-
tries that are climate-neutral. Nevertheless, in the 
short to medium term energy efficiency can contrib-
ute to the reduction of energy demand and CO₂ 
emissions. 
The replacement of Europe’s existing (and aging) 
basic materials production plants promises meaning-
ful efficiency potential as well. But such investments 
should only be made if they do not lead to the lock-in 
of emission-intensive processes in the long term. In 
some cases, it would make sense to design production 
plants that are flexible in handling electricity demand 
in order to help integrate intermittent renewable 
energy, even though this might have negative effects 
on efficiency (Agora Energiewende, 2016).
5.9 Use of biomass 
Reductions in CO₂ emissions in the basic materials 
industry can also be achieved by replacing fossil fuels 
with biomass. Meaningful potential areas of biomass 
use in the basic materials industry are heat and the 
provision of feedstock for basic chemicals. Possible 
areas of application in the long term would be the use 
of biomass in combination with CCS in cement kilns 
to achieve negative emissions (BECCS) or as a 
 climate- neutral carbon supplier in the hydrogen- 
based production of steel. Many scenarios mostly rely 
on the use of biomass in the industrial sector for the 
production of low- and medium-temperature heat. 
They argue that biomass can be efficiently used in 
this area. Moreover, there’s the possibility of using 
CO₂ from burning biomass as a renewable source of 
15 Technologies are considered “cross-cutting” if they are 
relevant for multiple application areas or economic sectors. 
Such technologies include electrical motors and pumps.
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Key low-carbon technologies for a (mostly) GHG-neutral steel production  Table B.3








and smelting in 




This route involves a two-tiered production process. With direct 
reduction using hydrogen, hydrogen is used instead of coke (C) 
to extract iron in direct-reduction plants. This eliminates CO₂ 
emissions in iron ore reduction. The process produces a spongy 
mass known as direct reduced iron (DRI) that is then smelted into 
crude steel in an electric-arc furnace. (Scrap steel can be smelted 
together with raw steel at this stage.) If hydrogen is produced 
using 100 per cent renewable energy, this route is virtually CO₂-
neutral. 
-97 per cent before 2025(initially with 
natural gas)
Iron electrolysis 
and smelting in 




The process of electrolysis reduces iron ore to pig iron in a caustic 
soda solution. Afterwards, an electric arc furnace smelts the crude 
steel. A carbon-based reduction agent is no longer required. The 
process promises a clear increase in energy efficiency relative to 
the blast-furnace route and could be nearly CO₂-free if powered 
mostly by renewable electricity. 
-87 per cent 2040–2045
HIsarna® process 
in combination 
with CO₂ capture 
and storage
Strategy: CCS
The HIsarna® process is an innovative, carbon-based smelting 
technology that eliminates the need for certain agglomeration 
steps (coking plant, sintering/pelleting) in steel production. Iron 
ore, which can be mixed with up to 50 per cent scrap, is reduced 
directly to pig iron in a single reactor. The process enables CO₂ 
reductions of up to 86 per cent. Moreover, because the CO₂ 
exhaust is relatively pure, it is particularly suitable for CCS. 
The captured CO₂ would then have to be transported via a CO₂ 
infrastructure and injected into suitable storage locations.
-86 per cent 2030–2035







CCU and green 
hydrogen
The CCU process captures some of the smelting gases from blast 
furnaces and uses them for the production of reusable chemical 
materials (e.g., methanol, ethanol, synthetic fuels, and ammonia). 
The gas elements in the smelters no longer have to be burnt and 
could also be substituted for petroleum in the chemical industry. 
The low-carbon production of reusable chemical materials such 
as methanol (a raw material for plastic production), requires the 
generation of additional green hydrogen. As a result, this route 
demands large amounts of electricity.
-63 per cent 2025–2030
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Key low-carbon technologies for (mostly) GHG-neutral chemical production  Table B.4











Power-to-heat helps make the electrical system more flexible and 
allows the direct use of electricity for the production of heat and 
steam. With power-to-heat, the use of fossil fuels in CHP plants or 
gas boilers could be avoided or reduced in the future. If 100 per cent 
renewable electricity is used, the heat and steam could be produced 
without CO₂ emissions. Both electrode boilers (for temperatures up 
to around 500 degrees Celsius) and high-temperature heat pumps (in 
combination with mechanical vapour compressors for temperatures 
up to 200 degrees Celsius) can be used for this approach. 
-100 per cent Starting in 2020
CO₂ capture (CCS) 
in combined heat 
and power (CHP) 
plants in the 
chemicals industry 
Strategy: CCS
By switching to carbon capture (CCS) technologies, the emissions of 
existing CHP plants for chemical processes could be reduced by up to 
90 per cent. The captured CO₂ would have to transported away after 
capture via a CO₂ infrastructure such as pipelines or ships. The CO₂ 
could then be placed in suitable storage locations such as empty gas 
and oil fields in the North Sea.







When producing green hydrogen, electrolysis separates water 
molecules into hydrogen and oxygen. Various processes exist for 
electrolysis: alkaline electrolysis, PEM (polymer electrolyte membrane) 
electrolysis and high-temperature electrolysis. If the electricity comes 
entirely from renewable energy, the hydrogen can be produced 
without emitting CO₂.
-100 per cent 2020–2030
Alternative 










economy, CCU if 
needed
In the methanol-to-olefin (MTO) and methanol-to-aromatics (MTA) 
route, olefins and aromatics can be produced from green methanol or 
synthetic gas (H₂ and CO). This eliminates the need for steam crackers 
and the CO₂ emissions they produce. For carbon-free methanol 
production, green hydrogen and eventually a carbon source would be 
needed from non-fossil sources (such as waste plastic, biomass, or 








Chemical recycling makes it possible to reuse plastic waste as 
feedstock for the chemical industry instead of burning it. In the 
process, the plastic waste is converted to useful gases (gasification) 
or to liquid oil (pyrolysis) and then made into alternative feedstock for, 
say, steam crackers that replaces virgin feedstock such as naphtha. 
This eliminates CO₂ emissions from burning waste plastics and the 
manufacture of naphtha as a feedstock.












The electrification of high-temperature heat can completely eliminate 
direct CO₂ emissions from steam crackers. Emissions arise from 
burning part of the feedstock (e.g. naphtha) for process heat (600 – 
900 degrees Celsius). It is also important that alternative, non-fossil 
feedstock from chemical recycling (e.g. pyrolysis oil) are not burnt. In 
this way, the carbon contained in the feedstock can be used multiple 
times if needed. (See chemical recycling.) 
-100 per cent 2030–2040
STUDY | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe | PART B 
65
The EU must take advantage of the reinvestment 
windows to deploy key low-carbon technologies. 
This is the only way to ensure an effective transition 
that minimises the risk of stranded assets. But the 
commercial availability of the necessary technologies 
varies from industry to industry. Accordingly, the 
policies for their upscaling and gradual deployment 
will have to reflect specific circumstances for 
reinvestment in each sector.
The question of reinvestment is all the more impor-
tant because large parts of the EU’s basic materials 
industries are at a crossroads. By 2030, roughly 
48 per cent of primary steel capacity, 53 per cent of 
steam cracker capacity and an estimated 30 per cent 
7  Reinvestment cycles of major EU 
 basic materials industries repre-
sent an opportunity for a smooth 
 industrial transformation
As described in Section B2, reinvestment cycles are of 
crucial importance for decarbonising industry. Due to 
the long lifetimes of industrial assets, investment 
decisions create long path dependencies. At a time 
when climate neutrality is emerging as the new 
paradigm, industrial reinvestments to substitute 
existing production capacities at the end of their 
lifetimes must be aligned with climate neutrality to 
avoid carbon lock-in and the risk of stranded assets.  
Wuppertal Institute/Agora Energiewende, 2021
Key low-carbon technologies for (mostly) GHG-neutral cement production  Table B.5










Carbon capture using the Oxyfuel process captures a large part 
of the process- and fuel-related CO₂ emissions in cement clinker 
production. The use of oxygen for the burning process simplifies 
the separation and increases the capture rate of the CO₂ to around 
90 per cent. The CO₂ would then have to be transported away 
using a CO₂ infrastructure and finally placed in a suitable storage 
location.
-90 per cent 2025–2030









In the LEILAC process, a special, indirectly heated steel vessel is 
used as the calciner. The process results in a pure CO₂ exhaust, 
which simplifies carbon capture. This allows some 85 to 90 per 
cent of total process-related emissions to be captured. The 
approach also enables the electrification of high-temperature 
heat, which eliminates energy-related emissions from the calciner. 
All in all, this eliminates around 77 to 80 per cent of the emissions 
from the clinker burning process.









Alternative binding agents allow the manufacture of concrete 
without the use of conventional cement clinker. By lowering the 
proportion of limestone, the process-related emissions can be 
reduced. In addition, the production processes are more energy 
efficient because the manufacturing process is carried out at 
lower temperature levels. Because the various alternative binding 
agents are in different stages of development, it is impossible to 
offer a final estimate of future market share, production costs and 
CO₂ reduction potentials.
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“campaign”) until they need relining, a major retrofit 
that takes several months. Campaigns are sometimes 
interrupted in response to a major slump in demand. 
Over the past 20 years Europe saw little investment 
in new blast furnaces, and none since 2008. Euro-
pean operators have focused on maintaining their 
productive capacities by regularly relining existing 
blast furnaces. We assume that all blast furnaces in 
the production stock have a remaining lifetime of 
twenty years based on the most recent relining date.17 
17 Steel plant operators have some flexibility in extending 
the length of a blast furnace campaign, in particular if 
they decide not to retrofit the installation but operate it to 
wear and tear.
of cement production capacity16 will reach the end of 
their lifetimes. 
7.1  Reinvestment cycles in the  
EU steel  industry 
Here we focus on reinvestment requirements for 
primary steelmaking, specifically for the relining of 
blast furnaces. As the core units for iron ore reduction, 
blast furnaces (BF) are the most emission-intensive 
of integrated steel plants.
Our analysis of the capacities to be reinvested are 
based on a database of today’s active blast furnaces 
and those held as a reserve. Blast furnaces are usually 
operated for a period of 20 to 25 years (known as a 
16 The number was extrapolated from German data in 
absence of a full site-specific dataset for Europe.
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2020
 * Steam crackers are normally maintained and modernised continuously so that they do not have to be replaced all at once. 
  Nevertheless, the graph provides a rough estimate of the reinvestment needs for existing facilities.
 ** Cement data represent numbers for Germany only. We estimate that the reinvestment requirements for the EU27 are in a similar range.
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Reinvestment needs by 2030 and direct employment in cement, 
steel and basic chemicals in the EU
Figure B.9
STUDY | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe | PART B 
67
the numerous plans and projects for DRI investments 
by EU steel manufacturers (Table B.7).  
Given Europe’s goal of achieving climate neutrality by 
2050 and reducing CO₂ emissions on the order of 
55 per cent by 2030, it is reasonable to assume that 
there will be no more investment in coal-based blast 
furnaces. Instead, we assume that of the blast furnace 
capacity slated to reach the end of its lifetime by 
2030 (50 Mt of primary steel capacity), 90 per cent 
will be replaced by plants to produce direct reduced 
iron.18 For the remaining 10 per cent, we assume the 
substitution by scrap-based secondary steel produc-
tion plants (electric arc furnaces). 
Direct reduced iron (DRI) for primary steel produc-
tion: To allow for sufficient time for upscaling, 
planning, licensing, and implementing DRI plants, it 
may be necessary to postpone early reinvestment 
requirements.19 This would allow primary steelmak-
ers to replace all 45 Mt of the EU27’s blast furnace 
capacity slated for reinvestment with DRI before 
2030. Assuming a 90 per cent utilisation rate, this 
translates into 41 Mt of DRI production in 2030. 
In a first step, DRI plants can run on natural gas, 
allowing for a GHG reduction of about -66 per cent 
relative to the integrated blast furnace route. By 2030 
18 For DRI-based steelmaking, two production routes are 
possible. The DRI could be either smelted in electric arc 
furnaces for direct steel production or be smelted in a 
submerged arc furnace for use in existing basic oxygen 
furnaces in established integrated routes. 
19 Blast furnaces that require relining before 2025 repre-
sent a specific challenge. Given the time for licensing and 
construction (2–4 years), some of the decisions regard-
ing relining may have already been taken. At the same 
time, the corona pandemic may offer an opportunity 
for reconsidering such reinvestments and preparing a 
transformative approach. For operators, that could mean 
extending the lifetime of their blast furnaces with minor 
refurbishments by 3 to 10 years allowing for time to 
develop alternatives. Policymakers also need to establish 
an appropriate policy regime for accelerating reinvest-
ment in DRI or EAF plants. 
Germany produces the highest share of primary steel 
in Europe – 31 Mt/year, or one-third of the total. Its 
manufacturers emit 59 MtCO₂/year. France holds the 
second position with around 22 Mt of GHG emissions, 
followed by Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, 
Belgium, and Poland, which release 10–12 Mt of GHG 
emissions each. 
Table B.6 shows that the first five-year period 
ranging from today to 2025 would require reinvest-
ments amounting to 18 Mt of hot iron. In reality, these 
capacities are at risk of not being reinvested due to 
the economic effects of the corona pandemic and 
existing overcapacities. Some countries (Austria, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Poland) could be seriously 
affected, standing to lose as much as half of their 
respective capacity. For the transformation of 
Europe’s steel industry by 2050, the 2025–2030 
period is key: 30 per cent of today’s existing blast 
furnace capacity will require retrofit or substitution, 
with country specific shares of up to 100 per cent. 
Some countries with smaller production capacities 
(Hungary, Romania, Sweden) will follow in the next 
period. From 2030 to 2035, the transformation will 
have impacted all countries producing primary steel. 
Total reinvestment needs in the period amount to 
26 Mt, equivalent to 25 per cent of total primary steel 
capacity. The UK will see its highest reinvestment 
needs (61 per cent) during this period. The last 
five-year period, 2036 to 2040, will require reinvest-
ments of about 28 Mt in the EU27 (27 per cent), which 
is similar to the previous period.
7.2  Using the reinvestment cycles in the 
EU steel industry for the deployment  
of  climate-neutral technologies 
For a smooth transition of the EU’s steel sector, it is 
important that the upcoming reinvestment cycle is 
used to deploy key low-carbon technologies that are 
compatible with climate neutrality. The technology 
for the production of direct reduced iron (DRI) is both 
compatible with climate neutrality and mature 
enough so that it can be deployed on a commercial 
scale in the EU well before 2030. This is illustrated by 
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Material Economics, 2019, assumes specific emissions of primary steelmaking for the EU27+UK at 1.9 tCO₂ per tonne of crude steel. Total GHG 
emission for the production of 101.1 Mt of crude steel was calculated at 202 MtCO2eq. While in some EU member states coking plants and 
 sintering are reported as part of the integrated blast furnace route, in other EU countries that is not the case. We thus assigned country- specific 
emissions factors according to the mean emission factor of hot-iron manufacture in the EU: 2.1 tCO₂ per tonne. This accounts for different scrap 
usage rates in the basic oxygen furnace and the different emission factors of crude steelmaking between the countries.












































































































































































13.1 0.1 0.7 13.0 7.4 6.3 2.9 (40%) 0.7 (9%) 0.7 (9%) 2.9 (41%)
10.3 0.3 2.5 10.0 5.4 4.9 2.1 (50%) 2.1 (50%)
0.1 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
7.6 0.0 0.2 7.6 4.3 3.7 2.4 (44%) 2.0 (37%) 1.0 (19%)
58.8 1.6 12.4 57.3 31.0 27.8 4.2 (13%) 12.3 (37%) 8.2 (24%) 8.9 (26%)
10.4 1.2 9.6 9.2 4.8 4.5 2.4 (50%) 2.4 (50%)
5.5 0.2 1.3 5.4 2.7 2.6 1.3 (50%) 1.3 (50%)
22.6 0.6 4.8 22.0 10.7 10.7 5.5 (46%) 1.0 (8%) 5.5 (46%)
0.2 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.7 0.0 0.3 2.7 1.6 1.3 0.7 (50%) 0.7 (50%)
12.8 2.4 19.3 10.4 4.7 5.1 0.5 (5%) 2.0 (23%) 6.2 (72%)
0.3 0.3 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
12.7 0.0 0.0 12.7 6.8 6.1 2.5 (42%) 3.5 (58%)
11.2 0.6 4.6 10.6 5.7 5.2 3.6 (47%) 2.5 (33%) 1.5 (20%)
0.3 0.3 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.1 0.1 1.0 4.0 2.3 1.9 3.7 (100%)
6.6 0.2 1.6 6.4 3.1 3.1 3.0 (100%)
8.5 0.0 0.4 8.5 4.6 4.1 4.1 (100%)
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
    ∑ 187.9 8.2 65.8 179.7 95.1 87.2 18.4 (18%) 31.5 (30%) 26.4 (25%) 27.9 (27%)
12.6 0.2 1.5 12.3 6.0 6.0 2.1 (29%) 0.8 (10%) 4.3 (61%)
 + 202.1 10.1 67.3 192.0 101.1 93.2 20.5 (18%) 32.3 (29%) 30.8 (28%) 27.9 (25%)
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Electric arc furnaces for secondary steel production: 
The electric arc furnace route that produces steel 
from scrap is another route that is compatible with 
climate neutrality. We conservatively assume that 
10 per cent of the primary steel production capacity 
requiring reinvestment before 2030 will be converted 
to electric arc furnaces, equivalent to an increased 
production of 4.6 Mt of secondary steel in 2030. The 
specific emission reduction per tonne of crude steel is 
1.68 tCO₂ (-93 per cent), which translates into 
emission reductions of 8 MtCO₂ for 2030.22 
Overall, this ambitious scenario allows for an emis-
sion reduction of 74 MtCO₂ by 2030 compared with a 
business-as-usual scenario with reinvestments in 
coal-based blast furnaces. 
22 The Swedish steel company SSAB has already announced 
plans to replace approx. 1.5 Mt of conventional steelmak-
ing capacity in Luleå with new electric arc furnaces to be 
built directly at the rolling plant in Oxeloesund by 2025.
we assume that sufficient amounts of clean hydrogen 
will be available to operate these plants with a 65 per 
cent share of carbon-neutral hydrogen and a 35 per 
cent share of natural gas (by energy content20). This 
mix will allow for an emission reduction of -89 per 
cent (1.6 tCO₂ of crude steel) relative to the blast 
furnace route, equivalent to 66 MtCO₂ reduction 
compared with a business-as-usual scenario, in 
which manufacturers continue to reinvest in con-
ventional blast furnaces.21 
20 Due to the scarcity of hydrogen and the advantage of 
maintaining some carbon in the steelmaking process, we 
have decided to limit the share of hydrogen initially to 
65 per cent. 
21 We estimate that for this scenario around 50 TWh of 
green hydrogen are required in 2030. For the pre-heating 
of pellets another 17 TWh of electricity or green hydrogen 
will be required. 
Overview of DRI plant investments announced by European steel companies  Table B.7
Agora Energiewende, 2021 Status: February 2021
Project, Site Country Company Status Quo Fuel Timeline
HYBRIT,  
Lulea
SSAB Started pilot operation with clean 
 hydrogen in 2020






MoU signed with Romanian govern-











Plan to produce 0.4 Mt green steel 
with green hydrogen by 2025,  
3 Mt of green steel by 2030





Planned construction of an H2-DRI 
demo plant to produce 0.1 Mt DRI/year





Salzgitter Construction of DRI pilot plant in 
Salzgitter 





Construction of pilot with capacity of 
0.25 Mt DRI/a





Plans to build DRI plant, ongoing 






Plans to start hybrid DRI/BF plant and 
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the most important feedstock for the European 
petrochemical industry today. 
The basic products of the petrochemical industry are 
so-called high value chemicals (HVC), such as olefins 
and aromatics, which are processed into polymers 
(plastics) and solvents. In Europe, the industry largely 
uses refinery co-products such as naphtha as input, 
which accounted for 78 per cent of the feedstock of 
the European petrochemical industry in 2017 
(Deloitte, 2019). In recent years, however, cheap 
ethane – a co-product of surging shale gas production 
in the US – has been playing an increasingly impor-
tant role.23 
The major production plants for olefins and aromatics 
today are listed in Table B.8.
23 In the US, shale gas and its co-products have largely 
replaced products from oil refineries as feedstock. 
Due to exports of ethane to Europe, some substitution 
has been induced. However, in East Asia, the world’s 
 fastest-growing market, naphtha continues to be the 
most important feedstock.
As this analysis has shown, reinvestment decisions 
during the upcoming reinvestment cycle in the 
European steel industry will be critical for its transi-
tion. Creating an investment framework for low- 
carbon technologies will be key to harnessing the 
huge potential for GHG abatement and clean produc-
tion that this strategic sector offers (see Part D). 
7.3  Reinvestment cycles in the  
EU petrochemical industry
The transition to climate neutrality is a major chal-
lenge for the European petrochemical industry, where 
CO₂-intensive steam crackers play an important role. 
Unlike blast furnaces in the steel sector, steam 
crackers do not have clearly defined reinvestment 
cycles because they can be continuously maintained 
and modernised. Nevertheless, the European petro-
chemical industry faces some landmark decisions in 
the coming decade. On the one hand, emissions must 
be reduced to contribute to the EU 2030 climate 
target of -55 per cent; on the other, the ramp-up of 
electric vehicles and the predicted decline in refinery 
products could create a shortage of naphtha, which is 
Petrochemical production processes and their relevance in the EU  Table B.8
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021
Process Feedstock Products Relevance for petrochemical 
production in the EU
Steam Cracking Naphtha, ethane, 
LPG, gasoil, hydro-
waxes
Main products are ethylene, pro-
pylene, butadiene, and BTX; yield 
structure depends on feedstock




Propane Propylene Important niche  
technology




Gasoline and other fuels;  
propylene as major by-product
Relevant for propylene  
supply in EU
Catalytic Reforming (CR) Heavy naphtha Reformate fuel (gasoline),  
BTX as major by-product: 
BTX: 0.88 (t of BTX/t of naphtha)
H₂: 0,03 (t of H₂/t of naphtha)








Methanol Paraxylene and toluene No industrial scale unit 
 worldwide
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and new investments are being made in Spain and 
Belgium. Additional investments are also being made 
in Poland.
By contrast, a conspicuous reluctance to invest is 
observable in continental Europe. Due to the 
increased costs for transport and access to the new 
feedstocks traded on the world market, sites here are 
less attractive. For this reason, crackers in continental 
Europe – all of which are closely linked to refinery 
complexes – will be at a crossroads by 2035. The only 
option to continue production without major adjust-
ments would be to resort to imported naphtha. 
Medium and heavy naphtha could become cheaper in 
the medium term if the introduction of electric 
vehicles in the passenger car sector picks up speed. 
However, processing these feedstocks is more 
CO₂-intensive than when using light naphtha (the 
most widespread type of naphtha in use today) and it 
is debatable whether this is compatible with the EU’s 
stricter 2030 climate target of -55 per cent.
Making decisions in this complex market environ-
ment that are compatible with the long-term goal of 
climate neutrality will be a major challenge in the 
coming decades. Steam crackers play a key role 
because as existing core assets they have an impor-
tance that is similar to that of blast furnaces in the 
steel sector. Technically, steam crackers can be 
operated more flexibly, allowing individual lines to be 
temporarily shut down. Unlike blast furnaces, 
crackers do not run continuously for twenty years 
before they can be overhauled. This means that 
retrofits or even the replacement of individual 
furnaces can be carried out any time. However, steam 
crackers are operated at the highest possible capacity 
utilisation due to their high capital costs. Although 
crackers can be operated with proper maintenance 
for longer than 60 years in some cases, an observa-
tion of retrofits and closures in Europe to date shows 
that the furnaces are usually only operated for 35 to 
50 years before they are fully replaced or shut down. 
Since the type of feedstock used can be changed 
when the furnaces are replaced, the reinvestment 
Today, steam crackers are the most important 
production facilities for the petrochemical industry 
in Europe. They are mostly integrated into local refin-
ery complexes or connected to them via pipeline 
infrastructures. In the coming decades, a decline in 
production from refinery-embedded processes such 
as fluidized bed catalytic cracking and catalytic 
reforming can be expected due to the decreasing 
demand for fuels that result from a growing share of 
electric vehicles. As refineries supply part of the 
feedstocks for the chemical industry, this could make 
the role of steam crackers even more important in the 
future. However, refinery closures would also reduce 
supply of light naphtha, which is the most important 
steam cracker feedstock today.
Over the past 15 years, steam cracker operators have 
become partially independent of local refinery 
integration. For example, terminals and tank farms 
for ethane have been built at coastal locations to 
import this typically cheap co-product of shale gas 
production in the USA. There are also very large 
reserves of so-called "natural gas liquids" in the 
Middle East, which can be imported as convenient 
cracker feedstock.
For the production of ethylene, ethane crackers on the 
European coast usually serve as the cost reference 
today.24 The cracker retrofits undertaken in the past 
10 years have included measures to enable the use of 
ethane as an exclusive or additional feedstock. 
However, this has made it more difficult to cover the 
market for propylene and especially for butadiene 
and aromatics, which is reflected in an increased 
price spread for these products compared with 
ethylene. This in turn allows some of the naphtha 
crackers, which have a higher yield for these prod-
ucts, to produce economically. The dedicated produc-
tion of propylene via propane dehydrogenation (PDH) 
plants has also gained importance in Europe in recent 
years. Existing plants are currently being expanded 
24 A rare temporary exception occurred during  
the spring of 2020.
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Due to the low level of new investments in the past 
30 years, almost 90 per cent of the plants will require 
reinvestment by 2045, which means that they can be 
adapted to new feedstocks or operating methods  
(e.g. electric cracking) or make room for new types of 
cycle winds up being determined by the age of the 
plant as well as the opportunity to adjust for new 
market conditions. Our estimates for the reinvest-
ment cycles and capacities of each period can be 
found in Table B.9.
Steam cracker emissions and reinvestment cycles per EU country  Table B.9


















































































0.4 0.5 1.1 - - 1.1 (100%) - - - -
4.6 6.0 5.5 - 1.0 (18%) - - 3.3 (60%) - 1.2 (22%)
0.7 0.9 1.2 - 1.2 (100%) - - - - -
8.5 10.7 12.8 4.1 (32%) 3.8 (30%) 2.3 (18%) - - - 2.5 (20%)
1.2 1.7 2.8 0.5 (18%) 2.3 (82%) - - - - -
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 (100%) - - - - - -
4.2 5.6 5.1 1.2 (23%) - 2.4 (46%) - 1.6 (31%) - -
0.9 1.2 1.4 0.8  (57%) - - - - - 0.6 (43%)
2.3 2.7 2.8 1.1 (39%) - - 0.8 (29%) 0.9 (32%) - -
4.2 5.4 8.0 3.2 (40%) 2.0 (25%) - 1.4 (17.5%) - - 1.4 (17.5%)
0.8 1.0 1.5 - 1.5 (100%) - - - - -
0.6 0.7 0.7 - - 0.7 (100%) - - - -
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 (100%) - - - - - -
0.6 1.0 0.7 - - - - 0.7 (100%) - -
0.0 0.0 0.5 - 0.5 (100%) - - - - -
 ∑ 29.4 38.0 45.1 11.9 (26%) 12.2 (27%) 6.4 (14%) 2.3 (6%) 6.5 (14%) - 5.8 (13%)
1.8 3.1 3.4 - 0.5 (15%) - 0.9 (28%) 1.9 (57%) - -
 + 31.3 41.1 48.5 11.9 (25%) 12.8 (26%) 6.4 (13%) 3.2 (7%) 8.4 (17%) - 5.8 (12%)
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If plastics use is to continue, closing carbon cycles 
with chemical recycling will be necessary in the long 
term to achieve climate neutrality. But the carbon 
cycle is not closed during the operation of a conven-
tional cracker: CO₂ emissions are produced by 
burning part of the product stream or natural gas to 
provide the required heat energy in the cracking 
furnaces. To avoid direct energy-based emissions, 
high-temperature heat via electricity (or hydrogen) 
would be needed. A variety of manufacturers are 
working together to develop similar approaches for 
electric cracking (see Table B.10).
In contrast to the developments mentioned so far, 
which are all being pursued by established players in 
the petrochemical industry, bio-based plastics can be 
a field for SMEs as well. The spectrum here ranges 
from alternative feedstocks to produce established 
polymers (drop-in polymers) and alternative inter-
mediates to novel polymers that can replace PET. 
Although it is not clear how quickly the decline in 
refinery products due to the ramp-up of electric 
vehicles will affect the chemical industry, it is 
important to establish alternative climate-neutral 
production technologies before 2030. This will both 
contribute to the EU's climate target of -55 per cent 
by 2030 and secure the EU chemical industry’s 
long-term competitiveness.
plants such as methanol-to-olefin or methanol- 
to-aromatics. Existing naphtha or ethane crackers 
not yet scheduled for reinvestment by 2045 could 
then be operated without technical modification with 
products from a Fischer-Tropsch plant. As long as 
Fischer-Tropsch feedstock is produced with climate- 
neutral hydrogen and carbon dioxide, cracker 
operation will be compatible with the requirements  
of climate neutrality. 
7.4  Using the reinvestment cycles in the EU 
petrochemical industry for the deployment 
of climate-neutral technologies 
Many strategies exist for a climate-neutral petro-
chemical industry, though a full description lies 
beyond the scope of this study. When it comes to 
steam crackers, this requires the elimination of 
energy-related emissions through electrification or 
CCS and switching to climate-neutral feedstocks. 
However, alternative process routes such as metha-
nol- and innovative biomass-based processes that do 
not rely on steam crackers are also conceivable. An 
alternative to the use of fossil naphtha from refineries 
as feedstock for steam crackers is the use of plastic 
waste for chemical recycling. A high-quality pyroly-
sis oil can be obtained from relatively pure waste with 
a predominant proportion of polyolefins such as 
polyethylene and polypropylene. The length of the 
hydrocarbon chains produced can be influenced by 
the choice of catalyst and the operating mode of the 
reactor in order to control the distribution of gas 
(ethane) and liquid (naphtha, gas oil). The technologies 
that are in development so far are diverse. Pyrolysis 
products can be used in modified flexible steam 
crackers, while a completely new route results from 
waste gasification. The resulting synthesis gas 
(carbon monoxide and hydrogen) can be synthesized 
into methanol (see the Waste to Chemicals project) 
and processed into olefins and aromatics in new 
methanol-to-olefin or methanol-to-aromatics 
plants.
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other building materials such as wood. Another 
promising approach is based on the principle of 
material circularity: concrete from demolition is 
crushed and the aggregates are separated and then 
either re-used as cement substitute directly (unhy-
drated cement) or brought back to cement plants for 
recarbonation and recycled to be used to produce new 
recycled clinker. But even with recycling, the indus-
try will still need to produce new cement clinker in 
the future. Roughly one-third of the emissions from 
clinker production (energy-related emissions) can be 
avoided in the future through the use of biomass or 
7.5  Reinvestment cycles in the  
EU cement industry  
There is a wide array of measures for reducing 
emissions along the cement and concrete value chain. 
These measures range from material efficiency 
through more efficient use of concrete and cement to 
alternative binders25 and material substitution with 
25 For example, the clinker content of cement can be 
reduced by replacing a portion of the clinker with 
another binder such as limestone and calcinated clay 
substitutes (“LC3” solutions).
Overview of EU petrochemical industries‘ plans for commercialisation of  
alternative production processes before 2030  Table B.10
Agora Energiewende, 2021 Status: March 2021




Sabic Chemical Recycling: Semi-commer-
cial plant for cleaning 15 kt of  
pyrolysis oil from chemical recycling 













Chemical Recycling: production 
of methanol from residual waste. 













Chemical Recycling: production of 
pyrolysis oil from waste plastics in 








Unipetrol Chemical Recycling: construction of 













CCU in long-lived products: pilot 
plant to convert metallurgical gases 











Electrochemical process: Pilot plant 
with a capacity of 20,000 t per year 
for the conversion of waste gases 














Electrified steam cracker: 
plan to build multi-megawatt 
 demonstration plant (TRL 6-7) 
Electricity 2023:
demo plant
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limestone quarries far from the coasts, so there’s a risk 
that connecting single cement works to a CO₂ pipeline 
infrastructure may prove difficult - even in the 
long-run. Besides, the use of CO₂ via CCU concepts 
will likely also require a CO₂ transport infrastructure, 
unless the CO₂ can be used in the cement plant itself.  
In Norway, the UK, and the Netherlands the develop-
ment of offshore CO₂ storage under the North Sea 
seems to face less public resistance than geological 
onshore CO₂ storage. Hence, it is likely that an inland 
CO₂ transport infrastructure will first develop close to 
coastal areas around those hubs. Besides, cement 
clinker plants close to the coast in the Baltic Sea or 
Iberian Peninsula could also be connected to the 
offshore CO₂ storage sites by CO₂ transport via ship. 
While there may still be reasons for sticking to 
the electrification of kiln heating. For the remaining 
two-thirds of process-related emissions, however, 
carbon capture technologies will likely be an indis-
pensable strategy to reach climate neutrality. This is 
because from today’s perspective the process emis-
sions in the clinker production process cannot be 
avoided. Although CO₂ capture technologies as 
end-of-pipe technology can also be applied to 
existing cement clinker production plants via 
retrofits, the actual location of cement clinker 
production plants will be an increasingly critical 
factor for the viability of CCS and the likelihood of its 
public support.
For CCS, the connection to a CO₂ infrastructure 
network is key for transporting CO₂ to long-term 
storage sites. Many cement works are located near 
Overview of European cement companies‘ plans for the deployment and  
commercialisation of CO₂ capture projects before 2030  Table B.11
Agora Energiewende, 2021 Status: February 2021




The project foresees to build an indus-
trial-scale plant to capture and store  










The project has been studying the eco-
nomic and technical feasibility of car-
bon capture in the cement sector since 
2007. The project is currently in Phase IV 
which involves developing a concept for 












Plans to build demonstration plant for 
Oxyfuel-capture (TRL 6-7). The captured 
CO₂ is intended to be used to produce 
‚reFuels‘ such as kerosene.  
2021–2024: 
demo plant




Planned construction of a CCS demon-




LEILAC I,  
Lixhe
HeidelbergCement
Pilot plant has a production volume 10 t 
of cement clinker/hour (TRL 4-5)
2019: started 
pilot operation 
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existing clinker production sites (such as proximity 
to limestone quarries or the local customer base), each 
reinvestment window offers the opportunity to move 
clinker production to sites where a connection to a 
CO₂ transport infrastructure is easier and thus more 
likely. Consequently, the existing practice of trans-
porting cement clinker to cement mills that only grind 
the clinker to cement for local markets is likely to 
increase in the future. 
Apart from that, there are several CO₂ capture 
technologies available – Oxyfuel CCS, LEILAC, and 
post-combustion CCS technologies (see Part E, 
cement) – and the specific plant design needs to 
match the technology choice for CO₂ capturing, even 
if they are only to be added as part of a future retrofit. 
Given the long technical lifetimes of cement plants 
- between 50 and 60 years – each reinvestment 
decision should devise an individual decarbonisation 
roadmap that is in line with achieving climate 
neutrality by 2050. In the coming decade, we 
 estimate that around 30 per cent of existing cement 
clinker production capacity will reach the end of its 
lifetime by 2030 and will require reinvestment.26 
Several European cement companies are working on 
commercialising CO₂ capture technologies and 
long-term CO₂ storage before 2030 (see Table B.11). 
We assume that by 2030 around 10 cement plants 
that are close to the Atlantic Ocean or to navigable 
rivers could be connected to long-term CO₂ storage 
sites that are currently being developed in the 
Netherlands and Norway. This could reduce emis-
sions by 9 MtCO₂ by 2030. In the future, the develop-
ment of a CO₂ infrastructure could also pave the way 
for negative emissions via BECCS. By using a large 
share of sustainable biomass in its fuel mix and 
sequestering the biogenic carbon share, cement 
works that are connected to a CO₂ infrastructure can 
generate negative emissions.  
26 These estimates represent numbers for Germany only. 
But we assume that the required reinvestment in the 
EU27 will be on a similar order. 
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Part C:  Regulatory framework and policy instruments 
for the development and introduction of key 
low-carbon technologies
1 Introduction 
Achieving the long-term goal of climate neutrality for 
Europe requires an industrial policy framework that 
incentivises the development, scaling and 
deployment of key low-carbon technologies. This is 
crucial for mitigating climate change and for 
positioning Europe as a leader in the global race for 
the development of climate-neutral technologies and 
sustainable industrial production hubs.
By signing the Paris Climate Agreement, virtually 
every country in the world acknowledged that 
sustainable economies and climate-friendly 
technologies will be needed to ensure the well-being 
of their citizens in 2050. Creating a climate-neutral 
industry holds important market opportunities in 
addition to environmental benefits. If Europe can get 
an early start, its companies stand to be pioneers in 
the field of climate-neutral technologies and shapers 
of global change.
There are many promising low-carbon 
manufacturing processes, and some of them have 
already been tested successfully in pilot projects 
(see Parts B and E). But if companies in the steel, 
chemicals and cement industries are to adopt them, 
they will need clear policy signals and a reliable 
regulatory framework. Without policy guidelines and 
incentives, businesses will not internalise the 
external costs of emission-intensive processes such 
as air pollution, global warming and health problems.
Individual policy instruments alone cannot cover the 
range of requirements for key low-carbon 
technologies in various stages of development. 
Emerging technologies require different incentives 
from those that are ready to be scaled at the industrial 
level. Moreover, the demands that policy instruments 
must satisfy vary by sector. 
This section presents policies that can be combined 
into a coherent framework that applies maximum 
leverage for creating a climate-neutral industry. The 
focus is on the mechanisms of policy instruments – 
presenting their different approaches, strengths and 
weaknesses and putting them in relation to each 
other. Part D develops policy recommendations that 
can convert individual instruments into a systematic 
strategy. However, we do not provide specific 
recommendations on the definition of such strategies 
on the level of EU member states and their relation 
with a broader European enabling environment. 
Rather, the strategy should result from discussions 
between political decisionmakers, industrial 
representatives, trade unions and other stakeholders. 
By sketching out a possible policy framework, this 
section provides a robust foundation for those 
discussions. 
1.1 Policy instrument criteria for  
a  climate-neutral industry
Independent of the state of development of key 
low-carbon technologies, the goal of climate-
neutrality in the steel, chemicals and cement sectors 
places particular demands on policy instruments.  
 → Send robust investment signals: First and 
foremost, policy instruments must offer certainty 
for the planning of capital-intensive, long-term 
investment in new production processes. Any 
uncertainties about the policy framework will 
negatively influence business behaviour, impede 
innovation and leave companies reluctant to invest 
in new technologies.  To remove these uncertainties 
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and to create a reliable framework for the adoption 
of climate-neutral technologies, an array of 
different policies is needed. A reliable, long-term 
regulatory framework is also necessary so that 
companies invest in new climate-friendly plants 
and equipment when existing facilities reach the 
end of their operating lifetimes, as many are 
scheduled to do over the next ten years. Without 
the right policies, companies could leave European 
countries, leading to massive job losses (see Part D). 
In order to give businesses an incentive to invest in 
key low-carbon technologies, action must be taken 
now. 
 → Offset the additional costs of acquiring and 
operating new technologies: Compared with 
conventional technologies, low-emission 
manufacturing processes are associated with 
higher costs, which can arise both at the point of 
investment and during operation. In today’s global 
market, companies cannot pass these extra costs to 
consumers without losing out to competitors 
abroad. Policies are therefore needed to defray the 
additional costs of developing, adopting and 
operating low-carbon processes. 
 → Satisfy the standard requirements of policy 
instruments: Alongside the above requirements, 
policy instruments for a climate-neutral industry 
must meet the standard criteria for sound 
governmental regulation. 
• Economic efficiency: When distributing public 
funds, each euro invested must achieve the 
highest possible environmental and economic 
benefit.
• Effectiveness and precision: The value of a policy 
instrument is measured by the contribution it 
makes to achieving its goal (in this case: a 
competitive and climate-neutral industry).
• Feasibility and acceptance: Policies of member 
states must be in synergy with the European legal 
framework, have political support and meet 
requirements for transparency and 
accountability. 
• Support the European industry’s international 
competitiveness: If policy instruments for 
climate neutrality are to be supported by all 
stakeholders they must consider the special 
features of the industrial sectors they affect. Steel 
and many products of the chemicals industry are 
commodities – standardised, interchangeable 
goods that are traded internationally. European 
producers in these sectors face strong 
international competition. Transport costs 
generally represent only a small fraction of total 
prices for these goods. External costs internalised 
through, say, CO2 prices, cannot be passed on to 
consumers in the world market as long as no 
comparable policy frameworks exist in other 
major producing countries. Higher production 
costs can jeopardise the competitiveness of 
European industry. It is crucial that policies be in 
place to prevent production from moving to 
regions with fewer restrictions for reducing 
emissions, - a phenomenon known as carbon 
leakage.1 
One set of policy measures that can prevent 
carbon leakage are border carbon adjustments, or 
BCAs,2 which include countervailing duties (SVR, 
2019). BCAs can be applied to emission-intensive 
products when imported to Europe in order to 
offset the higher prices of low-emission 
European products when competing with lower 
priced high-emission products from outside 
Europe.  
1 The relocation of manufacturing to countries with less 
severe carbon restrictions is just one risk. Another is 
known as investment leakage. This occurs when global 
companies based in Europe decide to invest in other 
regions of the world. What needs to be emphasised again 
is the importance of a reliable, long-term regulatory 
framework for investment.
2 In this study, we use the term border carbon adjustment 
(BCA) to ensure consistency with previous publications 
in English language. However, in the political discussion 
the term carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) 
is now used in official documents. When we refer to BCA 
we understand it as equivalent to CBAM.
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But the adoption of such mechanisms comes with 
significant hurdles. First of all is the question of 
their compatibility with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules, even though 
exceptions from the equal treatment of domestic 
and foreign goods due to environmental reasons 
and other political aims are possible in principle. 
Imposing duties based on the intensity of 
emissions demands exact knowledge of the 
carbon footprint of products and therefore 
comprehensive carbon tracking from the 
emission source. Although officials could make 
rough assumptions based on the source of the 
products initially, the concrete implementation is 
complex. Another difficult question that needs 
clarifying is whether the level of environmental 
protection in other countries is comparable with 
European regulations. Exemptions for least 
developed countries (LDCs) will likely be 
necessary as well. For EU member states with 
exporting industries, the introduction of BCAs, as 
with any restriction on international trade, brings 
special risks. The response of trading partners 
whose exports would be subject to the adjustment 
mechanism could lead to disputes and retaliatory 
measures that may harm export-centered 
business even in sectors that are not carbon-
intensive.  
Moreover, the effects of policy instruments on 
the international competitiveness of European 
industry differ significantly depending on 
whether they target production or consumption. 
When selecting specific instruments, therefore, a 
forward-looking policy framework must take 
into account possible effects on international 
competition. 
The creation of lead markets will only be 
successful if climate-neutral policies consider 
the international competitiveness of European 
industry while setting ambitious climate goals. 
Lead markets are markets or areas of technology 
in which industry can achieve a global 
competitive advantage through leadership in 
innovation and technology (Beise, 2001). The 
creation of internal demand for low-emission 
production technologies forms the foundation for 
future exports to the world market. Increasing 
pressure to manufacture products more 
efficiently and with lower emissions has created 
opportunities around the world and may create 
lead markets for low-emission industrial 
technologies.
1.2 Mechanisms for a climate-neutral industry
The requirements of policy instruments for a climate-
neutral industry can be further subdivided into 
mechanisms. Four types of policy mechanisms must 
be adopted for a climate-neutral industry in the long 
term. 
Initially, pressure is needed to push the affected 
sectors of the economy towards greenhouse-gas 
neutrality. At the global level, the Paris Climate 
Agreement provides guidance but does not imply 
immediate consequences or incentives for industry. 
The most important way to pressure the industrial 
sector is to internalise the external costs of CO₂ 
emissions. This includes the use of effective price 
signals, clear policy decisions and a long-term 
strategy for a climate-neutral industry. The central 
criterion for these instruments is their ability to 
establish low-emission business models in the 
market. Setting standards through regulatory laws 
could further strengthen policy decisions while 
addressing areas where experience shows that 
economic incentives have little effect. 
The right sort of pressure to act will lead to the 
development, testing and adoption of key low-carbon 
technologies (see the technology fact sheets in Part E 
of this report for more information). The introduction 
of a circular economy is a cornerstone of sustainable 
industry. Policymakers must eliminate disincentives 
for using recycled material, create new regulations 
and enable the use of the technologies that are needed 
for a circular economy. The use of low-carbon 
technologies is generally associated with higher costs 
than conventional processes, both at the initial 
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investment and during operation. But as long as the 
additional costs cannot be passed to consumers, or 
the required investment is too great, businesses will 
need financial support. In addition to supporting the 
provision of low-emission products, policies must 
encourage demand by creating public markets or 
incentivising private ones. Such policies help 
distribute the burden of creating a climate-neutral 
industry.
Every combination of policy instruments should 
cover these four mechanisms in order to effectively 
initiate the transformation of industry towards 
climate neutrality.
1.3 Forward-looking policy instruments can 
supplement European emissions trading
A wide spectrum of policy instruments exists that 
can help increase efficiency and reduce emissions in 
the industrial sector. The European emissions trading 
system (EU ETS) will play a key role alongside support 
policies and incentives. Many refer to the EU ETS in 
political debates about the necessity of augmenting 
the policy framework for decarbonisation (SVR, 
2019). In order to leverage the greatest possible 
efficiency advantages and avoid carbon leakage, 
emissions trading should be linked globally and 
implemented as widely as possible (DEHSt, 2013). But 
even appropriate initiatives within, say, the G20 
framework, are unlikely to provide an adequate 
outcome in the near future. Therefore, this study 
focuses primarily on the EU ETS in particular rather 
than on emissions trading in general.
In economic theory, price signals for CO2 are the most 
efficient way of securing CO2 reductions. In the 
European Emissions Trading System these price 
signals are achieved by imposing a maximum cap on 
total emissions and by auctioning the corresponding 
emissions allowances. At current and projected 
prices, however, these measures will be insufficient 
to ensure the climate neutrality of European industry 
in the long term.
Carbon price trends: Carbon prices in the EU ETS 
have increased significantly since 2019 and are 
projected to increase even further. However, as 
argued in Part B and as demonstrated in Part E, the 
abatement costs for most key technologies lie well 
above the prices of EU emission allowances forecast 
for the coming years. But even if carbon prices rose 
significantly in the medium to long term, business 
expectations about price changes in the EU ETS will 
be decisive for investment in key low-carbon 
technologies. Unfortunately, the increases in carbon 
prices that businesses currently expect are not high 
enough to initiate a fundamental transformation of 
the industrial sector towards climate neutrality. 
 → Volatility and insecurity: The EU carbon price 
depends on the regulatory framework negotiated 
by policymakers. But regardless of policies, 
emissions trading is inherently volatile, which 
makes it an unreliable basis for investment 
decisions (see Figure C.1 .) 
 → Plant lifespans and investment timelines: Unlike 
consumer decisions, investment in key low-carbon 
technologies cannot be gradually adjusted as 
carbon prices change. So it is crucial that long-
term signals for the introduction and scaling of 
these technologies remain reliable over decades. 
By the same token, CO₂ prices must not increase 
so drastically as to render recent investment in 
conventional technologies (such as those in the 
chemical industry) unprofitable, forcing companies 
to write them off before they are amortised. 
Therefore, as EU carbon price signals provide 
gradually increasing pressure over the long term, 
supplemental policy instruments are needed to 
cover the cost differential that can justify the 
necessary investment in climate-neutral 
technologies in the short and medium term.
To summarise: the EU ETS is important for forging a 
path to climate neutrality. By sending EU-wide price 
signals for emissions, it incentivises short-term 
optimisations. But it is not enough to steer the 
long-term processes necessary for decarbonising the 
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industrial sector and to cover the massive additional 
investment needed for developing, scaling and 
operating key low-carbon technologies. This is why 
the EU needs innovative and forward-looking policy 
instruments to supplement its emissions trading 
system. Such instrument are invaluable for triggering 
and directing transformative changes in the steel, 
chemical and cement sectors.
Infobox: EU Innovation Fund
 → What is the EU Innovation Fund? 
The EU Innovation Fund is the successor to the NER300 programme. Its purpose and design were laid 
down in the EU Emissions Trading Directive (EU 2003/87/EC) and in the Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU 2019/856). The goal of the fund is to support innovations in low-carbon technologies 
across all EU member states.
Development of the carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System from 2009 to 2021 Figure C.1






















Development of EU ETS carbon market price (ETS)
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 → What is the goal of the EU Innovation Fund? 
The goal is to support a variety of viable and innovative demonstration projects. In addition, it aims to 
help the European Union establish itself as a global leader in the field of low-carbon technologies.
 → How is the EU Innovation Fund financed and what is its endowment? What does the endowment of the 
fund depend on? 
The EU Innovation Fund is financed with auction proceeds of the EU ETS. At least 450 million 
allowances3 (EUR-Lex, 2018a; EUR-Lex, 2018b) will be auctioned for this purpose. The size of the fund 
depends on the level of the carbon price at the time of the auction. At an average price of around 45 euros 
per European emission allowance (EUA) over the next decade, the fund would amount to 20.25 billion 
euros.
 → Which projects are supported? 
The fund focuses on five areas: 1) innovative, low-carbon technologies and processes in energy-intensive 
industries; 2) carbon capture and utilisation (CCU); 3) the building and operation of carbon capture and 
storage (CCS); 4) the innovative production of renewable energies; and 5) energy storage.
3 See (EU) 2018/410, art. 10a para. 8. 
Operation of the EU Innovation Fund Figure C.2
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on European Commission, n.d.





Energy storageCarbon capture and use (CCU); 
building and operation of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS)
Energy-intensive 
industries
Supporting innovations such as...
Funded by: proceeds from the auctioning of EU ETS certificates
By 2030: around € 20 billion in investments
in the climate-neutral future of the EU
Promote innovations in green technologies and bring them to market maturity
CO2
First call for project 
applications in 2020
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 → Which assessment criteria are used when selecting projects? 
The projects and sectors that can participate are specified in the calls for proposals. The following criteria 
are specified by the Delegated Regulation 4 (EUR-Lex, 2019a):
• effectiveness with regard to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions
• level of innovation relative to the current state of technological development
• maturity of planning and business models 
• technological potential and market potential for a wide application, reproducibility and/or future cost 
reductions
• efficiency with regard to costs
• balance of geographical distribution 
 → Which costs can be supported and in which form? 
The fund can subsidise both capital and operating costs. As a rule, the fund can provide subsidies of up to 
60 per cent of costs depending on the projects’ level of risk. For projects that are already relatively close to 
market, conventional instruments such as loans or guarantees can also be used, although the details are 
still under discussion. The subsidies can be combined in principle with other EU support programmes 
and national initiatives. These include investEU, Horizon Europe, Enhanced European Innovation Council 
(EIC) pilot, InnovFin Energy Demo Projects, NER300, Connecting Europe Facility, the Modernisation 
Fund, the Cohesion Fund and private capital funds.
 → Which conditions apply for receiving payments? 
The subsidy is provided based on the achievement of milestones/stage goals defined by the project. Up to 
40 per cent of the subsidy can go towards project development up to the financial close, i.e. the final 
investment decision. Commencement of operation is another stage goal. The complete payment may be 
tied to the achievement of the planned reduction in emissions. In contrast to coupling the entire subsidy 
to achievement of the project’s emission reduction goals, a staggered payment relieves the recipient from 
carrying the entire risk alone. 
 → When and how can applications be made? 
Starting in 2020, the European Commission will issue regular calls for proposals (EUR-Lex, 2019b). 
The application phase will be divided into two parts: In the first step, applicants must present their project 
and apply for consideration. This involves describing the main characteristics of the project to the project 
commission. In the next step, applicants must provide a detailed application.  
Projects that are still at an early stage can receive project development assistance after the first step as 
long as they have the potential to meet the selection criteria. 
4  See (EU) 2019/856, art. 11.
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1.4 Methods for developing and selecting 
instruments 
The smart selection and combination of policy 
instruments is needed to create a long-term climate-
neutral industrial sector. Relying on any single 
instrument will not be enough. The goal of this study 
is to create a policy toolbox for discussing and 
achieving the emissions reduction goals of the 
industrial sector.
In the next section, we present fact sheets for the 
toolbox instruments and describe an environment in 
which a comprehensive policy strategy for a climate-
neutral industry can arise. 
The design of policy instruments for decarbonising 
the industrial sector has been discussed in various 
research studies, advisory projects and workshops 
with representatives from industry, ministries, trade 
unions and civil society. This report is based on those 
discussions. To maintain a close link to existing 
discussions, the selection of policy instruments for 
the report follows a two-stage process. 
First, an inventory was made of all instruments being 
discussed for the development and launch of low- or 
zero-carbon industrial processes or infrastructure 
needed for decarbonising European industry. We 
drew on a range of reports including IES, 2018; 
Klimaallianz et al., 2016; Ecofys/Prognos/Universität 
Stuttgart et al., 2017; IER/EEP/adelphi, 2017; IREES, 
2017; and Ecofys, 2017. The long list of policy 
instruments can be found in Table C.1. The 
instruments discussed in the literature were divided 
into three categories: subsidy, charges/surcharges 
and standards. In order to limit the selection to 
particularly promising instruments, we subjected the 
21 instruments in the longlist to multiple qualitative 
evaluations using five equally ranked criteria:
We assessed the instruments based on their potential 
for emission reductions (size of the sectors covered, 
expected range of application, ability to trigger 
transformative change); cost efficiency (use of 
resources in relation to effect); expected effectiveness 
for supporting key low-carbon technologies; 
Process for the selection of policy instruments Figure C.3
Agora Energiewende, 2021
Step 1: Creation of a longlist 
Literature research
GHG reduction potential
Cost eciency € Internalising external costs
Comparison with other ongoing 




Expert opinion Acceptance Circular economy standards
Step 2: Evaluation by criteria
Step 3: Categorising the shortlist 
by action mechanism
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feasibility and enforceability (administrative cost, 
legal or political hurdles); and expected acceptance
among affected stakeholders. The information used 
for the evaluation is based on the reviewed literature 
and the assessments of technical experts. We did not 
attempt to rank or define the best instruments. 
Rather, our goal was to assemble a shortlist of 
promising, highly innovative instruments. 
We subsequently discussed and adapted the shortlist 
over the course of multiple workshops with sector 
representatives. The overriding aim when selecting 
instruments for the shortlist was to cover the widest 
possible range of mechanisms needed for a climate-
neutral industry, as described in Figure C.4. The 
instruments in the shortlist also covered the various 
development stages of key low-carbon technologies.5 
On the basis of these criteria, we presented ten 
instruments for discussion in stakeholder workshops. 
5 We made an exception for instruments that purely serve 
to support research and development. The workshops 
confirmed our impression that these instruments are 
sufficiently covered by current policies.
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Name Description GHG reduction Cost efficiency Effectiveness Enforceability Stakeholder acceptance
Support
Tax reduction for recycled goods Support the reuse of goods and the use of recycled materials. One way to do this is to 
reduce their value-added tax rate.
Reform of the tendering process for energy 
efficiency measures
Expand existing tenders for supporting energy efficiency from electricity to thermal 
efficiency and increase the coverage of additional costs.
Accelerated depreciation for investment in 
energy efficiency
Allow quicker accelerated depreciation of investments in energy-efficiency technologies to 
make them more attractive for businesses.
Carbon contracts and carbon contracts-for-
difference (CCfD)
Cover incremental costs of investing and operating key low-carbon technologies by 
remunerating the resulting emission reductions, possibly relative to the CO₂ price.
Technology-specific research support Help the development of specific key low-carbon technologies by subsidising R&D costs.
Accelerated depreciation for investment in 
GHG reduction
Reduce the effective costs of climate investment by lowering taxes to offset additional 
costs.
Green financing instruments Create a credit institute to provide low-interest loans solely for financing investment in 
climate change mitigation.
Charges, surcharges
Carbon price floor with border carbon 
adjustment
Create a rising carbon price floor to establish a plannable price signal for introducing 
climate technologies. Subject imports from countries without carbon pricing to a charge. 
Exempt exports from the carbon pricing system.
Carbon price on end products Impose a charge on products based on the carbon intensity of the materials.
Climate surcharge on end products Impose a climate surcharge on selected materials or their products (steel, plastic, 
aluminium, cement) based on volume, irrespective of the production process or origin.
Reduction of fossil fuel subsidies Reduce direct subsidies or tax benefits for fossil fuels in order not to disadvantage climate 
technologies.
Reform of power markets for electricity-
intensive businesses
Create electricity market instruments that mobilise demand side flexibility and sector 
coupling, as well as energy efficiency..
Reform of energy taxes Tax fossil fuels based on their carbon emissions, and reduce the electricity price to make 
electrification more attractive.
Regulations
Green public procurement Ensure that public spending is made in accordance with obligatory sustainability criteria in 
order to create lead markets for low-carbon and GHG-neutral products.
Clean hydrogen support policies Introduce support instruments that create a business case for clean hydrogen.
Standards for recyclable products Require producers of consumer goods to design their products so that they are easier to 
recycle and reuse.
Extended producer responsibility Introduce requirements for reverse logistics, deposit systems or fees to oblige the 
producers of consumer goods for recycling and waste disposal.
Ban on plastic in certain applications Forbid plastics in disposable products and in products for which ecological alternatives 
exist.
Quotas for low-carbon materials Oblige producers of consumer goods to use raw materials with a specified carbon-free 
share.
Changes in construction and product standards Revise standards and supplementary regulations in the construction industry that allow 
the introduction of low-carbon materials and higher material efficiency.
Increased environmental requirements for 
chemicals
Impose stricter regulations for chemical products to favour solutions based on biomass 
instead of petroleum-based plastics.
Legend:           Instrument selected for the shortlist          attractive      unattractive 
Longlist of policy instruments for a climate-neutral industry  
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on Navigant, 2019
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reduce their value-added tax rate.
Reform of the tendering process for energy 
efficiency measures
Expand existing tenders for supporting energy efficiency from electricity to thermal 
efficiency and increase the coverage of additional costs.
Accelerated depreciation for investment in 
energy efficiency
Allow quicker accelerated depreciation of investments in energy-efficiency technologies to 
make them more attractive for businesses.
Carbon contracts and carbon contracts-for-
difference (CCfD)
Cover incremental costs of investing and operating key low-carbon technologies by 
remunerating the resulting emission reductions, possibly relative to the CO₂ price.
Technology-specific research support Help the development of specific key low-carbon technologies by subsidising R&D costs.
Accelerated depreciation for investment in 
GHG reduction
Reduce the effective costs of climate investment by lowering taxes to offset additional 
costs.
Green financing instruments Create a credit institute to provide low-interest loans solely for financing investment in 
climate change mitigation.
Charges, surcharges
Carbon price floor with border carbon 
adjustment
Create a rising carbon price floor to establish a plannable price signal for introducing 
climate technologies. Subject imports from countries without carbon pricing to a charge. 
Exempt exports from the carbon pricing system.
Carbon price on end products Impose a charge on products based on the carbon intensity of the materials.
Climate surcharge on end products Impose a climate surcharge on selected materials or their products (steel, plastic, 
aluminium, cement) based on volume, irrespective of the production process or origin.
Reduction of fossil fuel subsidies Reduce direct subsidies or tax benefits for fossil fuels in order not to disadvantage climate 
technologies.
Reform of power markets for electricity-
intensive businesses
Create electricity market instruments that mobilise demand side flexibility and sector 
coupling, as well as energy efficiency..
Reform of energy taxes Tax fossil fuels based on their carbon emissions, and reduce the electricity price to make 
electrification more attractive.
Regulations
Green public procurement Ensure that public spending is made in accordance with obligatory sustainability criteria in 
order to create lead markets for low-carbon and GHG-neutral products.
Clean hydrogen support policies Introduce support instruments that create a business case for clean hydrogen.
Standards for recyclable products Require producers of consumer goods to design their products so that they are easier to 
recycle and reuse.
Extended producer responsibility Introduce requirements for reverse logistics, deposit systems or fees to oblige the 
producers of consumer goods for recycling and waste disposal.
Ban on plastic in certain applications Forbid plastics in disposable products and in products for which ecological alternatives 
exist.
Quotas for low-carbon materials Oblige producers of consumer goods to use raw materials with a specified carbon-free 
share.
Changes in construction and product standards Revise standards and supplementary regulations in the construction industry that allow 
the introduction of low-carbon materials and higher material efficiency.
Increased environmental requirements for 
chemicals
Impose stricter regulations for chemical products to favour solutions based on biomass 
instead of petroleum-based plastics.
Legend:           Instrument selected for the shortlist          attractive      unattractive 
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The ten recommended instruments on the (shortlist) 
were critically discussed in six stakeholder 
workshops and a series of meetings with technical 
experts and decisionmakers. Over the course of the 
workshops, we presented our main interim findings 
from the technology fact sheets to the technical 
experts and to the representatives of various 
industries for discussion. We then presented the 
complete spectrum of policy instruments described 
in this report. The participants had the option of 
selecting particularly interesting instruments for 
more intensive discussions in small groups. We used 
the information and insights from these discussions 
to fine-tune the policy instruments. 
Several instruments promote incremental 
improvements to the efficiency of production 
processes and to the internalisation of the external 
costs of low-emission processes: the carbon price on 
end products, a climate surcharge on end products 
1.5 Shortlist of the policy instruments and 
stakeholder workshops
In the following fact sheets, every instrument is 
briefly described along with its mechanism, a brief 
legal evaluation and information on implementation. 
The policy instruments described can be categorised 
according to various aspects. First, they can be placed 
into one of three levels in the industrial value chain: 
upstream (secure access to energy and raw materials 
at competitive prices), midstream (incentives and 
direct support for the change of production processes) 
and downstream (creation of secure markets and 
regulatory requirements). Second, the instruments 
can be categorised by their mechanism: 
internalisation of external costs, creation of secure 
markets, financing of additional costs and promoting 
a circular economy & standards. Figure C.4 provides 
an overview of the instruments for each system of 
categorisation. 
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and the introduction of a carbon price floor with 
border carbon adjustment inside or outside the EU 
ETS. These instruments balance out the cost 
differences on a continual basis. These instruments 
can put pressure on industry but alone they are not 
enough to ensure the sweeping introduction of key 
low-carbon technologies. To scale market-ready 
technologies and secure markets for products 
produced with low emissions, policymakers can 
introduce quotas for low-carbon materials and green 
public procurement. The support for the investment 
and use of low-emission production processes can be 
funded by green financing instruments as well as 
carbon contracts and carbon contracts-for-difference 
(CCfDs) or clean hydrogen support policies. Finally, 
standards for recyclable products and changes to 
construction and product standards can promote the 
development and use of key low-carbon technologies 
and can contribute to higher material efficiency. 
Approaches for the policy instruments in the shortlist Figure C.5
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on Navigant, 2019 
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OF KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES
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CARBON PRICE FLOOR WITH BORDER CARBON 
ADJUSTMENT (BCA)
Instrument design
This instrument introduces an increasing carbon price floor in the EU ETS. The mechanism sends a reliable price signal 
for investments and introduces border carbon adjustment (BCA) charges on imports and reliefs for exports. 
Carbon pricing through the EU ETS is an economically efficient 
instrument for reaching carbon reduction goals and for 
internalising external costs. An increasing carbon price in the 
EU ETS in recent years has led to substantial carbon reductions 
in the power sector. This is not the case in the basic materials 
industry, however. On the one hand, the majority of emission 
allowances that businesses receive are freely allocated; on the 
other, carbon abatement costs of key low-carbon technologies 
are often significantly higher than the EU ETS price. An 
increasing carbon price floor sends a reliable price signal and 
would provide investment security. In order to offset export 
disadvantages for the energy-intensive basic materials industry, 
the price of exports at the border would have to be reduced 
by the amount of the previous carbon charge (Border Carbon 
Adjustment, BCA). In addition, when significant disadvantages 
arise for businesses competing on the European market, it will 
be necessary to apply adjustment charges on imports of carbon-
intensive goods within the BCA framework. This would create 
similar competitive conditions in the domestic market and avoid 
carbon leakage (SWP, 2018).
As part of its communication on the European Green Deal and 
the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050, the EU Commission 
sees BCAs as a key measure to protect industrial sectors from 
international carbon leakage. However, the instrument is 
associated with significant difficulties that pose fundamental 
methodological questions. For starters, should the electricity 
mix of a country be assumed when evaluating emissions – 
or can an energy-intensive company declare the purchased 
electricity to be zero-carbon? The difference would be decisive 
for, say, countries with higher shares of electricity produced 
by coal. In addition, there are questions about how to price 
carbon appropriately for imports from industrial countries and 
developing nations and how the implicit or explicit carbon price 
of climate policies in other countries can be compared to the 
EU ETS price. Moreover, the instrument could be misused for 
protectionist purposes. There is the risk that trading partners 
could view a border carbon adjustment as a trade restriction and 
respond with retaliatory measures. Trade law and trade policy 
disputes are therefore likely.





Market price of steel
Effect of an EU-wide 
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CARBON PRICE FLOOR WITH BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENT
A high carbon price in the EU ETS coupled with a border carbon adjustment is an efficient instrument from an 
economic point of view and guarantees a level playing field for industry. 




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy source
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation
(plant/product)
 AREA OF APPLICATION
The instrument applies to all emission sources from 
industrial and energy sectors registered in the EU ETS 
as well as to the import of carbon-intensive goods. All 
key low-carbon technologies whose carbon abatement 
costs are lower than or equal to the carbon price become 
competitive.
 
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
The border carbon adjustment would be coupled to the 
international development of emissions trading and the 
price development in the EU ETS. If carbon prices in other 
G20 economies are introduced, the BCA could potentially 
be lifted or applied only to other countries without a 
comparable carbon price level. 
 STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
A carbon price floor already exists in many emissions 
trading systems (e.g. California, Great Britain). The EU 
Commission and the European Council are discussing 
BCA as an element of the European Green Deal and as a 
potential direct revenue source for the EU budget. Border 
charges have been under discussion for a while now, but 
their feasibility is disputed (SVR, 2019). Exporting industries 
and nations are traditionally reluctant to endorse and 
implement border carbon adjustment measures. The 
instrument is supported by professional organisations 
(including EUROFER), governments (including FR) and the 
European Council, the European Parliament as well the 
president of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. 
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect
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Instrument details
1 The waterbed effect occurs when reductions in one EU country are negated by increased emissions in another. It arises because the reduction of emissions frees up 
emissions trading allowances, which can then be used by emitters in other countries. Starting in 2021, it will be possible for countries to cancel a number of their 
allowances to account for the emission-reducing effect of their domestic policies.
2 In the Emissions Trading Scheme, a portion of the allowances is auctioned on the market. The carbon price floor could be implemented as an auction reserve price in 
the EU ETS, which means that only offers above the price floor are accepted and any unsold allowances are cancelled after the auction. This would ensure that the 
carbon price was no lower than the price floor.
Possible interactions
Depending on the scope of and participation in an EU ETS 
price floor, the total price of allowances could fall, reducing 
the overall effect on emissions reduction (waterbed effect1). To 
counter this, the carbon price floor should be combined with 
other measures, such as the cancellation of EU ETS allowances. 
But uncertainty around eventual tax set-offs for exports 
and the possibility of an inadequate carbon price floor mean 
that this instrument alone will not suffice to motivate large 
investment projects in comparatively expensive technologies. 
Accordingly, additional instruments besides the price floor 
will be needed to incentivise investment. These include quotas 
for low-carbon materials or carbon contracts-for-difference 
to promote investments in key low-carbon technologies with 
abatement costs above the price floor.
Financing
The additional costs stand to affect emitters registered in 
the EU ETS, who would then pass these on to consumers. 
The border charges that may potentially be levied on imports 
would increase prices for carbon-intensive goods. The extra 
income from carbon pricing could be used to support affected 
consumers, as it does in Canada (Engie et al., 2018).
Design options
The instrument could be formally implemented both inside and 
outside the EU ETS process. Within the EU ETS, the price floor 
could be implemented as a reserve price in the auctioning of 
EU allowances. But this would require amending the EU ETS 
directive, which is only possible with a unanimous decision 
by member states.2 Outside the EU ETS, a short-term price 
floor could be introduced within a single nation, as in Great 
Britain and the Netherlands, or with like-minded neighbouring 
countries. A primary energy charge could balance out the 
difference between the price floor and the actual EU ETS price 
(PIK, 2018; Agora Energiewende, 2018). The border adjustment 
would not apply in countries with carbon pricing comparable 
to that of the EU. This would motivate countries who want 
unimpeded trade with the EU to introduce an equivalent 
carbon pricing regime. 
The border adjustment instrument has its difficulties, however. 
In principle, a border adjustment can only be introduced 
throughout the entire EU or European Economic Area (EEA). 
Otherwise goods could be imported to the joint European 
market from EEA countries without a border adjustment 
system in order to get around a border adjustment in countries 
that do. But even were the border carbon adjustment to apply 
to all of the EU, the administrative costs for determining the 
carbon intensity of all imports and exports would be high. The 
data collection would be particularly complicated for processed 
products whose exact material composition is unknown. 
General assumptions could reduce the complexity, but these 
would have to be legally assessed. Exempting imports from 
countries with sufficient carbon pricing would further increase 
costs. It is doubtful whether the instrument conforms to WTO 
rules, as the brief legal assessment makes plain. Consequently, 
it is likely to face objections and be subject to arbitration. 
Special features
As part of the EU ETS Reform, the EU could increase carbon 
floor prices for the covered sectors. In parallel, the EU could 
encourage other countries to implement a comparable price 
floor. This would exempt them from the border carbon 
adjustment mechanism and forge preferential trade relations 
with countries that have comparable ambitions for climate 
change mitigation. 




• The market decides across sectors on the most 
favourable carbon abatement technologies – very high 
efficiency
• Planning security for climate investment
• Energy tax reform based on a national carbon price 
floor can be implemented quickly
OPPORTUNITIES
• There is a clear political will to create a carbon price 
floor in important EU countries including France and the 
Netherlands
• The introduction of a price floor for EU trading partners 
could be an attractive option for circumventing the 
border carbon adjustment
WEAKNESSES
• Border carbon adjustment and exceptions can limit the 
effectiveness of a uniform price signal
• High administrative costs for border carbon adjustment
• Determining the carbon footprint emitted in the 
production of imported and exported products is very 
expensive
• The carbon price or carbon price floor needs to be 
sufficiently high (at least 100€/t of CO2) in order to 
create a business case for most key low-carbon 
technologies
RISKS
• Border carbon adjustment may not conform to WTO 
rules (particularly in combination with European carbon 
price floor)
• Could further aggravate global trade conflict
• Countries with a carbon-intensive electricity mix 
could attempt to circumvent the system with green 




• In principle, WTO rules would allow the introduction 
of an EU border carbon adjustment as long as imported 
and domestically produced goods are treated equally. 
However, such a measure would not compensate exports 
for the higher carbon cost that they face when produced in 
Europe.
• WTO rules do not exclude averaged BCA calculations 
for foreign products. The calculations must be based on 
appropriate criteria, however. It is important that they do 
not have a discriminatory effect on the domestic system. 
• A border carbon adjustment in combination with a price 
floor through the EU ETS would be more difficult to 
implement within the WTO framework. The border charge 
applies to a production process of the product, not to a 
characteristic of the product. Whether the WTO permits 
charges based on the production process is disputed. 
• At the European level, the introduction of a carbon price 
floor within the EU ETS is legally possible in principle but 
requires an amendment to the EU ETS directive.




Carbon contracts offer payments for emission reductions achieved with key low-carbon technologies to compensate 
for their incremental cost compared to GHG-intensive production processes. Carbon contracts-for-difference (CCfDs) 
complement the effects of the EU ETS and compensate for insufficient and variable carbon prices.
Key low-carbon technologies generally entail higher 
investment and operating costs than conventional 
technologies. Carbon prices in the EU ETS fluctuate and 
are too low to justify investments in most key low-carbon 
technologies. Moreover, the CO₂ price signal will not be 
effective if the low-carbon technologies do not receive the free 
EUA allocations that are awarded to conventional technologies 
to protect them from carbon leakage. As a result, the current EU 
ETS design promotes efficiency improvements of conventional 
technologies but does not support investments in key low-
carbon technologies. 
Carbon contracts and CCfDs are options that complement the 
EU ETS to promote and ensure transformative investments. 
They provide state-guaranteed payments for the CO₂-
abatement obtained by key low-carbon technologies and 
compensate for their incremental costs relative to GHG-
intensive incumbent technologies. Depending on the design 
and effects of the EU ETS in terms of free allocations for 
incumbent and key low-carbon technologies, different 
scenarios need to be considered, as illustrated by Figure C.7.
Scenario 1: Carbon contracts to compensate  
full incremental costs
With current regulation, most key low-carbon technologies 
do not receive the free allocations that are awarded to 
incumbent technologies. If this situation remained in place, 
the incremental producion costs compared to GHG-intensive 
technologies would not depend on the EU ETS price and have to 
be fully compensated by a carbon contract.
Scenario 2: CCfD in combination with free EUA allocations
If key low-carbon technologies do receive free allocations, 
their sale will cover part of the incremental costs that result 
from their operation. In this case, CCfDs must compensate 
for the variable difference between the market value of these 
allowances and the CCfD contract value that was defined to 
cover incremental production costs.
Scenario 3: CCfD in the context of a BCA regime
The objective of a BCA regime is to protect industry from 
carbon leakage without the need of issuing free EUA 
allocations. The result is an effective carbon price and the CCfD 
has to cover the difference between the effective carbon price 
and the CCfD contract value.
Carbon Contracts-for-Difference
Agora Energiewende, 2021
Scenario 1:  
Free allocations are granted to 
conventional, but not to key  
low-carbon production technologies:
Scenario 2:  
Free allocations are granted to 
conventional and key low-carbon 
production technologies:
Scenario 3:  
Sector is subject to BCA. No free 
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Note: Under the current EU ETS carbon leakage protection system, energy-intensive industries with high trade exposure receive free EUA allocations to maintain their production 
cost at the level of international competitors with equally GHG-intensive processes. This cost, which is largely independent from the carbon market price, is the reference for the 
calculation of the CO₂-abatment cost that results from producing with key low-carbon technologies. This incremental cost can be covered fully with a carbon contract (Scenario 1) or 
by a combination of free allocations also for key low-carbon technologies and the payment of a CCfD (Scenario 2). In case the system evolves towards a Border Carbon Adjustment 
(BCA) without free allocations to energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, the production cost of GHG-intensive technologies increases and the payment of the CCfD 
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CARBON CONTRACTS-FOR-DIFFERENCE (CCFD)
This instrument reduces financing risks and incentivises investments and production with key low-carbon 
technologies that are compatible with climate neutrality.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy source
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
This instrument addresses high-volume, innovative 
technologies in the basic materials industry that are 
compatible with climate neutrality and that have moved 
beyond the demonstration phase. Examples include: 
hydrogen-based production of direct reduced iron (steel), 
methanol-to-olefin/-aromatics route (chemicals) and 
carbon capture with the oxyfuel process (cement).
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
Depending on technology-specific necessities, CCfDs can 
be structured as an interim solution to anticipate higher 
carbon prices and changes in EU ETS regulations or to offer 
stable, long-term support for capital-intensive investments 
like the production, transport and use of hydrogen. In any 
case, CCfDs should be complemented with appropriate 
exit strategies, such as the substitution with high carbon 
prices in the context of a BCA, an appropriate global 
agreement or the development of green lead markets that 
create an alternative revenue source. Depending on the 
specific necessities, the duration of CCfDs can vary from a 
minimum of five to a maximum of 20 years. 
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
The carbon contract is based on an idea by Helm and 
Hepburn (2005). The concept of a CCfD was developed 
by the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW/
Richstein, 2017; DIW, 2019). CCfDs are also under discussion 
at the European level (IDDRI, 2019). Agora Energiewende 
is currently developing concrete proposals for the 
implementation of carbon contracts for the steel, cement 
and chemical industry (2021, forthcoming).
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




CCfDs are suited to fill a noticeable gap in the funding world: 
support for the commercial scaling of innovative low-carbon 
technologies with operational costs that exceed those of 
incumbent technologies. With this capacity, CCfDs are an ideal 
complement to existing instruments that focus on supporting 
investment costs. In addition to this synergy, other potential 
policy interactions must be considered: 
• CCfDs must be designed in synergy with policy instru-
ments that affect energy prices, such as the cost for elec-
tricity generation, surcharges, and grid fees, as well as for 
fossil fuel alternatives. 
• CCfDs trigger GHG abatement industries covered by the 
EU ETS and thus influence the balance of available EUA. 
These effects need to be considered when defining the EU 
ETS cap or the retirement, use and effect of EUA allowanc-
es that are made available by the instrument.
• Projects triggered by the CCfDs may impact the bench-
mark setting for the definition of free EUA allocations of 
existing production units. 
Financing
Initially, CCfDs can be funded with existing sources, such as 
the EU Innovation Fund and member state budgets. Ideally, 
sources are combined to structure synergetic effects between 
CCfDs that support incremental operational costs with 
instruments that support investment costs. At the same time, 
nondiscriminatory climate surcharges on final products 
should be established as a reliable refinancing instrument, as 
discussed in the specific policy fact sheet. 
Design options
The design of CCfDs must be specific to the necessities and 
objectives of different technologies and their context in terms 
of supporting infrastructure. Design options can be discussed 
based on the following aspects: 
i) Project selection: Investments with key low-carbon 
technologies are site-specific and strategic for the 
development of key infrastructures for transformation. 
Initially, such investments require individually designed CCfDs 
with payments that cover project-specific GHG abatement 
costs. Over time, such project-specific support contracts may 
evolve to the auctioning of CCfDs.
ii) Contract duration: Contract duration should be defined 
based on needs, objectives and the combination with other 
support instruments. For projects that imply large investments 
and high incremental costs, longer durations are required. 
iii) EU ETS interaction: EU ETS rules for free allocations have 
very sector-specific impacts on key low-carbon and reference 
technologies. These impacts and their possible evolution during 
the contractual lifetime must be considered in the CCfD design. 
iv) Dynamisation: Incremental costs of producing with 
key low-carbon technologies relative to GHG-intensive 
technologies depend on a multitude of factors such as cost 
variations in energy carriers and raw materials. To minimise 
the resulting risk of excessive or insufficient state aid for 
investors and the public sector, it is useful to adjust CCfD 
payments accordingly. The CCfD already includes a dynamic 
adjustment to the carbon market price, a feature that can 
be expanded to cover relevant energy price or raw material 
indices. 
v) Delivery obligations: CCfDs can be designed with or 
without the requirement to deliver a specified volume of GHG 
abatement. If investors are not obliged to the delivery of a 
specified contractual volume, the CCfD is a put option, a design 
that minimises technological and economic risks. However, 
in cases where the investment is an anchor for an extended 
value chain, e.g., the production and transport of hydrogen, it is 
necessary to structure appropriate obligations to support these 
downstream investments. 
vi) Synergy with green lead markets: CCfDs aim to support 
the investment and operation of key low-carbon technologies 
with the payment of an appropriate CO₂-reduction premium. 
Because of the legal provisions for such state aid, further 
marketing and crediting of the resulting CO₂ reduction is not 
permitted. However, it is important to encourage companies 
to market and sell low-CO₂ and climate-neutral products (and 
the implicit CO₂ reduction) to support the development of green 
lead markets. Both objectives can be met by allowing investors 
to opt out of the CCfD payment and sell their products as green 
if an appropriate premium can be achieved on the market. 
These aspects of CCfD design provide a provisional overview 
of relevant elements that need to be carefully balanced to 
design efficient support mechanisms for different sectors and 
projects.




• CCfDs can support innovative technologies in the critical 
and economically challenging phase between pilot 
project and market readiness (the so-called valley of 
death)
• Can be aligned to specific technologies and sectors
• The dynamisation of support payments with carbon 
price and other indices allows to minimise risks for 
investors and the state
OPPORTUNITIES
• CCfDs have great potential to bring key low-emission 
technologies to the market
• They can help establish Europe as a lead market for 
certain key low-emission technologies
• CCfDs can support the development of green lead 
markets also outside of Europe
WEAKNESSES
• Complexity of design and associated transaction costs 
make CCfDs best suited for large funding projects
RISKS
• Depending on design, technology and regulatory 
circumstances, the costs may be high




• When designing the measure, attention should be paid to 
ensure that bidders abroad are not discriminated (art. III 
GATT, XVII GATS and art. 30, 110 TFEU).
• Depending on the financing mechanism, CCfDs may 
constitute a state aid acc. art. 107 TFEU. However, the 
notification now comes with inherent legal risks (see legal 
assessment for H-CfD). 
• CCfDs can be implemented both at the national and 
European level.
• At the national level, CCfDs do not require authorisation 
by the European Commission, if funding is not provided by 
state funds.
• If a climate surcharge is used in order to finance a CCfD, 
then the possibility for a notification by the European 
Commission depends on whether the state has control over 
the financial resources.
• At the European level, CCfDs can for instance be financed 
by, say, the EU Innovation Fund and by programmes 
outside of the EU ETS.




State measures can reduce financing costs for investment in key low-carbon technologies.
A climate-neutral industry will require significant additional 
investments. Instruments for reducing financing costs 
can significantly reduce the full costs of transformational 
technologies. 
Approach 1: Favourable state loans
The state can pass on its low financing costs to businesses 
for climate-friendly investment. States generally have a 
significantly lower insolvency risk than companies. By 
assuming part of the financing costs, the state can pass on its 
interest advantages to businesses. This provides businesses 
with external capital at lower costs than those offered by 
private capital markets (KPMG, 2018). In addition, private 
capital can be leveraged with appropriate de-risking strategies. 
Examples are governmental guarantees or mezzanine finance 
products to compensate for technology risks. Demand-side and 
market risks can be minimised with instruments that create 
secure demand, such as public procurement and product quotas. 
Sufficient revenues for key low-carbon technologies with 
higher operational costs can also be guaranteed with carbon 
contracts-for-difference. This approach is especially relevant 
for technologies that are nearly market-ready (TRL 8 and 9). 
Approach 2: Government guarantees to protect against the risk 
of failure in the final stages of technology development
The development of new technologies is associated with 
higher risks – and higher risk premiums – than conventional 
technologies. If the state takes on some of the risk in the last 
stages of development (TRL 5-9), the financing costs can be 
reduced. The state could assume the risk for demonstration 
plants under tightly defined criteria (e.g. in the event of a failed 
test and a total loss) in order to minimise the risk premiums of 
private lenders. With state backing, banks can grant loans at 
near market rates. Furthermore, the state guarantee would also 
send a signal to investors that the investment is fairly secure. 
In particular, state green bonds can steer additional capital to 
industry at lower financing costs. Businesses continue to bear 
the business risk but they can avoid high-risk premiums. 
State guarantees should not be used for funding the early 
phases of technological development (TRL 1–5). For those 
phases, research funding and venture capital (BDI/ BCG, 
Prognos, 2018; BCG, 2018) are the better choices. 
Mechanism of green financing instruments
Agora Energiewende, 2021














Effect of green financing 
instruments
Funding with green financing 
instruments in the mix
€
-x million €
A mix of instruments to safeguard investment
1. Government support (e.g., state loan guarantees)
2. Favourable state loans
Marketing risk of 
green products
Technical risk *
3.  Lower requirements for equity 
capital thanks to government 
backing 
Borrowed capital
•  Higher total debt service, but 
lower cost of debt (interest)
•  Higher proportion of 
borrowed capital
Borrowed capital
Cost of equity capital
Cost of borrowed capital
Equity capital
•  Lower total remuneration of 
equity capital




•  In ideal cases, avoids 
risk premiums
Figure C.8 
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GREEN FINANCING INSTRUMENTS
Reduced interest rates for climate investments can supplement other decarbonisation policies.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy source
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
Approach 1 includes climate investments that make 
sense from a macroeconomic perspective, but not from 
a business perspective. Such climate investment often 
includes capital-intensive measures. Only technologies 
with near market-ready risk-return profiles benefit; new 
technologies with high risk premiums do not.
Approach 2 reduces financing costs for investment 
in key low-carbon technologies in the final stages of 
development (TRL 5–9). 
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
Financing support only needed until climate technologies 
are competitive at normal market interest rates.
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
• Green bond incentives in bank regulation: In discussion 
at the EU level (EU HLEG, 2018)
• Governmental provision of/backing for loans is already 
being practised to a degree by banks such as the KfW 
Development Bank in Germany and the World Bank 
• Green quantitative easing is under discussion in expert 
circles (I4CE, 2018)
• Fiscal incentives: In Brazil, loans for infrastructure 
investment are subsidised with tax reductions (Oliver 
Wyman, 2014). To date, no known example exists in the 
area of climate. 
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




Even if climate technologies become more economical through 
low interest rates, the government must create pressure 
to act (“demand”) and secure markets for climate-friendly 
technologies (“support”) in order to motivate businesses 
effectively. Alongside favourable loans, businesses also 
need instruments such as carbon price floors, green public 
procurement, and a quota for zero-carbon materials. 
Financing
• Green bond incentives in bank regulation: An instrument 
that reduces regulatory demands for climate investment 
rather than penalising investment that harms the climate 
would take pressure off banks.
• The government provision of loans or loan guarantees may 
possibly lower costs for business development banks.
• Green quantitative easing: low costs for central banks; 
inflation effects possible depending on scope of money 
creation; extends the mandate of central banks beyond 
their actual remit.
• Fiscal incentives: lost government income from 
withholding tax to the full extent of the interest reduction.
Design options
There are various design possibilities for the instrument  
(I4CE, 2018). 
• It can incentivise or obligate banks to buy green bonds by 
means of equity capital requirements. 
• State development banks could provide low-interest loans 
themselves or secure loans from private institutes in order 
to mobilise private money for climate investment. 
• Central banks could in turn make indirect money for  
climate investment available through the purchase of 
green bonds (green quantitative easing). 
• On the fiscal side, interest rates for climate-friendly 
investment could be indirectly reduced by eliminating 
capital gains taxes.
For all design options, a uniform and ambitious definition of 
climate-friendly investment is needed to create the necessary 
financing products. The EU Commission is currently working 
on such a taxonomy (European Commission, 2019a). 
Special features
Other instruments such as a carbon floor price or carbon 
contracts-for-difference (CCfDs) make climate technologies 
more competitive. Nevertheless, some of the necessary 
investments will not be profitable for businesses with loans at 




• In principle, the above design options stand up to legal 
scrutiny.
• Policymakers must make sure that domestic and foreign 
suppliers are not treated differently. (See. Art. III GATT and 
XVII GATS.)
• As for state aid, the risks are minimal in terms of European 
law. Depending on the design and financing mechanism, 
green bonds can be qualified as state aid acc. to art. 
107 TFEU. If so, it is highly likely that a notification 
either in accordance with the General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER) or with the ruling of the EU Commission 
based on the Environmental and Energie Aid Guidelines 
(EEAG) would be possible.
• The instrument does not impair the free movement of 
capital.
• The implementation of financing assistance is possible 
within existing law in the case of the government pro-
vision or safeguarding of loans. Green bonds require the 
introduction of uniform European standards and changes 
to equity capital requirements. Green quantitative easing 
requires an expansion of the legal responsibilities.




• Current low interest rates in the EU mean low 
additional costs for the instrument 
• Very effective for capital-intensive technologies with 
a long lifespan, which includes most key low-carbon 
technologies and efficiency investment 
OPPORTUNITIES
• Political momentum due to the increasingly large role 
played by green capital investment 
• Proactively involves capital markets in the 
transformation 
• Non-governmental initiatives such as the Carbon Risk 
Management Tool (Carima), the Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) can ease the implementation 
of climate measures in the capital market by providing 
transparency 
WEAKNESSES
• “Climate investment” not yet clearly defined
• A low equity capital requirement increases a business’s 
share of borrowed capital. This increases a business’s 
debt ratio, which can downgrade its credit rating and 
increase the costs for all investment
RISKS
• An end to the low-interest rates in the EU could 
significantly increase the costs of the instrument
• State backing limits business risk but creates the 
danger of moral hazard
• Mixing monetary policy and financial-market regulation 
with climate policy goals raises fundamental questions 
about the mandate of monetary policy
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CLIMATE SURCHARGE ON END PRODUCTS
Instrument design
The instrument consists of a surcharge levied on selected materials (steel, plastic, aluminium and cement) by weight. 
The revenues go to fund other climate policy instruments.
A large part of industrial GHG emissions come from the 
manufacture of a small range of basic materials (steel, 
aluminium, cement and plastics). Pricing these materials at 
production (say, via the EU ETS) can only be implemented in 
a limited way, as even small increases in price can endanger 
competitiveness on global commodity markets. To prevent 
businesses from moving abroad, basic materials producers 
receive the majority of their carbon allowance for free, but this 
reduces their motivation to produce carbon-free products.
A climate surcharge on end products targets selected materials 
at the point of consumption, regardless of where they are 
produced. When buying a washing machine, for instance, a 
charge would be due based on the weight of the steel used in 
the washing machine.
In order to reduce administrative costs, products where the 
charge is below a certain threshold are excluded. At first, 
the charge could be raised on steel, aluminium, cement and 
plastics. The instrument does not draw a distinction based 
on how much CO2 has been released during the production 
process. This means that zero-carbon steel is charged the 
same amount as conventional steel. Unlike the carbon price on 
end products, the climate surcharge does not require carbon 
footprint tracking. 
The pricing also creates an incentive to reduce the proportion 
of carbon-intensive materials in products. Because imported 
materials are subjected to the charge, but exports are not, 
there is no disadvantage for national products for domestic 
consumption and for export. This eliminates the risk of 
carbon leakage. The income from the climate surcharge on 
end products can be used for funding other climate policy 
instruments (e.g. CCfD).
How a climate surcharge on end products would affect steel processing  
in the automotive industry – an example
Agora Energiewende, 2021 Assumptions for calculation: 0.8 tonnes of steel per passenger car; 150 euros of additional costs per tonne of low-carbon steel
CO2
Production / import of  
carbon-intensive steel
Production of low-carbon steel
+ € 60  
climate surcharge 
per vehicle
Effect of the instrument
Car dealer Consumers
Government
Additional income for 
promoting climate-
neutral steel production
Climate surcharge on end 
products: Low additional 
costs for consumers








+ € 0 additional costs
New car price
Proportion of additional 
costs in end-product price: 
< 1%
Carbon reduction with 
low-carbon production 
Comparable price opens up the market for low-
carbon products
Incentives for businesses to produce low-carbon  
basic materials and end products
Supply of low-ca bon roducts enables development 
of green lead markets
Climate surcharge based 
on carbon benchmark per 
kg of steel in end products
Proportion of additional costs 
for low-carbon steel: 28 % 
(offset by CCfD)
Figure C.9 
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CLIMATE SURCHARGE ON END PRODUCTS
The instrument generates income for other instruments (e.g. CCfDs). There is only a small cost for end consumers, 
but it creates incentives for material efficiency.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy carrier
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
Physical goods made of materials with high carbon 
intensity (steel, aluminium, cement and plastics).
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
The instrument would remain in force as long as there is 
no accurate international tracking system in place for the 
carbon footprint of materials or as long as a worldwide 
alignment of carbon prices does not occur.
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
Recommended by the Climate Friendly Materials Platform. 
A similar approach is being discussed by policymakers 
in Germany and the EU under the rubric of a plastic tax, 
intended primarily to eliminate waste.
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




In order to avoid a double charge, goods that fall under the 
climate surcharge would have to be excluded from other 
environmental charges such as the carbon price imposed by 
the European emissions trading system. Installations that are 
covered by the EU ETS would therefore have to be compensated 
financially, i.e. through the free allocation of EU ETS 
allowances or other mechanisms. As trade-exposed industries 
already receive free allowances, this condition is met, but 
the combination with a climate surcharge would prevent a 
reduction in the volumes of free EU allocation as envisaged by 
EU policy. As a result, current product benchmarks that define 
the level of free EUA allocation would need to be fixed at a 
level that compensates emission intensive technologies for the 
carbon cost that is being imposed by the climate surcharge on 
end products.
Financing
End consumers bear the costs, but these are low relative to the 
product price itself. For example, a small passenger car that 
would cost 60 euros more can generate significant funds to 
finance support instruments for transformative investments 
such as a carbon contract or CCfD. A moderate steering effect 
on material efficiency and substitution can be expected. While 
end consumers are not generally price-sensitive to such a small 
price increase, even small price signals can influence purchase 
decisions in business procurement of the automotive industry 
or retail. 
Design options
In the initial version (limited to steel, aluminium, cement and 
plastics), the instrument is relatively simple to implement, 
as the charge is calculated on the basis of the weight of the 
materials, which serves to approximate its carbon intensity 
(DIW, 2016). In addition, governments already have a wealth of 
experiences with consumption-based charges (e.g. for tobacco, 
alcohol and energy). One tonne of steel in a vehicle would be 
charged with a flat rate, independent of the actual emissions 
released in its production. The charge is not due immediately 
on production; rather, it is passed down the value chain as part 
of a charge suspension procedure. The charge is only due when 
sold to an end consumer or a business that is not exempt from 
the charge. All exported products are exempt. 
Specific features
The instrument has many similarities to a carbon price on 
end products. The difference is that the climate surcharge on 
end products is not pegged to the exact amount of carbon that 
arises from the production of a basic material. For instance, 
this would mean that carbon-free steel is charged just as much 
as conventional steel. The instrument’s great advantage is that 
there is no need to track a product’s carbon emissions.
Aspects of implementation
Legal assessment
• Introduction of a climate surcharge on end products 
is legally permissible in principle. A number of 
considerations should be kept in mind, however.
• As a charge on consumption, the instrument is compliant 
with WTO rule as long as the equal treatment of imported 
and domestically produced materials is ensured. (See art. 
III GATT and art. 110 TFEU.) Governments may not impose 
higher surcharges for imported products than for domestic 
products. Moreover, flat rates must also be based on 
verifiable and robust assumptions.
• Depending on the design, a border carbon adjustment 
system for products with a foreign element may be 
necessary – however, this is not generally permissible 
according to WTO rules. 
• If producers included in the European emissions trading 
scheme are covered by the surcharge, the product’s 
carbon footprint may be charged twice – at the point of 
production and the point of consumption. To avoid double 
charging, the climate surcharge must be compensated by 
a continued issuance of free allocations or an equivalent 
exemption from the effects of the EU ETS.
• An adjustment mechanism in the form of a free allocation 
of emission allowances will require a change to the EU ETS 
directive, namely, the rescinding of the regulation in art.  
10 para. 1 RL (EU) 2018/410. It is possible that the technol-
ogy benchmarks would have to be frozen at current levels. 
• If needed, an adjustment mechanism can be used to justify 
the equal or unequal treatment of products that is deemed 
unconstitutional.




• Creates income for funding other instruments 
(e.g. CCfDs)
• The market determines material efficiency and the 
most favourable alternative technologies
• No carbon leakage risk because surcharge also applies 
to imports
• Both imported materials and those produced 
domestically are treated equally
• No global carbon tracking necessary
• A flat rate is not discriminatory and thus complies with 
world trade rules and the European law
OPPORTUNITIES
• Can be restricted to specific products (steel, cement, 
etc.)
• Low costs for end consumers
• Can help to create a global level playing field for 
transformative investments in heavy industry (e.g. if 
revenues are used to finance low-carbon technologies 
via CCfDs)
• Creates an introduction to comprehensive material 
pricing
WEAKNESSES
• Comprehensive implementation needed at the EU level 
• An opening clause for member states may be possible, 
but would require changes of the EU ETS directive
RISKS
• Can lead to unwanted use of materials not subject to 
the charge
• Undermines the logic of a gradual reduction of free EU 
allowances envisioned by the EU ETS 
• Uncertain whether it is permitted as an additional 
national measure for emitters included in the EU ETS
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CARBON PRICE ON END PRODUCTS
Instrument design
The instrument consists of a surcharge based on the carbon footprint of the materials that compensates for the cost 
disadvantage of low-carbon products. The revenue can be used to fund other instruments.
A large portion of industrial GHG emissions comes from the 
manufacture of materials for end consumer products (ETC, 
2018a). Carbon pricing for the production of, say, plastics, 
aluminium or steel, can only be implemented in a limited way, 
as even small increases in price can endanger a company’s 
competitiveness on the global commodity markets. Because 
this can lead to carbon leakage, carbon-intensive industries in 
the EU ETS receive the majority of their carbon allowances free 
of charge.
By contrast, the carbon price on end products prices the carbon 
emissions of materials at consumption instead of at production. 
For example, when purchasing a soft drink in a plastic bottle, 
a consumer would pay a surcharge on the carbon emissions 
released in the production of the bottle. A plastic bottle from 
carbon-neutral production would not be charged. As a result, 
the higher manufacturing costs (on account of, say, chemical 
recycling) can be passed on to the customer. In contrast to the 
climate surcharge on end products, where all products whether 
climate-neutral or not are charged by weight, the carbon 
surcharge is based on a specific product’s carbon footprint. 
This means that the additional costs for the consumer remain 
limited. A soft-drink bottle made of carbon-neutral plastic 
would be less than 0.01 euro cent more expensive than 
those made of conventional plastics (ETC, 2018b). A carbon 
price would be levied on conventionally manufactured 
soft-drink bottles. As soon as this carbon price exceeds the 
additional costs of producing a carbon-neutral plastic bottle 
(under 0.01 euro cent), the green manufacturing technology 
becomes competitive on the market. Because this instrument 
allows the costs to be passed on directly to the consumer 
without competitive disadvantages, manufacturers would be 
incentivised to switch to carbon-neutral production methods. 
Because all imported end products are charged, but exports 
are not, there is no danger of carbon leakage. The instrument 
is expected to make carbon-neutral production competitive 
in the domestic market and to reduce the amount of carbon-
intensive materials in use. 
The main challenge of this instrument is that it requires the 
complete and seamless tracking of the carbon footprint for 
every product. The current costs for comprehensive carbon 
tracking are not acceptable, however. 
How the carbon price on end products would affect  
steel processing in the automotive industry – an example
Agora Energiewende, 2021 Assumptions for calculation: 0.8 tonnes of steel per passenger car; 150 euros of additional costs per tonne 
of low-carbon steel; 1.8 tCO₂ per t of conventional crude steel; carbon price of ~70 to ~100 €/tCO₂
Carbon price corresponds to the 
carbon emissions caused by the 
manufacture of the end product
Carbon price on end 
products: Low additional 
costs for consumers
+  € 100 – 140 carbon 
price on end products
+ € 0 additional costs
New car price
New car price
+ € 120 additional costs 







Carbon reduction with 
low-carbon production 
Incentives for businesses to produce  
low-carbon basic materials
Comparable price opens up the market  
for low-carbon products
Effect of the instrument
Car dealer
Vehicle import




Production / import  
of carbon-intensive steel
Production / import  
of low-carbon steel
Proportion of additional costs 
in end-product price: < 1%
Carbon price
Proportion of the additional costs 
for low-carbon steel: 28 %
Figure C.10 
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CARBON PRICE ON END PRODUCTS
The instrument represents a minimal burden for consumers but creates incentives for producers and suppliers 
along the value chain to substitute materials, introduce circular economy measures and switch to carbon-neutral 
production processes.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy source
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
The instrument incentivises the manufacturers of all end 
products covered by the carbon price to switch to low-
carbon materials. This makes key low-carbon technologies 
such as the direct reduction with hydrogen (steel), steam 
from power-to-heat (chemicals) and carbon capture with 
the oxyfuel process (cement) more attractive.
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
The instrument remains in force as long as carbon-
intensive materials are cheaper without it.
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
Policymakers have discussed such a measure in the form 
of a plastic tax mainly for avoiding waste; among experts, 
the instrument is under discussion as a GHG-based price 
signal.
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




In order to avoid a double charge, goods that fall under the 
carbon pricing system would have to be excluded from other 
carbon charges such as the European emissions trading 
system. This could happen by ensuring that manufacturers 
continue to receive free EU allowances. The retention of free 
allowances, however, is in conflict with the EU’s current policy, 
which is to reduce the number of free allowances over time. 
By eliminating the risk of carbon leakage, however, the carbon 
price on end products can be set significantly higher than 
would be the case in the EU ETS. Thus, despite the continued 
distribution of free allowances, more ambitious carbon pricing 
would be possible.
Financing
The end consumers bear the costs, but these are low relative 
to the product itself. For example, if the carbon price is around 
85 euros per tonne, a standard passenger car containing 
800 kg of conventional steel (assuming 1.8 tCO₂ per tonne of 
conventional steel produced) would cost around 120 euros 
more. At this level the additional costs for a car with low-
carbon steel and conventional steel would be equal. In cement 
manufacturing, a CO₂ price signal of 70 to 100 euros per tonne 
would be needed to make low-carbon technologies competitive. 
The total costs for building a house would increase by only 
around three per cent as a result (ETC, 2018b). For foodstuffs 
– drinks in plastic bottles, say – the costs of a product would 
increase by only around one cent (ETC, 2018b). The steering 
effect on material efficiency and substitution would not affect 
the end consumer; rather, it would arise along the value chain. 
While end consumers are not generally price-sensitive in this 
way, small price signals can influence purchase decisions for 
business procurement in, say, automotive suppliers or the retail 
trade. 
Design options
The design of this instrument is comparatively complex 
because the amount of GHG emissions that arise in the 
production of end consumer goods for are largely unknown. 
This applies particularly to imported products. In the long term, 
a robust international carbon tracking system would have to be 
introduced in order to levy the charge on specific products. The 
tracking system could determine how much GHG is released 
when, say, manufacturing a tonne of steel for a particular 
vehicle type. The carbon surcharge could then be calculated 
on this basis. In the fully fleshed-out version, the instrument 
would directly incentivise businesses to invest in low-carbon 
products because lower emissions in production would directly 
reduce the surcharge on their products. But carbon tracking 
is only realistic in the long term because of the technical 
challenges and the international cooperation it requires. New 
technologies that enable carbon footprint tracking at very low 
transaction costs (using blockchain technology, for example) 
could make this instrument possible in the future. At first, the 
instrument could be limited to particular materials and selected 
end products. 
Special features
Due to the complexity of the instrument’s design, a quota could 
be introduced in the short term for low-carbon materials in 
certain products – such as a requirement that passenger cars 
contain a certain share of direct-reduction steel. In the long 
term, the quota would be replaced by more flexible, broader-
based GHG pricing. The climate surcharge creates similar 
incentives on the product side, but it can be introduced 
more quickly and more affordably because it doesn’t require 
extensive carbon tracking.
The income from the instrument could be used for other 




• In general, the carbon pricing of end products is legally 
permissible. 
• The instrument is permitted by WTO rules as long as it 
complies with the non-discrimination rule in art. 110 TFEU 
or art. III GATT.
• The instrument nevertheless comes with significant legal 
difficulties due to the necessity of establishing a global 
carbon tracking system.
• Requires an amendment to the EU ETS Directive.




• The market determines material efficiency and the 
most favourable alternative technologies
• As a consumption charge, probably WTO-compliant
• No carbon leakage risk because the charge is levied 
only on the end consumer
OPPORTUNITIES
• Low costs for end consumers
• Creates a global level playing field for heavy industry
• The large EU market provides an incentive for carbon-
free production abroad
• Carbon tracking could enable better supply-chain 
management 
WEAKNESSES
• Without product-specific carbon tracking, nearly 
impossible to implement over the long term; 
comprehensive carbon tracking along the value chain 
is hardly possible today
• Zero-carbon products for export have no direct 
advantage 
• Global cooperation is needed for carbon tracking 
RISKS
• Carbon tracking can be difficult in individual cases such 
as the chemicals industry due to complex value chains
• Some designs of carbon tracking could lead to unlawful 
discrimination
• May substitute taxed materials (e.g. plastics) with 
products with other CO₂-intensive products (e.g. paper)
• May lead to resource shuffling by exporting countries




The instrument obliges the government to establish strict sustainability criteria for procurement. The requirement 
creates secure markets for sustainably manufactured products (for steel, cement and vehicles in particular).
The public sector is an important buyer of products and 
services. For example, Germany, the EU's largest member state, 
has an expenditure volume totalling over 350 billion euros per 
year (approx. 13 per cent of GDP). The public sector represents 
a substantial lever influencing the properties and production 
processes of the products it acquires. 
So far, sustainability criteria for public procurement have only 
included particular product groups and are not obligatory, 
and as a result are not widely applied in practice. In 2015, 
only 2.4 per cent of public procurements took into account 
sustainability criteria (Chiappinelli/Zipperer/DIW, 2017). 
Compulsory sustainability criteria in public procurement 
would have a strong steering effect. To create a market for 
sustainable products in construction, sustainable criteria could 
become a standard part of public procurement in the EU. Only 
in certain well-justified individual cases should exceptions 
be made. The consistent application of sustainability criteria 
for buildings, modes of transport and transport services 
are particularly pertinent. A mandatory accounting of life-
cycle costs or a mandatory quota for low-carbon/recycled 
materials (in construction, say) could set important impulses. 
A consistent, green public procurement leads to secure 
markets for sustainable products and thus reduces the risks 
for businesses investing in low-carbon production. Moreover, 
criteria for public procurement would also set standards for 
private market transactions and could complement and support 
CCfDs as a funding mechanism for the production of low-
carbon products.










Renewable energy plants 
(a criterion for funding)
Carbon reduction with 
low-carbon production
Creation of markets for  
low-carbon basic materials
Incentive for businesses to 
produce low-carbon  
basic materials
Slightly higher 
costs for EU 
Member states 
for low-carbon 
materials in end 
products
Effect of the 
instrument
Secure market increases investment 
security for low-carbon technologies
Businesses
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GREEN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
A consistent, green public procurement by the public sector would have a significant positive effect on the 
environment and create lead markets for green products.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy source
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
In principle, sustainability criteria can be used in all areas 
of public procurement. A particularly high potential for GHG 
reduction exists in the areas of construction and transport. 
Among the foreseeable secure markets, the following 
technologies can benefit in particular: Direct reduction 
with hydrogen (steel), methanol-to-olefin/aromatics 
route (chemical), carbon capture with the oxyfuel process 
(cement), carbon capture and electrification of high-
temperature heat in calciners (cement) and alternative 
binding agents (cement).
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
No limitation is necessary. The instrument is a sensible 
and effective option over the long term. The government 
should commit itself to using sustainability criteria for 
at least 20 years to ensure businesses have secure 
markets for their products (e.g. green steel) as they 
plan. Nevertheless, the sustainability criteria should be 
continuously adapted to technological developments.
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
The idea of sustainability criteria for public procurement 
is not new. In 2003, the EU called on its member states 
to set up national action plans for creating a green public 
sector (European Commission, 2019b). Some states are 
already using sustainability criteria in public procurement. 
The Netherlands is one example. Governments there 
must apply environmental criteria when awarding public 
contracts (Baron/OECD, 2016). 
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




Sustainability criteria can overlap with other regulations in 
the areas of materials and resource efficiency. But the effect 
would either be neutral or mutually reinforcing. For example, 
standards for recyclable products could make green public 
procurement easier. 
Financing
Most public procurement takes place at the local and state 
levels, where financial capabilities are often extremely limited. 
Design options
The instrument could be made mandatory for all procurements 
where the share of public funding exceeds 50 per cent. The 
criteria could become stricter over time. For instance, they 
might stipulate that 2 per cent of steel used in public building 
projects be green in 2022, 50 per cent be green in 2030 and 
100 per cent be green in 2050. Exceptions to this rule should 
only be allowed in certain, well-founded cases. As for transport 
services, the sustainability criteria should consider not only 
vehicle emissions but also the incentives that shape driving 
and flying behaviour. The instrument could also be extended to 
areas where the government determines the terms for public 
bidding. In bids for renewable energy, for instance, EU Member 
States could make sustainable materials mandatory. 
Aspects of implementation
Legal assessment
• The introduction of mandatory environmental criteria 
when awarding public contracts faces manageable legal 
risks.
• Alongside the equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
bidders, the instrument must fulfil publication and 
notification requirements when specifying technological 
regulations. See art. 2 para. 9-11 ÜtH (Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade).
• The instrument conforms to the fundamental freedoms 
and the procurement directive of EU law. However, the 
award criteria must be connected to the object of the 
contract.




• Sends important signal to citizens and business that 
the government is leading the way 
• Creation of secure markets for green products
• Highly cost-efficient if successfully implemented 
• Easy to implement nationally and regionally 
OPPORTUNITIES
• Emergence of lead markets for green products
• Effective changes to the production of goods
• Important signal to foreign countries
• Creating references for private markets
• Complementing other instruments such as CCfDs
WEAKNESSES
• Creates additional costs and increased complexity 
when awarding public tenders and determining 
sustainability 
RISKS
• In the short term, supply shortages and limited 
competition can occur
• Not all product quality requirements for certain 
applications may be available as green products
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QUOTAS FOR LOW-CARBON MATERIALS
Instrument design
The instruments requires producers of consumer goods to use a specific amount of zero-carbon materials in their end 
products. The measure guarantees businesses secure markets for low-carbon materials.
Many key low-carbon technologies for producing materials 
such as chemical recycling or steel from the direct-reduction 
process are almost market ready, but economically still not 
competitive. In order to create a secure supply (or lead markets) 
for low-carbon basic materials and to scale their production, 
the government specifies a quota for low-carbon materials – 
particularly those used for consumer goods such as steel. 
This provides manufacturers with higher investment security 
for climate technologies by creating a reliable market for low-
carbon basic materials. The mandatory use of low-carbon 
materials would create demand and an appropriate price for 
such products. Because the quota applies to products sold in 
Germany and in the EU, the additional costs accrue equally for 
both domestic and imported products. Carbon allowances can 
be introduced for a transition period so as not to discriminate 
against manufacturers (domestic or foreign) who have no 
access to green materials. Imports of certified low-carbon 
materials can help fulfil the quota. Exports of basic materials 
from Europe such as metals or basic chemicals would not be 
affected by the regulation. This ensures the competitiveness of 
products made in Europe and exported abroad, and eliminates 
the risk of carbon leakage.
The instrument also incentivises foreign manufacturers 
active in the European market to use green basic materials 
in their end products. The demand of foreign manufacturers 
of consumer goods for green materials will increase the 
production of low-carbon basic materials abroad, even if no 
comparable regulations have been introduced. 
The additional costs for the consumer remain limited. 
A passenger car made completely of green steel would cost 
approx. 160 euros more (ETC, 2018b). If the quota started with 
a proportion of five percent, the additional costs for the end 
consumer would be low.
How a quota for low-carbon materials affects  
steel processing in the automotive industry – an example
Agora Energiewende, 2021 Assumptions for calculation: 0.8 tonnes of steel per passenger car; 150 euros of additional costs per tonne of low-carbon steel
CO2
Production / import of 
carbon-intensive steel
Production / import of 
low-carbon steel
Manufacturers that do not 
meet the quota may have to 
purchase carbon allowances
33% of  
low-carbon steel +€ 40 surcharge
Effect of the instrument
Car dealers Consumers
The quota requires that 
auto manufacturers, 
on balance, use 33% 
low-carbon steel in the 
products*
Proportion of additional costs 
for low-carbon steel: 28% 
Proportion of the 
additional costs in the 
price of a new vehicle: < 1%
Vehicle import
New car price
 *  The quota can be designed in the same 
way for other basic materials (cement, 
aluminium, plastic).
Carbon reduction with 
low-carbon production
Creation of markets for  
low-carbon basic materials
Incentive for businesses 
to produce low-carbon  
basic materials
Quota for low-carbon 
materials: Low additional 
costs for consumers
Figure C.12 
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QUOTAS FOR LOW-CARBON MATERIALS
A quota could be introduced quickly to bring key technologies to the market and in the long term be replaced by 
more flexible solutions.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy source
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(product/plant)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
Carbon-intensive materials in consumer goods for  
which zero-carbon manufacturing alternatives exist.  
These include the following in particular: hydrogen- 
based production of direct-reduced iron (steel), chemical 
recycling (chemicals) and carbon capture with the oxyfuel 
process (cement).
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
Recommendation by the ETC (ETC, 2018d); to date, only 
voluntary initiatives such as the pledging initiative for 
recycled plastics.
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
In contrast to a quota, which only address a certain share 
of an end product, a carbon price on end products could 
serve as a comprehensive instrument. But production-
side pricing requires an international tracking system of 
the carbon footprint of materials. By contrast, the quota 
can be introduced with limited carbon reporting in specific 
industries, creating immediate incentives for producers. 
Once a more comprehensive tracking system has been 
developed, however, quotas can be replaced by GHG-
based pricing.
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




Price signals such as a carbon minimum price floor with a 
border carbon adjustment would make technologies such 
as power-to-chemicals or direct reduction with hydrogen 
more competitive in the long term. But climate-neutral 
investment also requires secure markets in the short term. A 
quota can satisfy this function by supplementing green public 
procurement and providing a possible option for the private 
sector. 
Financing
Additional costs would initially be incurred by producers and 
passed on to end consumers. These additional costs would 
be relatively low for most affected goods, so that neither 
consumers nor producers in Europe would be significantly 
disadvantaged. Manufacturers could also rely on the readiness 
of certain customer groups to purchase more expensive GHG-
neutral products (such as passenger cars made of zero-carbon 
-steel, similarly to Fairtrade foodstuffs).
Design options
The instrument could be designed specifically for certain 
materials and end products. This could reduce the 
administrative costs of carbon tracking but it could also lead 
to the selection of high-emission applications. The instrument 
could stipulate that a share of the steel used in passenger cars 
must be made with hydrogen-based production of direct-
reduced iron (ETC, 2018c). A quota could also promote plastics 
produced from renewable carbon, such as chemically recycled 
plastic or bioplastic (nova, 2018). Construction companies could 
be obliged to fulfil quotas for low-GHG cement (ETC, 2018d). 
The quota would take effect at point of sale to the end 
consumer. Every vehicle sold in Europe would have to 
demonstrate a proportion of CO2-free steel. But for the 
instrument to work, a system would have to be introduced 
to certify that domestic and foreign manufacturers are using 
green steel in their products. The quota might also apply to 
manufacturing. For instance, one could require a European 
automotive manufacturer to use a certain proportion of its steel 
use from zero-carbon manufacture (ETC, 2018c). 
Many of the production processes require investment in new 
plants, but the investment cycles often extend over several 
decades. The quota would therefore have to start low and 
increase over time. This would ensure that the necessary 
volumes of low-carbon materials are available for production. 
In addition, regulations would have to be created for providers 
that do initally not have access to low-carbon products. This 
might require compensatory payments or a certificate system 
between manufacturers.
Special features
The instrument can focus on specific production technologies 
and customer segments (see above). The focus will keep 




• The implementation of quotas for the use of materials 
made from carbon-neutral production is legally 
permissible. Several points must be taken into account, 
however.
• Because quotas are intended to cover imported as well 
as domestic material, they must comfort with the non-
discrimination rule of art. III GATT. Unlawful forms of 
discrimination could occur in particular with regard to the 
certification of imported products. The requirements for 
certification must be uniform for all products. Likewise, 
quotas may not disadvantage imported products subject to 
identical requirements.
• In addition, quotas can, depending on the concrete design, 
be subject to the requirements of the WTO agreement on 
technical trade barriers (the so-called TBT agreement). One 
would have to check whether the quotas comply with art. 5 
and art. 2 no. 2.2 of the TBT agreement. Art. 2.2. stipulates 
that technical requirements may not limit trade any more 
than necessary. The risks of non-implementation also 
need evaluation.
• With respect to the European Law the quota may encroach 
the priniciple on free movement of goods and therefore 
requires a justification. A possible justification would be 
environmental protection. Moreover, the quota would have 
to be in line with the principle of proportionality. 




• Creates secure markets for low-carbon products 
• Fairly targeted support of central technologies for 
decarbonisation 
• The market decides the price and production methods 
for zero-carbon products
• Low additional costs for end consumers
• No disadvantages for European basic materials industry 
because the quota on end consumption also covers 
imports
• No carbon leakage risk
OPPORTUNITIES
• Can be implemented quickly
• Depending on the level of the quota, substantial GHG 
reductions possible 
• Creates an incentive abroad to invest in zero-carbon 
production 
• Makes it possible for consumers to demand green 
products if businesses identify products with zero- 
carbon materials 
WEAKNESSES
• Administrative costs for taking into account carbon-
neutral basic materials (need for a certification system) 
• Undesirable effects if level inappropriate or area of 
application unsuitable 
• Assumes that producers can access low-carbon 
materials
• Certification system may discriminate against individual 
carbon-efficient manufacturers
RISKS
• Depending on the scope of materials and products, 
may be complex to implement; harmonisation 
requirements will have to be observed
• Depending on the design, it could be regarded as a 
non-tariff restriction on trade; compatibility needs to be 
assured with GATT (particularly non-discrimination rule 
in art. III) and the TBT agreement (particularly art. 5 and 
art. 2 no. 2.2)
• Manufacturers may switch to materials (from plastics 
to paper packaging) not included in the quota that 
increase CO2 emissions 
• If quota were increased too quickly, low-carbon 
materials would have to be imported (e.g. bioplastic 
from Brazil)
• Depending on the materials and products included in a 
quota, European harmonisation requirements might also 
have to be considered.
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CLEAN HYDROGEN SUPPORT POLICIES
Instrument design
This group of instruments aims at creating a business case for clean hydrogen by closing the price gap between 
conventional fossil fuel-based technologies and clean hydrogen in no-regret applications.
The use of clean hydrogen will be a key pillar for 
decarbonisation and climate neutrality. In certain sectors 
such as steel and chemicals, but also as a system backup for 
renewables in the power sector its use will play a particularly 
important role (Agora, 2020). In addition, synthetic fuels made 
from clean hydrogen could be used in the future in the areas 
of air transport and shipping. The European Commission has 
already set out an ambitious Hydrogen Strategy that aims at 
reaching a target of 2x40 GW electrolysers by 2030 (European 
Commission, 2020d). However, concrete policy instruments 
to create a business case for clean hydrogen have yet to be 
formulated. Different types of instruments can incentivise 
investment in the production, transport and use of clean 
hydrogen.
The first instrument targets the greening of existing hydrogen 
demand by providing a premium to cover the incremental cost 
of producing clean hydrogen instead of using GHG-intensive 
processes, such as steam methane reforming. Such a “hydrogen 
contract-for-difference”, could cover incremental costs of 
using clean hydrogen in existing methanol and ammonia 
production plants and compensate for variations in gas, 
electricity, and carbon prices that influence cost differences 
over time. “H-CfDs” would target industries that already use 
GHG-intensive hydrogen and employ them as anchors for the 
swift deployment and expansion of clean hydrogen production.
The second instrument supports industry with transforming 
their processes to generate new demand for clean hydrogen. 
Examples are investments in hydrogen-fueled direct reduced 
iron or new installations for chemical recycling, methanol and 
ammonia. These investments create new production facilities 
and face diverse incremental costs for capital expenditure 
and operation that can be supported with carbon contracts or 
CCfDs. These instruments can be designed to support the whole 
value chain of the production, transport and use of hydrogen.
The third option is to define quotas for the sale and use of clean 
hydrogen-based fuels for shipping  and aviation. In response to 
the regulated demand, the private sector will procure adequate 
supply and the price will be defined by market forces. 
All these instruments aim at bridging the cost gap between 
conventional fuels and clean hydrogen with the goal of 
accelerating technological development and cost reduction. 
Another goal of these instruments is to promote climate 
technologies and contribute to European technology leadership 
in a growing world market for these technologies.
Clean Hydrogen Support Policies
Agora Energiewende, 2021
Figure C.13 
Policy Instrument Hydrogen-Contract   for Difference
Greening existing 
hydrogen production
Ideal for pre-existing H₂  
demand with low costs  
for clean H₂ integration
Carbon contracts  
and CCfDs
Greening industrial  processes 
req.  green hydrogen 
(e.g. steel and chemicals)
Appropriate to support the 
development of new clean  
H₂-based value chains
Clean hydrogen-based  
fuel quota
Blending in aviation  and 
maritime fuels
Allows H₂-based fuels to 
compete for market demand 
created by the quota
Potential application
Remarks
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CLEAN HYDROGEN SUPPORT POLICIES
These instruments promote the scaling of hydrogen technologies and contribute to Europe’s leadership in a 
growing global market for these technologies.
  INSTRUMENT TYPE
 Support (H-CfD; Carbon contracts and CCfD)
 Charge/surcharge
  Regulation (clean hydrogen-fuel quota for aviation and  
shipping)
  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy source
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
Clean hydrogen will play a key role in decarbonising certain 
industrial processes and is a building block for synthetic 
fuels in aviation. In the industrial sector, clean hydrogen is 
fundamental to several key low-carbon technologies, such 
as: the hydrogen-based production of direct reduced iron 
(steel) and chemical recycling via the methanol- to-olefin 
route (chemicals). 
  NECESSITY CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
Support instruments for clean hydrogen will lead to a 
gradual cost reduction for the production, transport and 
use of clean hydrogen. At the same time, carbon prices 
are expected to increase. Both processes will reduce and 
eventually eliminate the cost gap between clean and 
GHG-intensive hydrogen and produce a cost competitive 
European hydrogen industry. Recent studies estimate that 
cost parity can be achieved as early as around 2030 if 
the uptake of clean hydrogen is supported with adequate 
measures (McKinsey, 2021).
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
Hydrogen support instruments such as a Carbon contract-
for-difference are mentioned in the EU Hydrogen Strategy 
(European Commission, 2020). In addition, a minimum 
quota for hydrogen-based synthetic fuels in aviation of 
2% by 2030 is currently being adopted in Germany (BMU, 
2021). 
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




Currently, the carbon abatement costs of clean hydrogen are 
still very high relative to the carbon price in the EU ETS. If 
clean hydrogen technologies become cheaper as they undergo 
technology learning curves, rising carbon prices in the EU ETS 
can reduce the additional cost of clean hydrogen technologies. 
In the long run carbon prices in the EU ETS may be sufficiently 
high to obviate the need for further support instruments for 
clean hydrogen. 
A significant degree of uncertainty regarding future costs still 
exists for buyers of hydrogen such as the steel or chemical 
sector. This uncertainty can, however, be attenuated by 
appropriate design of the hydrogen support instruments. For 
instance, a carbon contract or CCfD for steel manufacture with 
hydrogen-fueled direct reduction could cover the incremental 
costs of producing with clean hydrogen.
In the case of hydrogen quotas for sellers of maritime and 
aviation fuels the quota is a volume-based instrument and the 
price will result from regulatory demand. 
Financing
H-CfDs, carbon contracts and CCfDs will require appropriate 
long-term refinancing mechanisms. One such instrument 
could be a climate surcharge applied on CO₂-intensive end 
products (e.g. steel in a car). While the additional costs in 
the final product are comparatively small, it could generate 
funds that allow for the production, transport and use of 
clean hydrogen in industrial processes. In the case of a clean 
hydrogen quota in aviation fuels, the additional costs could be 
borne by air travellers. 
Design options
Carbon contracts or CCfDs can be designed to support 
investments and production with clean hydrogen-based low-
carbon technologies, such as the manufacturing of climate 
neutral steel, ammonia, and methanol. These industries can act 
as anchors for investments in the production and transport of 
clean hydrogen. By supporting the implementation of solid 
and sustainable value chains, the instrument is ideally suited 
to initiate the development of hydrogen-based industrial 
networks. Top this end, such contracts need to be designed 
and awarded to specific sites and projects that can offer the 
necessary transformational spillover effects and act as seeds 
for the development of the hydrogen market and infrastructure 
that are needed for climate neutrality. 
Once production and use of hydrogen become more mature, 
carbon contracts could be awarded in competitive auctions. 
This would generate competition for the production, transport 
and use of hydrogen, reveal new opportunities, and drive down 
prices. 
A further evolution is to design double auctions that separate 
procurement auctions for clean hydrogen from auctions that 
allocate the contracted volumes to different industrial users. 
The resulting costs differences, as well as risks that result from 
different duration and commercial conditions of procurement 
and sales contracts need to be borne by a central entity that 
can incentivise the development of a hydrogen market. As 
discussed, the costs incurred by this central entity will have to 
be covered by appropriate re-financing mechanisms.
Specific features
Any economic support instrument for clean hydrogen must be 
coupled with a sustainability framework for clean hydrogen 
production and use. Specifically, the definition of green
hydrogen needs to ensure that its production does not 
contribute to increasing emissions along the industrial value 
chain, even if considering indirect emissions from increased 
electricity use (scope 2) or other changes in the value chain 
(scope 3 emissions). Therefore rules governing guarantees of 
origin for clean hydrogen, the "additionality" of renewable or 
decarbonised energy for clean hydrogen production, and rules 
ensuring that clean hydrogen is first allocated to the most 
appropriate "no-regret" options (incl. steel and chemicals) must 
be developed in parallel. 
Aspects of implementation
Legal assessment
• For a legal assessment of carbon contracts and CCfD, please 
see the respective instrument fact sheet. 
• H-CfDs may constitute a state aid according to Art. 107(3) 
TFEU depending on the mechanism that will be used for 
refinancing. However, the notification of such an aid is 




• Adresses both supply and demand side of clean 
hydrogen
• Basing support on competitve auctions enables 
competitve price determination
• Projects can be anchors for developing  
hydrogen-based industrial networks
OPPORTUNITIES
• European businesses can become leaders in this future 
technology, building technological leadership
• Significantly reduces costs for electrolysis technology 
• Represents first step to creating a hydrogen economy
• Instrument complements EU-ETS by targeting  
climate-neutral technologies
WEAKNESSES
• High carbon reduction costs for clean hydrogen may 
lead to high long-term costs for society
• The instruments requires creating institutions, 
regulations and oversight
RISKS
• Funding the learning curve does not necessarily lead to 
sustained success for European industry, as the case of 
the photovoltaic industry shows
• State aid notification by European Commission 
• Discriminates against other technologies
for now with inherent legal risks. The Guidelines on State 
aid for environmental protection and energy 2014 – 2020 
do not provide any conditions for such aid. Moreover, 
it is difficult to quantify the economic significance in 
advance because of the volatility of the market price for 
the production of green hydrogen. It is also questionable 
whether the aid intensities according to annex 1 no. 1 
(55% for medium-sized enterprises and 45% for large 
enterprises; 100% for bidding) are high enough to satisfy 
the need for such an aid. 
•  H-CfDs should be granted by an auction procedure in 
order to incentivise efficiency, which should lead to cost 
savings in support policies.
• If the H-CfDs cannot be entered by a foreign enterprise 
there is a need for a justification according to the anti-
discrimination-principle. Moreover, the discrimination 
against other technologies (such as synthetic fuels and 
biomass fuels) will also need a justification according to 
article 3 of the German Constitution (GG).
• To prevent violations, retroactive effects with existing 
subsidies such as paragraphs 64a, 69b EEG2021, 
paragraphs 37a of the law for air quality and control 
(BImSchG) and 3 of the 37. Regulation for air quality and 
control (37. BImSchV) should be considered.
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CHANGES IN CONSTRUCTION AND 
PRODUCT STANDARDS
Instrument design
The instrument requires the revision and adaptation of regulations and standards in order to facilitate material 
efficiency and substitution and increase the recyclability of construction materials.
The main materials in the construction industry are steel, 
cement and bricks. But the manufacturing of these materials 
involves some of the most energy- and emission-intensive 
processes in the industrial sector. Achieving greenhouse-gas 
neutrality, especially for concrete, is an enormous challenge. 
It involves reducing the amount of steel and cement used in 
construction, increasing the use of alternative materials (e.g. 
wood, alternative binding agents) and increasing recyclability 
(by, say, avoiding composite materials) in the construction 
industry. 
Changing standards and regulations can help reduce material 
use in the construction industry and improve efficiency. 
Changings standards from requirements for approved 
construction materials to requirements for required properties 
such as fire protection, statics and insulation enables the use of 
new materials (e.g. timber construction) and new compositions 
(cement with low clinker proportions or alternative binding 
agents, textile-reinforced concrete, less voluminous but 
stronger steel bars). 
Supplementary regulations that increase material efficiency 
and take into account life cycle assessments (LCA) when 
awarding contracts (see instrument green public procurement) 
can further increase sustainability. The supplementary 
regulations must stipulate improved materials and the 
derivation of precise dimensioning. Today, dimensioning in the 
construction industry can exceed requirements by as much 
as 100 per cent (Material Economics, 2018). The regulations 
should be accompanied by a specification of materials, a 
reduction in the share of waste/scrap – today the share in 
construction is around 15 per cent – and the increase of 
sustainable and recycled materials (Material Economics, 2018).
Effect of changes to construction and product standards
Agora Energiewende, 2021













CO₂ reduction in construction
CO2
by, say, reducing over-
dimensioning, avoiding 
waste
by, say, improving recycling 
rates and modular design
Incorporate obligatory 
criteria for sustainability in 
building regulations
From the specification of 
construction materials 
to the definition of 
properties
Changes include replacing 
steel or Portland cement 
with wood or cement types 
with low clinker levels
Figure C.14 
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CHANGES IN CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCT STANDARDS
Revised standards and regulations in construction can lead to significant savings in materials and emissions and 
substantially increase the sustainability of the industry.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy carrier
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of 
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
Construction industry, particularly new construction 
and demolition. Enabling the use of innovative building 
materials whose properties may differ, particularly cement 
with alternative binding agents, concrete with high 
proportions of recycled raw materials such as demolition 
material, textile-reinforced concrete, carbon concrete and 
wood. 
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
No limitation necessary. The instrument will make 
sense and be effective at all times. EU, federal and state 
governments should introduce an evaluation process in 
which independent experts regularly assess standards 
and regulations on the basis of current requirements and 
material properties.
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
The instrument is currently being discussed among 
experts.
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




With green public procurement, some of the regulations could 
be implemented for the public sector. These two instruments 
complement each other. Ambitious carbon pricing for energy 
and materials could have a similar effect. It could be combined 
with a minimum carbon price with a border carbon adjustment. 
In discussions about a future building energy law, the topic of 
grey energy (primary energy that is necessary to construct a 
building) is gaining attention.
Financing
Additional costs would initially be incurred by building 
contractors or passed on to property tenants. For new 
buildings, funding could help cover the new property and 
 
efficiency requirements for construction. The avoidance of 
over-dimensioning could also lower costs without leading to 
disadvantages.
Special features
In the building sector, there is considerable potential for 
improved material and resource use. Material Economics 
(2018) has found that a recycling scenario in 2050 could 




• Changes to regulations and standards (CEN, European 
Committee for Standardization) governing construction 
materials require multiple changes to EU regulations, 
the Construction Products Regulation in particular. 
Because the sustainable use of resources is anchored in 
the Construction Products Regulation, the European level 
can account for the sustainability of products and low-
carbon production when creating new regulations and 
standards (e.g. CEN). But this regulation is not mandatory 
for legislators. To become mandatory, the Construction 
Products Regulation and the CEN standards would have to 
be amended. 
• WTO rules require that newly created regulations and 
standards be compliant with the requirements of the 
agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT) (particularly 
art. 2, no. 2.2).
• At the national level, the legal feasibility mostly depends 
on the extent to which existing European harmonisation 
requirements are already in place. No national 
requirements can be made for products governed by the 
Construction Products Regulation, because the European 
harmonised standards take precedence (ECJ, ruling on 
16.10.2014, C-100/13).





• Sustainable use of resources already anchored in the 
Construction Products Regulation (though it is not 
mandatory)
OPPORTUNITIES
• Significant GHG reduction potential especially in the 
areas of cement and steel
• Can contribute to creating markets for sustainable 
products
• Cost efficiencies due to lower material use 
• Material substitution in construction (e.g. more wood)
WEAKNESSES
• Complex and fragmented implementation
• Implementation problems due to lack of monitoring
RISKS
• In the short term, the regulations can lead to increased 
construction costs
• The industry could oppose reforms to existing standards
• Compliance with the freedom of movement of goods 
stipulated in art. 34 TFEU and the requirements of the 
TBT agreement must be adhered to
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STANDARDS FOR RECYCLABLE PRODUCTS
Instrument design
This instrument requires manufacturers to design products in a way that facilitates recycling so as to close material 
cycles and reduce carbon-intensive primary production.
When designing products, manufacturers rarely consider 
material use after the end of a product’s life, which severely 
limits recycling and component reuse (Material Economics, 
2018). For example, few electrical devices exist that allow 
the replacement of defective components. This shortens the 
lifespan unnecessarily. Packaging often consists of multiple 
materials that are not easily separated. As a result, material 
recycling is limited or not economical. 
To make reuse and recycling simpler and more attractive and 
economical, the recycling of a product must be planned into 
its design (IEA, 2018). The instrument is meant to lay down 
product-specific regulations for mandatory recycling. Among 
other things, the instrument’s requirements would include 
(Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2018): 
• standardisation of product components
• product design for ease of disassembly
• limitation of composite materials
• limitation of small-sized waste
• limitation of rare materials
• limitation of colouring and additives
For steel production, the instrument addresses the 
contamination of steel by copper and nickel in particular. The 
goal must be to separate and sort different types of steel so that 
when melted down they can be reused. In theory, steel can be 
reused almost indefinitely without loss of quality.
In comparison with the steel industry, the recycling potential 
of construction materials is nowhere near full utilisation. For 
cement and concrete, technologies are now in development 
that will enable almost complete recycling in the future (Bakker 
et al., 2015; HeidelbergCement, 2019). The technologies are 
meant to recycle the cement, sand and gravel in concrete as 
well as the steel bars in its reinforced form. A large proportion 
of these materials could be recycled, significantly reducing the 
energy for extraction and production. To increase the recycling 
of construction materials, it would be helpful to establish a 
building pass system listing the materials used at each site 
(Madaster Platform, 2019). A certification system for recyclable 
construction materials could further simplify the process. 
The effect of standards for recyclable products
Agora Energiewende, 2021
*  Standards for recycling 
instead of downcycling
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STANDARDS FOR RECYCLABLE PRODUCTS
Taking a product’s end of life into account for its design enables a circular economy, with benefits that justify the 
regulatory costs.




  DECARBONISATION LEVER
 Energy efficiency
 Change of energy carrier
 Process optimisation & substitution
  Resource efficiency & material substitution
  SECTOR APPLICABILITY
  Cross-cutting technologies                   Steel                   Chemicals                   Cement                   Circular economy
  APPLICABILITY TO TECHNOLOGIES BY MATURITY LEVEL
Development Market entry Existence
Research Scaling Creation of  
green markets
Investment Operating costs Optimisation 
(plant/product)
  AREA OF APPLICATION
The instrument can be used for goods with a low recycling 
quota (e.g. electrical devices and food packaging), steel 
products (e.g. passenger cars), construction materials (e.g. 
the cement, sand and gravel elements in concrete). 
The instrument can incentivise the following processes/
technologies in particular: the sorting of scrap steel to 
increase secondary steel quality (steel), chemical recycling 
(chemical) and the use of recycling concrete (cement). 
  NECESSITY OF CARBON TRACKING
  mandatory
  helpful
  not necessary
  DURATION OF EFFECT
Once high carbon prices are established so that full 
recycling becomes the most economical option, the more 
detailed regulations can be eliminated. 
  STATE OF THE DISCUSSION
At the EU level, individual goods are already regulated. 
For example, reusability and recyclability have been 
criteria for passenger car approval since 2005. In 2018 the 
EU parliament enacted the Eco-Design Directive, which 
established rules for the energy efficiency of devices and 
for increasing their reusability and recyclability.
Legend:       Primary effect      Secondary effect




In spite of this instrument, the production of new materials 
will remain necessary. This is why the incentivisation of 
low-carbon production – through, say, higher carbon prices 
– will continue to be important. In order to fully utilise the 
instrument’s recyclability standards, regulations – for waste 
separation, say – may have to be tightened in the long run. In 
principle, the benefits of recycling must always be weighed 
against its costs. The benefits can lie in the avoidance of 
GHG or in the recovery of valuable raw materials. Recycling 
processes that stand in the way of this principle can be 
disregarded. Thus, in the medium term, the energy and CO₂ 
intensity of material production and material disposal at the 
end of a building's service life could also be taken into account. 
Financing
The extra costs in the manufacturing of consumer goods 
could be passed on to the end customer. But in the long term 
waste disposal costs for consumers would also fall. Ultimately, 
the costs would decrease over the medium term because the 
exchange of defective components reduces new purchases.
Economically, longer product lifespans could lead to reductions 
in private consumption. For countries with few raw material 
resources, more resource efficiency is a macroeconomic 
opportunity, however, as it decreases the import dependency of 
those countries. 
Design options
There are various options when designing regulations for 
recycling standards (CEPS, 2018). One is the vertical regulation 
of individual products. Another is the horizontal regulation of 
specific aspects across product groups, such as the requirement 
that all product batteries be easily removable. Voluntary 
agreements with manufacturers and dealers could initiate 
changes to product design in the short term.
Further questions would need answering about the details of 
the instrument, including measurement methods, adherence 
monitoring and import handling. Furthermore, the regulations 
must be flexible enough not to hinder innovation (CEPS, 2018). 
The following measures could help simplify the mechanical 
recycling – and to some degree – the chemical recycling of 
plastic: 
• Limits to composite materials
• Limits to colourings and additives if needed 
• Limits to individualised reusable deposit bottles if needed 
(PwC, 2011)
• Adaptation of product and (if needed) construction 
standards to enable the manufacture of plastics with a 
high share of recycled materials for broad application 
The following measures could help recycle steel products 
without loss of quality (Material Economics, 2018): 
• Mandatory separation of steel and copper waste flows (e.g. 
during vehicle scrappage)
• Mandatory product design allowing copper and steel 
components to be separated mechanically as simply as 
possible 
The following measures could help recycle construction 
materials: 
• A landfill ban for the coarse fraction of demolition 
materials (sand and gravel) in order to establish material 
cycles and to contribute to the conservation of resources 
• A ban on fine fractions of demolition materials (cement 
paste and hardened cement paste) as filling material in 
road construction, provided technologies exist in the 
future for their recycling (downcycling)
• Adaptation of product and construction standards so 
that construction materials with a high share of recycled 
elements can be approved for use
Special features
For this kind of regulation, many more detailed regulations 
needing continuous adjustment are necessary at the product 
and material levels.  These create high administrative costs. 
Even with very high carbon prices, additional regulations will 
be necessary, particularly in areas where price incentives 
barely reach. Regulatory provisions are necessary for a fast 
start of a circular economy. Furthermore, the instrument serves 
raw-material security by reducing resource consumption.




• Reduced waste incineration and carbon emissions 
• Reduced production of new material 
• Increased lifespan of products 
• Increased security of raw materials
• Increased qualities in secondary steel production and 
reduced carbon-intensity in primary steel production 
• At the European level, product-specific requirements 
(e.g. recyclability) are possible though not mandatory. 
OPPORTUNITIES
• Recycling and re-use have a positive macro-economic 
effect
• More conscious consumers and an end to throwaway 
society
• Europe could seek to amend the Ecodesign Directive 
and the Construction Products Regulation
WEAKNESSES
• Relatively fine regulations are needed that must be 
adapted frequently
RISKS
• Regulation that is too inflexible hinders product 
innovation
• Lack of control and penalties can limit effect
• Product prices may increase
Aspects of implementation
Legal assessment
• The introduction of mandatory product-specific 
regulations is legally possible at the European level, but it 
assumes a change in the Construction Product Regulation 
and the EU Ecodesign Directive. At the national level, 
permissibility depends particularly on whether European 
harmonisation requirements already exist that take 
precedence.
• Product-specific regulations must comply with WTO rules 
regarding the agreement on technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) (particularly Art. 2 No. 2.2).
• European law already allows product-specific 
requirements regarding, say, reusability or recyclability. 
(See art. 15 para. 6 in conjunction with appendix 1 of the 
Ecodesign Directive and art. 3 para. 1 in conjunction with 
appendix 1 no. 7 of the Construction Products Regulation.) 
Specifying such requirements is not yet mandatory 
for legislators. A mandatory requirement, therefore, 
would need a change to the Ecodesign Directive and the 
Construction Products Regulation.
• The permissibility of product-specific requirements 
at the national level assumes that no harmonisation 
requirement exists at the EU level. (On the precedence of 
the Construction Products Regulation, see the ECJ ruling of 
16.10.2014 – C-100/13 Commission/Germany.) 
• Other possibilities alongside mandatory, product-
specific requirements are voluntary commitments by 
the manufacturer. Measures within the remit of the EU 
Ecodesign directive must be approved by the European 
Commission. (See art.18 of the directive.)
Agora Energiewende | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe
132
3 Conclusion
The ten policy instruments on the shortlist represent a 
 theoretical basis with significantly different approaches for 
incentivising the transition to a climate-neutral industry. 
They are meant to serve as possible starting points for discus-
sions about industry decarbonisation – not only in the EU, but 
potentially also other regions of the world. 
However, as the analysis made plain, there is no one silver 
 bullet that can incentivise the roll-out of key low-carbon  
technologies alone. While a border carbon adjustment is 
viewed by some as an efficient instrument, there are a number 
of important questions that need to be answered: How can the 
real carbon footprint of imported goods be verified? Are rebates 
for exported goods into markets without a comparable CO₂ 
price signal compatible with current WTO regulations? And 
will the CO₂ price be high enough to incentivise investment in 
key low-carbon technologies? And technicalities aside, how 
will the introduction of such a mechanism be viewed politically 
by other important trading partners such as the US and China? 
Finding answers to those questions will likely require time 
before such an instrument can be implemented. 
Similarly, while being an interesting option in theory, a carbon 
price on end products would require complete global CO₂  
tracking for every end-product component. A swift imple-
mentation of this instrument thus seems rather unlikely, but it 
could become a meaningful option in the portfolio of instru-
ments once global CO₂ tracking becomes possible (e.g. through 
blockchain technology). Instead of focusing on one instrument, 
we need to develop a comprehensive and adequate policy mix 
that unlocks the full decarbonisation potential at each part of 
the value chain. 
Given the strength and weaknesses of the different instru-
ments what is a sensible way to combine them? How do they 
interact with another? And how do they fit into the existing 
European policy landscape? These questions will be addressed 
in the next section where we formulate concrete policy 
 recommendations in the form of a Clean Industry Package for 
Europe. 
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The transition to a climate-neutral industrial sector 
can contribute to economic recovery and secure 
long-term prosperity. Between 2020 and 2030, 
between 30 and 53% of the EU’s aging industrial 
plants in the cement, steel and steam cracker sectors 
will require major reinvestment and refurbishment.3 
Existing, high-carbon technologies must be replaced 
with low-carbon technologies. Moreover, significant 
investment is needed in strategic infrastructure such 
as clean power, hydrogen, biomass and carbon 
capture and storage. New skills and jobs will be 
required to facilitate this transition to innovative, 
climate-neutral technologies and business models. 
The next 5 to 10 years thus represent a major window 
of opportunity in which Europe can combine the 
transition to climate neutrality with economic 
recovery and long-term stability. Given the urgency 
posed by the climate crisis, member states must begin 
to make these investments during the next several 
years and the EU must follow up with robust legisla-
tive policies. 
Border carbon adjustments and expected carbon 
prices will not be sufficient to initiate investments 
in climate neutrality over the next 10 years. The 
industrial sector has yet to invest in key low-carbon 
technologies at industrial scale. This is not primarily 
because of international competition but because 
carbon prices are not expected to be high enough 
during the next decades to justify the economics  
of these technologies. Even with carbon prices 
averaging 45-60 €/tCO2, as proposed in the recent 
Impact Assessment of the 2030 Climate Target Plan, 
nearly all of the key low-carbon technologies would 
not be profitable. Moreover, carbon prices or border 
adjustments alone will not create the conditions 
needed for investment in clean power, hydrogen,  
CCS infrastructure and other technologies. Likewise, 
3 See Wuppertal Institute (2020, forthcoming).
1 Introduction
Under the 2030 Climate Target Plan and the  
European Green Deal, the European Commission  
has recommended that the EU reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions by -55% by 2030 (relative to 1990 
levels) and achieve economy-wide climate  
neutrality by 2050 (European Commission, 2020a).1  
Achieving these targets is technologically and 
economically achievable with the right policies in 
place (Agora Energiewende & Oeko Institute, 2020a). 
Meeting them will also keep the EU on track to fulfil 
its commitment to climate neutrality under the Paris 
Agreement. During the post-COVID19 recovery, more 
ambitious climate action can boost the economy by 
stimulating investment in green infrastructure and 
technology, creating new jobs and laying the founda-
tions for long-term industrial competitiveness.  
The European industrial sector has a vital role to 
play in delivering this vision of the European Green 
Deal. Direct emissions from the EU27’s industrial 
sector accounted for 719 MtCO2eq in 2017, equivalent 
to 20% of annual net EU greenhouse gas emissions 
(Eurostat, n.d.)2. By far, the greatest emitters are the 
cement, steel and chemicals sectors, making up 
approximately 60% of the total. By 2050, the EU will 
need to reduce its combined industrial emissions by 
approximately 95% and offset residual emissions 
with carbon sinks to achieve climate neutrality. 
1 This chapter has already been published in October 2020 
prior to the EU Council decision in December 2020 to 
adopt an EU 2030 climate target of -55 percent GHG 
emissions reduction.
2 The figure excludes emissions from energy sectors such 
as upstream power and heat production, refining, and 
solid fuel production. 
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2  Why the EU needs a  
Clean Industry Package now 
There are three basic reasons why the EU  
needs a Clean Industry Package:
 → Continuing current policies until 2030 will lead  
to high-carbon technology lock-in in the medium 
term and will put jobs at risk in the short-term  
because there will be no credible business  
case for clean investment.
 → The EU is ready to begin investing in  
a portfolio of key low-carbon technologies  
during the next 5 years.
 → Only a coordinated set of policies  
across the value chain can ensure that  
the necessary investments will be made.
2.1  Continuing current policies until 2030 will 
lead to high-carbon technology lock-in and 
put jobs at risk
To stress again, the industry sector accounted  
for 719 MtCO2eq (or 20%) of the EU27’s emissions  
in 2017. The total is even higher if one considers 
indirect emissions sources. To achieve the -55% 
emissions reduction target by 2030 and reach climate 
neutrality by 2050, the EU will need to make signifi-
cant steps towards reducing its industrial emissions. 
For example, meeting the 2030 target will require the 
EU27 to cut its industrial CO2 emissions by between 
22 and 25% relative to 2015 levels (Figure D.1).
In one sense, this is not a very significant increase  
in expected business as usual reductions, since the 
introduction of the Clean Energy Package and the 
2018 carbon market reforms are already expected  
to decrease industrial emissions by 18% by 2030 
relative to 2015 levels. The European Commission’s 
Impact Assessment of the 2030 Climate Target Plan 
has shown that the most energy-intensive industry 
sectors in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
could deliver a 29.4% reduction in emissions by 
simply adopting the best available current technolo-
the development of efficient, circular value chains 
requires lifting a range of price and non-price 
barriers.
With between 30 to 53% of the EU’s energy- 
intensive industrial assets will be up for major 
reinvestments during the next 5 to 10 years, policy-
makers must act now. The EU needs a strong regula-
tory framework that provides clear incentives for 
investment along the entire value chain, from 
infrastructure and production to final products  
and recycling.
With genuinely transformative policies, the EU  
can shift the course of global efforts to decarbonise 
industry. From vehicle emissions standards to energy 
labelling, the EU is a recognised leader in environ-
mental regulation. Recently, the People’s Republic of 
China put forward its own plan for achieving carbon 
neutrality by 2060 (NYT, 2020). By demonstrating 
what is feasible in so-called “hard to abate” industrial 
sectors, the EU can also have an outsized influence  
on policy to decarbonise industry globally, including 
among major emitters like China, whose industry 
accounted for 5.17 gigatons of CO2eq emissions in 2014, 
or 46% of China’s total for that year (UNFCCC, n.d.). 
Moreover, if the EU acts boldly now, it can become  
a technology leader and effectively set the global 
standards for climate-neutral production and 
products.
The purpose of this paper is to explain why the 
legislative package which will be proposed in 2021  
to implement the 2030 Climate Target Plan and the 
European Green Deal must consist of a transformative 
and comprehensive policy package to drive invest-
ment and job creation in clean industrial technologies. 
The next section explains in more detail why a policy 
package is required. Section three then sketches some 
concrete proposals for a Clean Industry Package.  
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The EU’s energy-intensive industrial assets are slated 
for major reinvestment and refurbishments during 
the coming decade. It is imperative that the sector 
makes new investments in technologies that are 
compatible with climate neutrality by 2050 (Figure 
D.2). Based on the ages of current plants, some 48% of 
blast furnaces (primary steel), 53% of steam crackers, 
and roughly 30% of cement kilns will require modern-
isation to remain in operation and avoid carbon 
leakage. A policy framework is urgently needed to 
make sure that the right climate-neutral investments 
are made. Otherwise, the industry risks stranding its 
assets and increasing the costs of achieving its climate 
targets. 
The flip-side of this equation is that the upcoming 
investment cycle in energy-intensive industries 
presents a unique opportunity for advancing the EU’s 
economic recovery, provided that the right policies 
are in place.
gies, which are already used by 10% of EU installa-
tions.
But what matters is not only that the EU industry 
reduces emissions by 2030 but also, more impor-
tantly, how it does so. The EU’s overarching goal  
must be to reduce industrial CO2 emissions by ~95% 
by 2050. In one scenario, the EU industry could 
reduce emissions by approximately 25% by 2030 
through a range of marginal improvements to the 
efficiency of existing technologies. But doing so 
would have the perverse effect of locking in technol-
ogies and energy sources  unable to achieve climate 
neutrality by 2050. It is critical, therefore, that the 
2030 goal is met with low-carbon technologies  
that are compatible with climate neutrality in 2050. 
Policymakers must encourage the industrial sector  
to invest during the next 10 years in ambitious abate-
ment options for climate neutrality in 2050. This 
means implementing policies that go beyond the ETS.
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on data from Eurostat, 2017, European Commission, 2020b & EEA, 2021
Note: Data are for CO₂ emissions only. They exclude non-CO₂ emissions from industry, from refining, solid fuel production for energy and 
non-energy uses.
* To achieve climate neutrality, residual emissions will have to be oset by negative emissions technologies, many of which could be   
 developed in the industrial sector such as BECCS. By capturing and using CO₂ from other non-industry sectors, industry can provide   
 net-negative emissions. 
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CO2 emitted by the EU27 industrial sector from 1990 to 2018 
and proposed sector targets for 2030 and 2050 Figure D.1 
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broad categories of solutions that can be deployed to 
achieve these reductions in a manner compatible 
with climate-neutrality in 2050:    
First, industries can reduce emissions significantly 
by starting to commercialise key low-carbon 
production technologies. These include direct 
reduced iron (DRI) for steel production, chemical 
recycling, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) in  
the cement industry, which are all near-zero-carbon 
technologies and have sufficient technological 
maturity for commercial-scale deployment during 
the next 5 years.
Second, industries can achieve massive reductions  
by fuel switching from fossil fuels to net-zero 
alternatives such as direct electrification with 
2.2  The EU is ready to begin  
investing in a portfolio of climate 
neutrality- compatible solutions 
Despite the lack of progress in reducing emissions, 
the European industry has at its disposal  
a growing number of key low-carbon technologies 
and other levers to reduce emissions. Though some 
technologies are not fully mature, there is no reason 
why the EU cannot begin to deploy some key tech-
nologies already during the next 5 to 10 years.
Figure 3 shows estimates for the necessary  
emissions reductions by industry in the EU ETS. 
Using data from the European Commission and 
European Environment Agency, we estimate that 
energy-intensive industries will need to  
reduce their emissions by approximately 27% by 
2030 relative to 2019 levels. The figure lists three 
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2020
 * Steam crackers are normally maintained and modernised continuously so that they are not completely replaced at one time. However, 
  the need for reinvestment gives a rough impression of the need to modernise existing facilities.
 ** Indicative: Cement data represent numbers for Germany only. We estimate that the reinvestment requirement for EU27 is in a similar range.
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Reinvestment needs by 2030 and direct employment in cement, steel and basic chemicals in the EU Figure D.2
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2.3  A coordinated set of policies  
along the value chain is needed
Border Carbon Adjustments are often proposed  
as sufficient solutions to kick-start the low-carbon 
transformation of the industrial sector. But, as noted 
previously, this is far too simplistic. One of the main 
reasons is that companies that use low-carbon 
technologies must compete not only with foreign 
producers but also with domestic manufacturers 
using conventional technologies. This requires 
carbon prices that are higher than those currently 
planned.
Figure D.4 shows that the current carbon price –  
27 €/tCO2 – is well below the levels required to drive 
investment in breakthrough technologies. Not even 
the 45-60 €/tCO2 proposed by the European Com-
mission’s Impact Assessment on the 2030 Climate 
decarbonised electricity, biomass, and, clean hydro-
gen in steel and chemicals production.
Third, circularity and efficiency in the use of basic 
materials (such as steel, aluminium, plastics, cement 
and concrete) have the potential to reduce emissions 
in energy-intensive industries by up to 50% by 2050 
(Materials Economics, 2018). While some of these 
measures will not have an effect until after 2030 due 
to long product lifetimes, a number of measures can 
already begin to yield benefits before then.  
Implementing these solutions at the 30–53% of 
cement, steel and chemical production sites slated for 
refurbishment during the next decade can dramati-
cally shift industrial production facilities towards  
climate neutrality.
Agora Energiewende, 2021, based on data from Eurostat, 2017, European Commission, 2020e & EEA, 2021 
Note: Emissions that relate to industrial processes such a coking plants and power plants for industrial use are accounted for in the industry 
sector and not in the transformation sector. ETS emissions in 2005 are notional base year emissions with respect to the 2030 target, 
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and decarbonisation levers to deliver those reductions  
Figure D.3
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requires additional infrastructure planning and 
financing for industrial clusters and cross-border, 
pan-European solutions when appropriate.
 → Midstream: The industrial sector needs the right 
economic and financial conditions in order to 
develop, implement and operate investments in  
key breakthrough technologies and in order to 
address the risks of carbon leakage.  
 → Downstream: The industrial sector needs demand 
and scalable markets for decarbonised and circular 
products, markets that have internalised the higher 
costs of decarbonised products, and incentives to 
integrate the circular economy and resource 
efficiency all along the value chain.  
A detailed discussion of these requirements is  
beyond the scope of this paper, but Table D.1 summa-
rises the ten most urgent considerations.
The new European Commission has already proposed 
policies that could, if well-implemented, address 
some – but not all - of the industrial sector’s specific 
Target would be high enough to ensure the proper 
investments. 
But even if carbon prices rose enough for these 
technologies to be profitable in the short term, 
uncertainty surrounding ETS pricing would still 
create a barrier to investment. After all, the ETS price 
has fluctuated dramatically, going as high as 30 and 
as low as 0€/tCO2 , and there is no guarantee that it 
will remain high. Additional instruments to support 
the economics of expensive key low-carbon 
technolo gies are therefore needed.
The conditions needed for the industrial sector to 
invest in decarbonisation measures go beyond the 
simple question of carbon price levels or the risk of 
carbon price volatility, however. Specific needs can 
be identified along the value chain:
 → Upstream: The industrial sector needs reliable 
access to clean energy and basic materials at 
competitive prices via new infrastructure. It also 
Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2019
Note: CO₂ abatement costs depend very much on assumptions about electricity costs. For the calculation of these values, electricity costs of 
60 euros per MWh were usually assumed. The estimates here are based on Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institut, 2019 and represent the 
lower bound of CO₂ abatement costs in 2030. Higher CO₂ abatement costs are to be expected before 2030, compared to after 2030, because 
the technologies must still undergo learning curves for cost reductions. 
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Direct reduction with hydrogen (Steel)
Direct reduction with natural gas (Steel)
CCU of waste gases of the blast furnace route (Steel)
Green hydrogen from electrolysis (Chemicals)
Methanol-to-olefin/aromatics route (Chemicals)
Carbon capture with the oxyfuel process (Cement)
Current CO₂ price: 27 €/tCO₂
Expected CO₂ price range in the EU ETS until 2030
Estimated CO₂ abatement costs of selected key technologies 
versus today‘s conventional reference process for 2030
Figure D.4
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models.  In general, these conditions cannot be 
created by the industry sector itself. Rather, the EU 
will need to create them by enacting new policies. 
This section proposes a Clean Industry Package of 
eleven key policies to satisfy these conditions.
Figure D.5 summarises the eleven key policies that  
we propose. The policies are broken down by their 
position in the value chain, i.e. upstream, midstream 
and downstream.
3.1 Upstream policies
The key conditions for enabling the transition  
of the upstream value chain are:
 → access to sufficient, affordable clean energy
 → access to key infrastructure (e.g. hydrogen,  
clean power and CCS)
 → the planning, financing and regulation of energy 
networks, especially to support industrial clusters  
needs. These include the Hydrogen Strategy, the 
Sustainable Products Policy Initiative and the 
Circular Economy Strategy. However, to create a 
business case for truly climate-neutral investments, 
these broad initiatives must be turned into strong 
economic and regulatory incentives.
In some areas, such as infrastructure planning  
in key industrial clusters, implementing instruments 
to support the high operating costs  
of ultra-low carbon technologies or creating new 
markets for ultra-low carbon products, the Commis-
sion has yet to make concrete proposals. Accordingly, 
key gaps still need filling.
3  Policy needs for a comprehensive  
European “Clean Industry Package”
The preceding section outlined the reasons for the  
key conditions needed to kick-start investment in 
climate-neutral production, products and business 
10 essential conditions for industry to transition to climate neutral products,  
processes and business models Table D.1
Agora Energiewende, 2020 
 
  *  These carbon pricing systems generally apply to fossil-fuel emissions not covered by the EU ETS and include varying exemptions,  
especially for the industry due to competitiveness concerns. 
  **  Effective carbon rates, including carbon taxes, energy taxes and price of emission permits, but excluding emissions from the  
combustion of biomass in the emissions base.
  *** Provided that targets are not met. 
Upstream Midstream Downstream
→  Access to sufficient,  
affordable clean energy 
→  Access to key infrastructure  
(e. g. hydrogen, clean power & CCS) 
→  Planning, financing and  
regulation of energy networks,  
esp. to support industrial clusters  
→  Investment risk mitigation  
for unproven technologies
→  Recovery of higher operating cost  
of ultra-low carbon technologies.
→  Protection from carbon leakage  
under higher carbon  
& production costs
→  Funding costs of decarbonisation  
internalised in final product prices
→  Standards and demand for  
climate- neutral basic materials 
→  Stronger incentives to increase  
the quantity and quality of recycling 
→  Incentives for material CO2-efficiency  
in final product design, manufacturing 
& construction 
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the production of competitive clean hydrogen. This is a 
payment that would be given to producers to close the 
price gap between clean hydrogen and existing hydrogen 
that is already produced in Steam Methane Reformers 
today. “H-CfDs” might be appropriate for supporting 
early-stage investments in greening the existing produc-
tion of hydrogen and thus for specific industrial processes 
that already use hydrogen, where it is only a matter of 
switching from “grey” to “green” energy sources.
The second type of instrument is to provide down-
stream industrial users of hydrogen with a more 
comprehensive carbon contract-for-difference.  
This could either be used to cover the cost of switch-
ing from grey to green hydrogen (e.g. for existing 
hydrogen use in ammonia and fertiliser production) 
or to support the transformation of industrial  
technologies and processes, generating a previously 
non-existent demand for clean hydrogen.
To meet these needs, we identified the following policy 
priorities for EU and member-state policymakers:
Policy need 1. Economic support instruments to 
create a business case for investments in clean 
hydrogen production infrastructure:
If a decarbonised industrial energy infrastructure is  
to be built, it needs a business case to exist. For clean 
hydrogen production and transport, policymakers 
must create demand for a product that is currently 
more expensive than existing alternatives. Three main 
types of instruments can incentivise investments in 
the production and transport of clean hydrogen.
The first is to provide a feed-in premium, or what we 
might call a “hydrogen contract-for-difference,” to support 
Agora Energiewende, 2020
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of hydrogen blending would make it difficult to 
compete with foreign competitors that do not use 
renewable hydrogen.
A possible difficulty posed by quota systems – one 
experienced by renewable energy support schemes 
(IEA, 2011) – is that the price of quotas tends to 
fluctuate based on supply and demand, which 
themselves depend on other government policy 
interventions. On the plus side, quota systems avoid 
the need for direct subsidisation, allowing the 
internalisation of innovation costs in broader market 
prices for transport fuels.  
A number of actions at the EU level can help member 
states implement one or more of the above three 
instruments both effectively and sustainably:
 → The EU Environmental and Energy Aid Guidelines 
for State Aid, to be revised in 2021, must unambig-
uously open the door to the three options, including 
H-CfDs, CCfDs for industrial users of clean hydro-
gen and quotas for clean hydrogen- 
based fuel blending.
 → Reform of the Renewable Energy Directive, and 
supporting regulations, to clarify the conditions 
under which member states can support invest-
ments and scaling up of clean and decarbonised 
hydrogen (more on this below, Cf. point 2).   
 → Development of European Projects of Common 
Interest, integrating hydrogen development and the 
transformation of industrial processes in the steel 
and chemicals sectors, as a model for future 
projects.
Besides direct support mechanisms, a broader set of 
conditions must be in place to enable hydrogen in the 
energy system and direct electrification in the 
industrial sector. For example, national governments 
may also need to review power market design,  
hydrogen gas infrastructure regulations and taxation 
policies that facilitate the effective introduction of 
direct and indirect electrification in the industrial 
sector. 
For example, steel producers require major invest-
ments to move from conventional blast fur-
nace-based processes (which use coking coal) to  
DRI/EAF-based steel production processes (which 
use hydrogen). Similar examples also exist for 
breakthrough technologies in the chemicals sector 
(e.g. low-carbon ammonia or H2-based methanol- 
to-olefins routes). These downstream users will face 
higher investment and operating costs when switch-
ing to hydrogen in new production processes.  
They will require support to cover the incremental 
cost of these new investments and operating costs. 
Simply providing clean hydrogen at the price of “grey” 
hydrogen will not be enough to justify the economics 
of these new low-carbon operations. Hence, a carbon 
contract for difference, offered at the level of the 
industrial hydrogen user, is a more appropriate 
instrument in these cases. 
A key factor for introducing clean hydrogen to the 
industrial sector is to account for investment needs  
in both upstream hydrogen production and in 
downstream hydrogen offtake. This is especially 
necessary for steel or chemicals manufacturing and 
other industries that must invest in new industrial 
processes while upstream hydrogen production is 
being developed. These investors need to see  
hydrogen infrastructure investments moving ahead 
with high certainty to be able to move ahead with 
their own site transformations. Similarly, upstream 
infrastructure providers will also need to see firm 
commitments and policy instruments such as CCfDs 
being created to be able to invest in upstream infra-
structure with confidence. Close coordination of 
policy support relating to both the supply infrastruc-
ture and downstream investment decisions to create 
demand  will be essential for the design of effective 
support instruments.
The third and final option is to set clean hydrogen 
quotas on sellers of maritime and aviation fuels. Here 
the private sector absorbs the cost of blending a share 
of renewable fuels in the end product. This option is 
not appropriate for industry because the higher cost 
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 → rules ensuring that clean hydrogen is allocated first 
to the most appropriate ”no-regret” options, 
beginning with steel and chemicals;
 → rules governing the safety of hydrogen deployment 
and the technical requirements of transport 
pipelines.      
Policy need 3. Planning and financing  
of decarbonised energy infrastructure,  
especially for industrial clusters 
Presently, responsibility for the planning and funding 
of public utility electricity and public gas infrastruc-
ture falls to the National Energy and Climate Plan 
(NECP) under the EU’s Energy Union Governance 
Regulation, where it is then delegated to entities at the 
national level. Introducing hydrogen, carbon capture 
and storage and clean power infrastructure for the 
decarbonisation of industry requires revisions to 
existing national governance systems. At a minimum, 
future versions of National Energy and Climate Plans 
should include planning and reporting on the financ-
ing of strategic industrial infrastructure – which  
the existing NECP template does not explicitly cover.
Much of the infrastructure planning and development 
will need to begin by focusing on the micro-scale,  
Policy need 2. A robust sustainability framework  
for clean hydrogen production and use  
To develop clean hydrogen that does not contribute to 
increasing emissions along the industrial value chain 
(scope 3 emissions4), the EU will also need a robust 
sustainability framework. This could be made part  
of a revised Renewable Energy Directive and related 
regulations on the definition of renewable hydrogen. 
A robust sustainability framework for clean hydrogen 
would need to set rules determining when hydrogen 
production is classifiable as “clean” and eligible for 
state aid. These include:
 → rules governing guarantees of origin  
for clean hydrogen;
 → rules governing the “additionality” of  
renewable or decarbonised energy for clean 
hydrogen production;5
4 That is to say, emissions that result from producing 
hydrogen with non-zero carbon electricity.
5 “Additionality” means that the renewable hydrogen is 
sourced from additional renewable energy production  
in the EU instead of from existing or new renewable 
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policies such as the Trans-European Networks for 
Energy regulation (“TEN-E”) and the Projects of 
Common Interest framework. The need for a decar-
bonised industrial energy infrastructure must be 
reflected in national and regional planning processes.
3.2 Midstream policies
The preceding sections identified three key require-
ments for the midstream part of the value chain:
 → Investment risk mitigation  
for unproven technologies
 → Recovery of the higher operating costs  
for ultra-low carbon technologies
 → Protection from carbon leakage  
under higher carbon & production costs
i.e. at the industrial clusters in each member state and 
on solutions for decarbonising them. Ideally, member 
states should develop decarbonisation strategies for 
industrial clusters in accordance with existing 
regulations. Such strategies should be summarised in 
future NECP revisions and serve as a reference point 
for other planning and EU financing instruments 
such as NECPs, Regional Just Transition Plans, 
Projects of Common Interest approvals, state aid 
approval requests, etc.
Cross-border infrastructure will also become 
increasingly relevant to the decarbonisation of 
industrial sites and clusters across Europe. Decar-
bonised industrial energy and the CO2-storage and 
transport infrastructure are critical for European 
Agora Energiewende, 2020
Note: Under the current EU ETS anti leakage system, the EU’s energy intensive industries with high trade exposure receive free EUA allocations to 
maintain the production cost at the level of international competitors with equally GHG intensive processes. This cost thus also represents the reference 
for the calculation of carbon specific cost dierentials of key low-carbon technologies. This incremental cost can be covered with a combination of free 
allocations also for key low-carbon technologies and the payment of the CCfD. In case the system evolves towards a Carbon Border Adjustment without 
free allocations to energy intensive and trade exposed industries, the cost for producing or importing products produced from GHG intensive technologies 
would increase and the payment of the CCfD, without free allocations to key low-carbon technologies, will be sucient to cover the cost gap. This 
illustrates, that a CCfD is compatible with a future border adjustment and increasing carbon prices but allows to mobilize urgent investments now.
Scenario 1: Sector subject to free allocation 
for conventional production installations










































The CCfD mechanism with two anti-leakage policies (free allocation vs BCAs) Figure D.7
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In sum, CCfDs help cover the operational cost gap 
between conventional and climate-neutral or 
ultra-low carbon technologies. But they also help 
stabilise revenue streams by eliminating the CO2 
price risk for project investors. In this way, they help 
significantly improve the economic viability and 
bankability of projects.
Given their urgency, CCfDs for industry would 
initially need to be awarded at the member-state 
level. They would nevertheless require a strong 
European enabling policy framework. EU-level  
CCfDs should be developed as soon as possible to 
ensure that Europe does not experience a two-speed 
rollout at the member-state level.
An EU-level mechanism would bring other advan-
tages as well: diversification of geographical and 
technological deployment, increased competition 
between technologies at auctions, solidarity with 
member states unable to pay for domestic CCfDs in the 
short term and facilitating the planning of  
pan-European infrastructure for industrial clean 
energy and CO2 storage (avoiding a two-speed Europe).
Specifically, the EU should put in place the following 
elements:
 → Open the door to national CCfDs under revised 
Environmental and Energy State Aid Guidelines. 
The conditions under which member states could 
develop a policy with likely approval must be clear.  
 → Develop guidance for minimum CO2 performance 
benchmarks and relevant sustainability criteria to 
ensure that CCfDs are allocated only to projects that 
are genuinely compatible with the goal of cli-
mate-neutrality by 2050.
 → Introduce guidance and possible technical support 
on how to ensure that project costs are evaluated 
correctly, do not lead to overpayment and do not 
minimise the risks of internal market distortions.
 → Reform EU ETS provisions on free allocation and 
benchmarks in order to simplify CCfD implemen-
We identified the following EU-level policy priorities 
for meeting these requirements.
Policy need 4. An EU policy framework for  
carbon contracts-for-difference to cover  
the higher operating costs of key technologies
Carbon contracts-for-difference (CCfD)  
would be awarded only to projects implementing 
technologies deemed compatible with achieving 
economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. In 
effect, they are a guarantee that the EU or the host 
member state will cover the difference between  
the actual EU ETS carbon price and the carbon 
price required for the project to be profitable. 
Figure D.7 illustrates how a CCfD works using 
either free allocation or border carbon adjustments 
as the main anti-leakage measure.6
Payments to the projects would be calculated based 
on the difference between the EU-ETS carbon price 
and a pre-agreed “strike price,” the breakeven 
carbon price necessary to make the low-carbon 
technology project commercially viable in relation 
to a given conventional technology. At the end of 
each year, the project owner reports the annual 
production level. 
If the carbon price average was below the strike price, 
the project receives the difference multiplied by a)  
the production cost using the low-carbon technology 
multiplied by b) the abated emissions from the new 
technology (relative to a conventional benchmark). 
Conversely, if the carbon price is above the strike 
price, then the project owner pays back a share of the 
“excess” income.
6  Technically, a third scenario is also possible: the national 
government could sell previously allocated allowances to 
the project and pay the full cost difference of the decar-
bonised technology. This scenario occurs when key-low 
carbon technologies do not receive free allocations. 
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Box 1: CCfDs would be affordable for member states
In view of the budget constraints due to the COVID-19 crisis, some national governments may be concerned 
about the costs of carbon contracts-for-difference. In reality, however, such fears are mostly unfounded.
Initial estimates for the cement and steel sector are shown in Figure D.8 below. The data explore two 
pathways for decarbonising steel and one for decarbonising cement.  For steel, option one describes a first 
step towards climate-neutral production. It begins by investing in natural gas-based DRI technology, which 
will reduce emissions by ~66%. (Over time, clean hydrogen will replace natural gas.) The second option 
consists of immediately introducing much higher levels of clean hydrogen for DRI, which will reduce 
emissions by 89% relative to conventional blast furnaces. For cement, the option is based on an oxyfuel 
process with CCS at 90% capture rates.
Figure D.8 presents the mid-range cost estimates up through 2030, with an assumed CO2 price of 45€/tCO2 
and an average wholesale power price of 60 to 70€/MWh. Actual site costs could differ depending on local 
conditions
Agora Energiewende, 2020
Note: Actual technology breakeven costs may dier from these estimates, depending on site-specific characteristics. The required CCfD strike 
price and thus per unit cost can be lowered if combined with other support/funding. Costs depend critically on ETS CO₂ price, H₂, and power 
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tation by member states and eliminate disincen-
tives.
 → Identify new funding sources – either from ETS 
auctioning revenues and/or from a climate sur-
charge on basic materials – to fund large-scale 
European CCfD projects.
Policy need 5. Financial de-risking instruments  
for capital expenditure in first-of-a-kind,  
large-scale investments
While CCfDs are an effective instrument for covering 
the operating cost gap between key low-carbon and 
conventional industrial technologies, they do not 
necessarily address the “capex risk” from the large-
scale deployment of new unproven technologies.  
For this, CCfDs may need to be supplemented by 
capital de-risking tools. These instruments can take 
different forms. However, some powerful tools 
already exist at the EU level. One such tool is the  
EU ETS Innovation Fund, which provides up to 60%  
of the additional costs of large-scale demonstrators 
for innovative low-carbon projects in any sector.7 
Another useful tool is InvestEU, which provides loan 
guarantees that help reduce the risk of investment  
in innovation and in “strategic” projects in Europe.
But though both of these tools are already in place, 
they also are relatively small and are spread thinly 
across many sectors and priorities. For example,  
the EU ETS Innovation Fund is expected to offer 
€8-11 billion over the ten-year period to 2030 
(roughly 1 billion per year) over all sectors of  
the energy system.8   InvestEU can be leveraged  
since it provides loan guarantees rather than grants. 
However, its size was reduced dramatically during 
7 See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/innovation-fund_en
8 See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/innovation-fund_en
The projected annual payments to cover the incremental costs of CCfDs suggest that the costs are fairly moderate 
for individual member states. For example, a large member state, representing, say, 20% of the total EU market  
for primary crude steel and Portland cement, and looking to convert 50% of its national production capacity  
to climate neutrality-compatible processes, would need to calculate between 170 million to 1.32 billion €/yr  
for primary steel (depending on the share of gas vs. hydrogen in DRI production) and roughly 500 million €/yr  
for cement (to shift production to oxyfuel and CCS technologies). These amounts would be sufficient to cover  
the clean-energy modernisation needs during the next 10 years for the steel and cement sectors in Europe.  
The above example was for a larger member state, but most EU member states do not produce more  
than 5% of the total EU supply of either cement or primary steel. In principle, therefore, these member states 
could convert their steel and cement sites to clean energy for less than 50% of the estimated cost.
Other factors can also affect costs. In practice, CCfDs are not likely to be the only support instrument, and 
infrastructure costs may be partially paid by other instruments. For example, the EU ETS Innovation Fund 
or national innovation funding tools would likely contribute to the capital cost of some projects, thus 
reducing the need for CCfDs to cover 100% of additional costs. In such circumstances, the above cost 
estimates would be on the high side. At the same time, costs would be higher if support is given to other 
sectors, such as certain basic chemicals or non-ferrous metals. Changes to assumptions regarding ETS or 
power prices could also increase or decrease the results, direction depending.
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the recent EU Re covery and Budget negotiations.9  
Other initiatives, such as the proposed liquidation  
of the EU Coal and Steel Fund, make up only a small 
slice of the total pie.
To boost these instruments, the EU must devise 
additional funding mechanisms. An EU-wide climate 
surcharge on products with large amounts of basic 
materials sold in the EU market is one solution. An 
additional source of funding could be new revenues 
from ETS auctions. These could stem from expanding 
the ETS to additional sectors beyond maritime and 
aviation fuels. They might also come from the 
elimination of free allocations for certain sectors 
(such as those moving to border carbon adjustments).
Policy need 6. Set standards for climate-neutrality 
compatible production of basic materials 
While carbon contracts-for-difference and financial 
de-risking mechanisms to support innovation will be 
essential for financing breakthrough technology 
projects, the EU also needs to send a clear signal 
dissuading new investments in industrial plants and 
technologies that are incompatible with achieving 
climate neutrality by 2050. Otherwise, EU companies 
may invest in half measures that reduce emissions in 
the short run but lock in technologies that cannot 
deliver economy-wide neutrality by mid-century.
The best way to tackle this problem is via setting 
standards for basic materials that are compatible with 
climate neutrality. Such standards are necessary for 
several reasons, including:
 → clarifying the project eligibility criteria  
for CCfDs (see above)




 → facilitating the creation of lead markets  
for climate neutral materials
 → facilitating green public procurement  
of climate neutral basic materials
 → providing a clear signal about the direction  
of future EU policy requirements to avoid lock-in 
of “half way solutions” that are not compatible  
with climate neutral industry in 2050.  
Once standards are set, the EU could determine CO2 
performance requirements for major reinvestments 
and for license extensions of existing plants after a 
given date, say, 2030. Revisions to the EU’s Industrial 
Emissions Directive could make the best available 
reference technologies post-2030 consistent with 
climate neutrality criteria.
Since IED regulations can take several years  before 
coming into effect followed by a  long, sometimes, 
4-year phase-in period, new standards should seek 
to set climate neutrality requirements for all major 
new investments or license extensions after 2030. 
Doing so would send a very clear signal to industries, 
encouraging them to prioritize their decarbonisation 
strategies and steer a course towards climate  
neutrality during the coming investment cycle. 
Policy need 7. A robust package of anti-carbon 
leakage policies, enabling long-term alternatives to 
free allocation and state aid
Under existing policies, the EU ETS Directive pro-
vides two main measures for tackling the risk of 
“carbon leakage,” i.e. when production, jobs and 
emissions move to countries with lower carbon 
prices. The first is the free allocation of emissions 
allowances to sectors at risk of carbon leakage, which 
include energy-intensive industries.10 The second is 
10 See European Commission (2018):  
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament  
and of the Council of 13 October 2003  
(consolidated text, incorporating revisions).
Agora Energiewende | Breakthrough Strategies for Climate-Neutral Industry in Europe
148
the possibility of state aid payments to compensate 
for higher electricity prices. But with higher carbon 
prices and declining free allowances likely in the 
future, these solutions will need to be revised and 
then eventually phased out in favour of alternatives. 
(See Box 2.) When it comes to maintaining a uniform 
carbon price along the value chain, phasing out free 
allocation and state aid will unlock additional down-
stream incentives for abatement. The phase-out  
can also help remove distortions created by certain 
regulations (such as the disincentive to substitute 
clinker for cement). 11
11 If free allocation is to be continued, then efforts may be 
needed in some sectors to revise existing benchmarks 
and prevent distortions. For example, in the case of 
cement, the existing practice of providing free allocation 
for clinker production (rather than cement) could have 
a distortionary effect. This is because is it fairly easy to 
substitute clinker with other materials, such as calcined 
clays, etc. Under high carbon prices, free allocation based 
on clinker production would provide companies with  
an incentive not to adopt this option. Subsuming cement 
under a border carbon adjustment or a product carbon 
requirement and phasing out free allocation would avoid 
the problem.
In the medium term, therefore, the EU will need to 
replace its current carbon leakage instruments with 
more sustainable and more effective alternatives. In 
the absence of a G20 agreement on a global carbon 
price, two basic options exist: border carbon adjust-
ments, which equalize carbon prices at the border,  
or carbon product requirements on all goods 
(imported or domestic) sold in EU. Unless a global 
carbon price agreement is reached, the EU will  
have to choose one of the two (or perhaps some 
combination thereof).
The exact speed with which the EU would need  
to move to these long-term alternatives will depend 
on how quickly free allocation and state aid cash 
payments become unsustainable in the EU ETS.  
This, in turn, depends on whether the EU decides  
to enlarge the ETS. As explained in Box 2 below,  
the point of unsustainability could be reached at  
any time between the mid-2030s and 2042.  
In the short run, however, both border carbon adjust-
ments and carbon product requirement present 
significant challenges. Carbon product requirements 
will not be able to be introduced immediately. Such 
policies are generally appropriate only once certain 
Agora Energiewende, 2019
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technologies become well-established. Likewise, border 
carbon adjustments require significant new adminis-
trative enforcement development and face political 
hurdles at the domestic and international level. 
A likely scenario is that border carbon adjustments in 
the near term will be impossible for all but a small 
handful of sectors and, even then, will require a 
cautious and gradual introduction. Instead, a transi-
tional arrangement will be needed that relies on existing 
state aid and free allocation systems that incorporate 
longer-term solutions like border carbon adjustments 
or carbon product requirements. Figure D.9 summa-
rises the broader anti-leakage policy package needed 
in the short, medium and longer term.
In the short-term, the following specific reforms  
will be needed:  
 → Free allocation must be continued at the  
full technology benchmark for sectors not subject  
to a border carbon adjustment, but adjusted 
ex-post based on true output (“output-based 
allocation”). Currently, free allocation is determined 
ex-ante based on past output.
 → Reforms to state aid guidelines are needed  
that limit support to electricity-intense sectors. 
Maximum aid levels should be linked explicitly to 
the carbon price and allowed to rise to 100% of the 
full technology benchmark for prices above 30€/tCO2.
 → Border carbon adjustments and carbon product 
requirements must be gradually implemented for 
the relevant candidate sectors. This requires 
monitoring and reporting infrastructures, mecha-
nisms to account for foreign carbon policies, 
mechanisms to provide export rebates, diplomatic 
efforts to reduce opposition and retaliation, etc.
Depending on the specific policy package design 
proposal, the EU may need to undertake additional 
reforms. These include:
 → reforms to eliminate the need for a cross-sectoral 
correction factor (depending on whether the EU 
expands the ETS);
 → changes to certain product benchmarks to avoid 
disincentives for clinker substitution (if free 
allocation is continued in the cement sector); and
 → rule changes that allow member states to provide 
cash payments instead of free allocation to sites 
receiving CCfDs without losing their allocated ETS 
allowances (provided that free allocation continues 
in sectors subject to CCfDs).12
12 In a free allocation system, the question is whether a free 
allocation should continue for ultra-low carbon sites 
receiving CCfDs, or whether a cash payment would be 
simpler, allowing allocations to be sold to raise the neces-
sary revenues for the member state or the EU fund.
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Box 2. The limits of the existing anti-carbon leakage system  
 
Under current ETS anti-leakage rules, free allocation is provided based on past activity levels multiplied  
by CO2 performance benchmarks based on the average of the best 10% of installations producing a given 
product in the EU. But the free allocations can be revised downwards if the total level of free allocation 
exceeds 46% of the total EU ETS allocation (including both free and auctioned allowances), whereupon  
a “cross-sectoral correction factor” (CSCF) kicks in. Furthermore, electricity-intensive sectors, such as 
producers of non-ferrous metals, are eligible to receive cash compensation for up to 75% of additional 
electricity costs arising from the ETS.13    
While the system has avoided leakage fairly well so far, more ambitious climate policies would sharply 
decrease the total number of ETS allowances over the next 10 years. Consequently, even if the CSCF were 
reformed to allow for a share of free allocation higher than ~46% of the cap, the share of free allocation 
would still grow very quickly – potentially consuming up to 75% of the total number of allowances by 2030 
and 100% by 2037. This indicates that free allocation is not a sustainable solution to carbon leakage in the  
13 See European Commission (2012): Guidelines on certain state aid measures in the context of the greenhouse gas  
emission allowance trading scheme post 2012. Adopted on 22.05.2012. Official Journal C154, 05.06.2012, p. 4
Agora Energiewende, 2021. Own estimates based on data from EEA, 2021 and European Commission, 2020b.
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medium term.14 Even in the short term, strong growth in the free allocation share would tend to put  
pressure on the residual auctioning share of allowances, which currently supports several dedicated funds 
and provisions in the broader EU ETS policy framework.
Another option would be to include in the EU ETS fossil use sales for the transport and buildings sectors. 
This would increase the total allowances available each year (Figure D.11). If the EU significantly enlarges the 
ETS, the existing free allocation mechanism could be retained for much longer than possible in the current 
system. Nevertheless, the EU would still need to transition to an alternative system at some point down the 
line.
Another problem with the existing EU ETS anti-leakage system is that free allocation is given prior to firms’ 
production decisions and unless production varies very significantly (more than +15% or –15%) from past 
activity levels, there is no ex-post adjustment to align free allocation to actual production levels at the end of 
the year. Under very high carbon prices, this could create an incentive for a certain percentage of installations 
14 This is true even if energy-intensive sectors reduce their emissions to zero, since the producers would still need to be 
protected from the additional cost of climate-neutral products relative to conventional ones. Under a free allocation sys-
tem, low-carbon technologies would probably require free allocations at the full conventional benchmark, although cash 
payments might also be an alternative. In the absence of a dedicated funding source, however, this too would likely be an 
unsustainable solution in the long term. 
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Policy need 8. A climate surcharge  
on material-intensive final products
If scaled at the EU level, CCfDs and related policies 
will probably require a new dedicated funding source. 
In general, it is desirable that any new funding source 
is ultimately paid for by the final consumer of the 
products, so that the sector would be “self-funding.” 
The ideal solution would therefore be a climate 
surcharge to be placed on final products that have 
very high levels of energy-intensive basic materials 
such as steel, cement or basic chemicals.
The list of such products could be long or short 
depending on how broad or narrow policymakers 
wish to make the tax base. But even a narrow tax base 
for a limited number of products such as new build-
ings, new motor vehicles and plastic packaging items 
would be able to both cover a large share of the 
consumption of steel, cement and plastic chemicals. 
For such products, the contribution rates would be 
very low, typically in the order of less than 1% of the 
final product cost,15 thus reducing any risk of under-
mining market demand. Carbon leakage would not be 
possible either, since all products sold in the internal 
market, including imports, would be subject to  
the charge, while exports could be exempted  
(See Figure D.12).
15 These are based on our own estimates.
3.3 Downstream policies
The preceding sections identified four key  
requirements for the downstream segment of the 
value chain:
 → funding costs of decarbonisation  
internalised in final product prices
 → standards and demand for  
climate-neutral basic material
 → stronger incentives to increase  
the quantity and quality of recycling
 → incentives for increased material  
CO2-efficiency in final product design,  
manufacturing and construction
We identified the following policy priorities at  
the EU level to meet these requirements.
1314
to reduce their production by a given percentage, import a share of the production no longer produced in 
Europe, and sell the surplus allocations on the market. This phenomenon is known as “operational carbon 
leakage.” Incentives for operational leakage can be eliminated by introducing ex-post adjustments to the level 
of free allocation given each year based on the actual production from the preceding year (more on this below).
A third problem with the existing carbon leakage system is that, under current state aid guidelines, which 
expire in 2020, a maximum of 75% of indirect ETS costs can be offered to compensate electricity-intensive 
sectors. At future carbon prices of 45-60€/tCO2, the absence of 100% compensation can have a major 
impact on the competitiveness of electricity-intensive products because they compete in international 
commodity markets with strong competition from non-EU countries. For example, in 2018, the EU 
imported basic unwrought and semi-finished aluminium products equivalent to 42% of total EU aluminium 
production for that year (Eurostat, n.d.).
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recycled scrap available 10, 20 or even 50 years  
from now, the issue is urgent.
We have identified three ways to incentivise the 
improvement of material quality:
 → The EU could reform recycling legislation  
for basic materials to include stronger incentives 
for material quality conservation. This could be 
done via reforms to sectoral legislation under the 
EU Waste Framework, such as the End-of-Life 
Vehicles Directive, the Waste Framework Directive 
and the Construction and Demolition Waste policy 
framework. Reforms could take different shapes, 
but options should include minimum recycled 
content requirements, additional material quality 
separation, collection and tracing requirements and 
incentives for Extended Producer Responsibility 
schemes to set quality goals alongside quantity 
objectives.
Climate surcharges could be levied at the  
national or the European level. Indeed, the EU has 
already proposed a plastics tax to pay for part of the 
European recovery fund post-Covid19 – “Next 
Generation EU”. The EU could expand this approach to 
a broader set of products containing large shares of 
carbon-intensive basic materials.
Policy need 9. Requirements to improve recycled 
basic material quality and material efficiency in 
manufacturing
One of the biggest barriers to boosting the  
circular economy for basic materials such as steel, 
non-ferrous metals and plastics is the degraded 
quality of secondary scrap and plastic. This limits  
the share of recycled materials that can be used to 
substitute new virgin materials. Since the products 
that are manufactured or built today will be the 
Agora Energiewende, 2020, adapted from illustration of Energy Transition Commission, 2018 
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in” of half-way solutions to climate neturality, the 
relevant label should only indicate “climate- 
neutrality compatibility”. This solution would thus 
be more akin to the current EU’s “Eco-labelling” 
system, rather than its “Energy labelling”. The 
resulting standards could potentially be used  
in a variety of legislative instruments, such as the 
environmental standards set under the  Construc-
tion Product Regulation, Green Public Procurement 
Directive or the Industrial Emissions Directive. 
 → Design requirements for final products containing 
large amounts of basic materials. To create a more 
complete set of incentives, the EU should set 
minimum requirements for embedded CO2 in final 
products, beginning with buildings and vehicles. 
One of the strengths of embedded carbon require-
ments is that they address material intensity, 
choice of materials, choice of recycled vs. primary 
materials, etc. They can also help tackle important 
sources of waste due to overestimation of materials 
needs in construction and inefficient manufactur-
ing processes. These regulations could follow the 
example of leading member states such as France, 
Sweden, Finland, and Denmark and require that 
member states adopt policies that require all new 
buildings to have embedded carbon below a given 
tCO2/m2 threshold (adjusted for certain features of 
the building), with tightening standards over time. 
Indeed, the EU has begun trialling its own evalua-
tion system for measuring building LCA emissions, 
known as LEVEL(s). This could be used a a technical 
basis for further requirements on member states to 
adopt mandatory requirements on new construc-
tion across the EU. 
The change could be adopted via amendments to the 
Construction Products Regulation16 and the creation 
of a new product regulation for construction products.
16 See https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/sustainability/
ecodesign_en
 → The EU could ban or otherwise disincentivise 
products with low recyclability or poor material 
efficiency performance – akin to existing practices 
for energy using products. This could include,  
for instance, incentives to reduce the number of 
polymers that plastic products contain,  
ensuring that products such as vehicles, machines 
or buildings are designed with longevity and ease  
of disassembly in mind, banning or disincentivis-
ing (via labelling) material-intensive construction  
and design.
 → The EU could revise construction and vehicle waste 
legislation to adopt minimum requirements for 
end-of-life de-construction, sorting and tracing. 
This should include, as a minimum, tighter limits 
and regulations on the demolition of and sorting of 
waste from buildings and construction and tighter 
limits and regulations on the shredding of vehicles.  
Policy need 10. “Climate neutrality-compatible” 
product labelling and eco-design requirements for 
embedded carbon
Assuming that carbon contracts for difference and 
climate-neutral compatibility requirements for the 
production of intermediate materials after 2030 are 
in place to drive investment upstream, there are two 
ways that the EU can support the creation of lead 
markets and demand for low-carbon basic materials:
 → Low-CO2 product labelling for basic materials. 
Common EU-wide labelling can help foster pur-
chaser confidence in the environmental integrity 
and climate-neutrality compatibility of basic 
materials. The label can be used as a reference point 
for leading private-sector purchasers who wish to 
advertise their green credentials. Since production 
technologies for intermediate basic materials are 
updated only every 20-30 years, these labels 
should not use the A-F rating, like the one used by 
the EU’s Energy products under Energy labelling. 
Rather, because non-marginal change is required, 
and the EU must be careful not to incentivise “lock 






Box 3.  Examples of eco-design requirements for lifecycle carbon assessment 
(LCA) limits and new construction labels 
Although many private and local government LCA initiatives exist (Bionova, 2018), national  
LCA labelling and eco-design policies have recently begun to emerge at the EU member-state level  
(Zero Waste Scotland, 2019). 
For example, France’s “E+C- labelling” scheme is a state-backed system that reports the full  
LCA emissions (and energy performance) of new buildings. Under the label, new buildings must report  
a) total energy consumption, and b) total lifecycle CO2 emissions, including energy use and embedded 
emissions in construction materials.17 Based on this label, from 2021, a reform of the existing thermal 
energy regulation on buildings18 will impose maximum binding limits on each of the above measurements. 
The limits for embedded CO2 emissions are expressed in kgCO2/m2, with an assumed 50-year building 
lifetime. Certain adjustments then factor in other relevant criteria (e.g. climatic zone, parking spaces, etc). 
While the limits are not extremely strict at the moment, the regulation defines limits below the  
minimum for buildings to receive a higher performance label. This is done to create a reference point  
for more ambitious clients and construction companies. It is expected that the binding limits will  
progressively be tightened over time.
In 2018, Sweden’s National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) introduced a new  
regulation for climate declarations of buildings, effective from 2022. It will include mandatory reporting 
requirements for most buildings and binding limits for climate impacts expressed in kgCO2 e/m2 BTA19  
(Boverket, 2020). Since 2015, Denmark has been offering a freely available lifecycle assessment tool for 
buildings. It will shortly be publishing a set of voluntary sustainability classes. These are intended to try  
out monitoring and evaluation tools before the introduction of mandatory requirements in the building 
regulations in 2023 (Zero Waste Scotland, 2020). Similarly, Finland launched a public consultation  
in 2018 on how to approach whole-life carbon footprinting. This will become mandatory for new buildings 
by 2025 (Zero Waste Scotland, 2020). 
Meanwhile the EU itself has been trialling, since 2018, the new LEVELS framework, which attempts  
to develop a harmonised European methodology for evaluating the sustainability performance of buildings 
across several indicators, including embedded CO2 emissions in materials. The EU could potentially  
build on this framework to introduce mandatory measures as has been done in the above-mentioned 
member states. 
17 See XPAIR (2020) and Batiment à Energie Positive & Reduction Carbone (RE2020), « Le label E+C- et la Réglementation 
Environnementale 2020 : Votre guide technique !, » https://blog.batimat.com/e-c-label/
18 See the Regulation on Thermal Energy use in Buildings (“Reglementation Thermique 2020”).
19  BTA refers to “bruttoarea,” which is broadly equivalent to “Gross Floor Area” (or GFA). 
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certify compliant methodologies and databases and 
require member states to implement these systems. 
4  Summarising the 11 proposals  
for a Clean Industry Package
The previous section has laid out a detailed list of 
specific proposals for policies that together could 
constitute something approximating a Clean Industry 
Package for Europe. They are not meant to be a 
shopping list but, rather, are an attempt to address 
specific conditions for putting Europe’s energy-in-
tensive industrial sector on a path to climate neutral-
ity by 2050. The policies are intended to be, and, in 
many cases, depend fundamentally on being, part of  
a package in order to have maximum effectiveness.
We have shown in several instances that policy 
effectiveness will depend on national-level and 
sub-national-level interventions. Helping member 
states to activate these levers of policy – facilitating  
a broad and inclusive “one-speed” transition across 
the EU27 – will require a combination of both “harder” 
legislative instruments together with other “softer” 
policies that enable, harmonize and provide technical 
and capacity-building support.  
What legal architecture should this combination  
of policies take? Should they be combined in, say,  
a “clean industry directive”?  A dedicated clean- 
industry directive is probably not required. With  
the exception of the introduction of border carbon 
adjustments and the new CCfD policy, most of the 
necessary policies could be introduced by reforming 
existing regulatory instruments. Yet a risk of this 
approach is that the overarching vision of a compre-
hensive and coherent package gets lost in the detail. 
To keep its eye on the big picture, the EU will need  
to consider the role of new governance tools for 
industrial decarbonisation, both as it prepares 
legislation and over the longer term.
Policy need 11. Green public procurement  
requirements for basic materials
EU public procurement legislation from 2014  
already permits 20 – but does not require – environ-
mental criteria to be used in public procurement for 
the domestic market. Following the distinctions  
made by Chiappinelli, Zipperer & DIW (2017), two 
basic approaches for the EU could potentially be 
envisaged and implemented via a reform of the Public 
Procurement Regulation:
 → The EU could set declining maximum  
CO2 limits on specific materials that are eligible  
for use in public projects. A similar approach has 
also been adopted by Buy Clean California21 in the 
United States, which forbids certain CO2-intensive 
materials in public projects when the scope 2 
emissions are above a given threshold. This 
approach has the effect of supporting the  
phase-out of CO2-inefficient products.
 → The EU could introduce mandatory life-cycle  
CO2 performance criteria in assessing projects, based 
on harmonised European methodology. Under the 
Most Economically Advantageous Tender system, 
environmental criteria can be explicitly monetised, 
with the better environmental performers receiving  
a reduced, “fictive” bid price. The Dutch Public 
Infrastruc ture Authority already uses a lifecycle 
assessment tool (“Dubocalc”) and a shadow price of 
50€/tCO2e to calculate fictive bids. The lifecycle 
assessment method is based on the Environmental 
Product Declaration Standards EN 15804 and  
EN 15978, with national adaptations (Zero Waste 
Scotland, 2020). To support this more generally across 
the EU for basic material products, the EU should 
20 See European Commission (2014): Directive 2014/24/EU 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/
EC; Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and postal ser-
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Figure D.13 summarises the eleven policy recom-
mendations and maps them onto existing EU-level 
legislative instruments. The figure shows that, save 
for CCfDs and eventual border carbon adjustment  
legislation, virtually all of the proposed instruments 
could be attained through reforms to existing  
legislative tools. 
Furthermore, virtually all of these legislative files 
have been proposed for revision under the Green Deal 
and the 2030 Climate Target Plan. This represents a 
golden opportunity to implement the proposed 
policies. At the same time, however, important 
elements that are not part of the legislative files on 
the table – notably an enabling framework for carbon 
contracts for difference and the development of 
robust standards for climate-neutral materials –  
must not be forgotten.
Agora Energiewende, 2020
Note: CDW stands for Construction and Demolition Waste
Energy Union Governance Framework
Clean Industry Package
→ Hydrogen investment support policy-framework
→ Robust clean hydrogen sustainability criteria
→ Industrial energy & CO₂ infrastructure 
















→ Renewable Energy Directive 
 Clean H₂ enabling framework
→ Hydrogen Sustainability Criteria Regulation (under REDII)
→ Energy Union Governance Regulation & TEN-E Regulation
→ Carbon Contracts for Dierence (CCfD)
→ Capital de-risking instruments 
 for unproven technologies
→ Climate neutral production standards
→ Reformed anti-carbon leakage system
→ Climate surcharge on CO₂-intensive final products 
→ Requirements & labels for embedded CO₂ 
 in intermediate & final products
→ Recycling quality targets & end-of-life obligations
→ Public procurement requirements
→ New CCfD Enabling Policies (state aid; criteria; EU funding)
→ Innovation Fund Regulation (ETS Directive)
→ Industrial Emissions Directive & Eco-labelling
→ EU ETS Directive; State Aid Guidelines (2021); 
 new BCA framework
→ Climate surcharge on basic materials-intensive products
→ Energy Performance in Buildings Directive & Eco-design
→ Waste Framework Directive 
 (End of Life Vehicles regulation, CDW*)  
→ Public Procurement Directive
11 POLICY PROPOSALS RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS  
Policies and legislative instruments to implement the Clean Industry Package Figure D.13
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Part E:  Key low-carbon technologies in the steel, 
chemical and cement sectors 
1 Introduction and methodology
This part of the study describes 13 key low- carbon 
technologies that can play a significant role in the 
production of low-carbon basic materials in the steel, 
chemical and cement sectors. These technologies 
stand to reduce GHG emissions and most of them are 
compatible with the creation of a climate-neutral 
industrial production. 
In addition to an introductory overview of each 
sector with information on current CO₂ emissions, 
production volumes, employment and reinvestment 
requirements, we provide 13 comprehensive fact 
sheets, one for each of the key low-carbon technolo-
gies. The fact sheets contain information on  current 
pilot and demonstration projects, CO₂  reduction 
potentials and abatement costs, earliest possible 
availability and cost estimates. 
The information is based on the studies and calcula-
tions that are documented in the publication Climate 
Neutral Industry: Detailed Presentation of the Key 
Technologies for the Steel, Chemicals and Cement 
Industries. This publication is a technical supplement 
that was initially developed for a decarbonisation  
study on German industry (see point 4 below) and is 
now used as a basis for the development of assump-
tions and projections that are representative of the 
European industry as a whole. 
The information in the fact sheets has been developed 
based on the following sources and strategies: 
1.  Scientific literature: The assumptions and ref-
erence data used for calculations and projections 
were generally based on scientific studies. Where 
applicable, the fact sheets relied on informa-
tion from papers in established academic jour-
nals such as Applied Energy and Energy Procedia. 
The fact sheets also refer to studies that use recent 
data, including Integrated Energy Transition (dena, 
2018), Industrial Transformation 2050 –  Pathways 
to Net-Zero Emissions from EU Heavy  Industry 
(Material Economics, 2019) and The Future of 
Hydrogen (IEA, 2019).
2.  Assumptions and results of internal calculations: 
For numerous key technologies, we carried out 
our own internal calculations of expected future 
 production and CO₂ abatement costs based on 
published scientific studies. Detailed information 
about our calculations and the underlying assump-
tions are contained in the aforementioned techni-
cal supplement. 
3.  Stakeholder review process: All technology fact 
sheets underwent a two-stage review process 
with stakeholders in the German industry. First we 
presented preliminary versions of the technology 
fact sheets at stakeholder workshops with par-
ticipants from businesses, industry associations, 
science and government. Based on the discussions 
and input, we revised the fact sheets and sent them 
to selected companies, associations and scientific 
institutions for further comments. We then took 
into consideration the comments and conducted an 
additional review of the literature before producing 
the final versions of the fact sheets.
4.  Adapting the technology fact sheets to the EU27: 
The technology fact sheets were initially devel-
oped and reviewed in cooperation with German 
stakeholders and published in the 2019 study 
 Climate-Neutral Industry: Key Technologies and 
Policy Options for Steel, Chemical and Cement. This 
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German-language study focused specifically on 
decarbonising industry in Germany. For the current 
study, we assessed the same key low-carbon tech-
nologies for the EU as a whole. To ensure the com-
patibility of the technology fact sheets with Euro-
pean reality, we performed some modifications: 
 → The CO₂ abatement potential and electricity 
requirements of key low-carbon technologies 
were scaled for a Europe-wide deployment. For 
the calculations, we relied on the 2017 production 
and emission levels from the steel, chemical, and 
cement sectors. 
 → Certain pilot and demonstration projects that were 
announced since the publication of the German 
study in 2019 were added to the technology fact 
sheets. We updated the earliest possible market 
readiness of certain technologies where appropriate. 
 → For consistency’s sake, we chose to not change the 
specific emission and cost figures for the reference 
technologies. This means that the maximum CO₂ 
reduction potential in the EU27 of each low-carbon 
technology was calculated according to the average 
specific emission levels of German plants. 
Data sources for individual elements of the 
 technology profiles:
 → Pilot and demonstration projects: 
Information on pilot and demonstration projects 
was obtained from operating companies and/or 
participating research institutions, as well as from 
appropriate websites and press releases. 
 → Maximum CO₂ reduction potentials: 
We estimated the theoretical maximum CO₂ reduc-
tion potentials of key low-carbon technologies 
for 2030 and 2050 by defining the rate at which 
low-carbon technologies can replace existing 
GHG-intensive production plants. The projections 
are based on an estimate of the earliest possible 
availability of the key low-carbon technologies 
(derived from the technology readiness level (TRL)), 
as well as the projected reinvestment requirements 
of existing installations. Because we estimated 
only the theoretical potential, we did not take 
into account possible economic or societal bar-
riers, such as the availability of infrastructure or 
the supply of sufficient quantities of electricity or 
hydrogen. More over, we did not consider compe-
tition between different low-carbon technologies, 
which would limit their individual contribution to 
GHG abatement.
 → CO₂ abatement costs: 
Data on CO₂ abatement costs are based on cal-
culations that compare the production costs of 
key low-carbon technologies with conventional 
GHG-intensive technologies and on findings from 
the technical literature. In view of the considerable 
uncertainties about future CO₂ abatement, we pro-
vided plausible cost ranges.
 → Earliest possible availability  
(technology readiness level, TRL): 
Assumptions about the earliest possible availability 
of individual technologies are based on the aca-
demic literature and on information from com-
panies and research institutions involved in pilot 
and demonstration projects. The current state of 
development of individual technologies is assessed 
by the internationally used TRL rating system. 
With this approach, technologies that are still in 
the research and laboratory stage are classified as 
TRL 1 to 3. Technologies that have entered the pilot 
phase receive the rating of TRL 4 or 5, while tech-
nologies that are in the demonstration phase are 
TRL 6 or 7. Technologies that are mostly mature are 
in the range of 8 to 9. However, the TRL alone does 
not say anything about commercial viability, i.e. 
the ability of a technology to compete with  
conventional technologies. 
The aim of the technology fact sheets is to assess and 
compare the complex physical and economic aspects 
of key low-carbon technologies and create a basis 
for discussions of their role and deployment. We are 
aware that the abbreviated presentation represents 
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a simplification, but we nevertheless hope that the 
synthetic compilation supports constructive dialogue. 
We would like to thank all the associations and com-
panies that took the time to review and improve these 
fact sheets. Any errors that still exist are solely those 
of the authors.
Notes on the fact sheets:
 → We had to settle on a selection of key low- carbon 
technologies to feature in the fact sheets. This 
selection is incomplete and omits potentially 
important future technologies for a climate-neu-
tral basic materials industry. For example, while 
we assess the electrolytic production of hydrogen, 
we do not present other (nearly) climate-neutral 
types of hydrogen production such as the use of 
CCS for steam reforming (blue hydrogen) or meth-
ane pyrolysis (turquoise hydrogen). We also omit 
various strategies to promote a circular economy 
(e.g., cement recycling), material substitution (e.g., 
the use of wood instead of cement and concrete 
in construction) or material efficiency. But we do 
consider these alternative strategies in Part B of the 
study.
 → The cost calculations or estimates in these fact 
sheets are geared towards private businesses. For 
example, we apply a discount rate of 8 per cent, 
which is typical for private investors, rather than 
the much lower social discount rate used in eco-
nomic analyses.
 → Cost calculations are based on electricity price 
assumptions of 60 to 70 euros per MWh for 
2030 and 50 to 60 euros per MWh for 2050.1 
More details on assumptions and calculations 
are  contained in the aforementioned technical 
 supplement.  
1 Electricity costs vary across EU member states. We assume that the 
companies in the basic materials industries will continue to benefit in 
the future from significant reductions in certain electricity price com-
ponents such as grid charges and levies for the financing of renewable 
energy plants. 
 → For both the reference technologies and the key 
low-carbon technologies, we considered only 
direct2 emissions generated during their opera-
tion. Unless otherwise noted, we did not take into 
account upstream emissions (which occur, for 
example, in the extraction of fossil fuels or in the 
construction of new production plants) and down-
stream emissions from the use and disposal of 
products. We chose this perspective because direct 
CO₂ emissions constitute the largest source of 
emissions and because of the uncertainties regard-
ing upstream and downstream emissions.
 → Estimates of future costs are based on 2020 prices.
 → For some key technologies, an integrated view is 
necessary. For example, assumptions about hydro-
gen production from renewables play a central role 
in calculating the production and CO₂ abatement 
costs of some of the technologies presented here. 
Likewise, the development of a closed carbon cycle 
economy in the chemical industry will require the 
combination of chemical recycling and electrified 
steam crackers. 
 → We invite all experts to provide us feedback 
regarding our assumptions and calculations so that 
we can further refine our evidence base for key 
low-carbon technologies.
2 Direct emissions do not include the emissions from electricity 
 production.
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2.1  Steel industry overview 
Steel is a material that is used in many  different 
industries. Much steel is used in infrastructure 
 (especially in the transport and construction  
sectors), where it remains for many years. 
Steel production can be divided into two categories: 
primary production, based on iron ore, and secondary 
production, based on scrap steel. Globally, the inte-
grated blast furnace is the most common process for 
reducing iron ore to hot metal, while the electric-arc 
furnace is the preferred process for melting and puri-
fying scrap steel. Both processes are used in Europe.
As referenced by official industry classification 
(NACE 24.1), the EU27 steel industry employed 
around 304,000 people in 2017 and directly produced 
an annual gross value added of 23.7 billion euros.1  
In 2017, steel production in the EU27 totalled 161 Mt.2 
Of this, 59 per cent was manufactured with inte-
grated blast furnaces (referred to as blast-furnace 
route below), whereas 41 per cent was produced in 
electric-arc furnaces (EAF). The energy demand 
of each process differs. EAF can only process steel 
that has already passed through the energy-inten-
sive reduction step from iron ore to pig iron in blast 
furnaces. In Europe, energy use in the primary route 
totals around 15 GJ  per t of crude steel for reduc-
tion and smelting and 2 GJ per t of crude steel for EAF 
smelting. The steel plant in Hamburg represents a 
special case in Europe as it is the only plant that uses 
natural gas for the production of direct reduced iron 
as a primary feedstock for steel production (see Table 
E.1 on the following page). 
Crude steel is rarely the product sold by steel mills. 
Rather, most manufacturing output consists of 
semi-finished steel made by hot-rolling crude steel 
into sheets, rods, beams, pipes and other products. 
The vast majority of steel producers both manu-
facture the steel and perform the hot-rolling, so the 
 volume of crude steel trade is quite low, though crude 
steel is available for import from other countries. The 
trade of rolled products is far more significant. Over-
all, the EU net trade balance of steel is rather balanced. 
However, since 2016 the EU became a net importer 
and in 2017 net imports amounted to roughly 3 Mt of 
steel. The largest domestic buyers of European steel 
by volume are the construction industry (35 per cent), 
the automotive industry (19 per cent), mechanical 
engineering (12 per cent), metal ware (14 per cent) and 
pipe manufacture (11 per cent).3
In 2017, EU27 steel and iron production directly 
emitted 188 MtCO₂.4 Most of these emissions can 
be traced back to the blast-furnace process. As 
with energy use, specific emission levels noticeably 
 differ between primary and secondary production 
(see Table E.1.). 
By 2030, 48 per cent of EU27 blast furnace  capacity 
needs refurbishment which requires replacing and 
investing in an equivalent to 50 Mt of hot metal 
capacity.4
Direct CO₂ emissions from the steel industry in the 
EU27 (+UK) in 2017
188 MtCO2  (+12 MtCO₂ in the UK) 
Steel production in the EU27 (+UK) in 2017 
161 Mt of crude steel 
(+7.5 Mt of crude steel in the UK)
Steel demand in 2017 (EU28)
159 Mt of finished steel 
Reinvestment required for blast furnaces by 2030
Approx. 48 per cent of blast furnaces, i.e. a total of 50 
Mt of annual hot metal production capacity)



















Creating a steel production that is mostly greenhouse 
gas (GHG)-neutral represents a great challenge, but 
it is technologically possible. There are already some 
promising approaches for producing GHG-neu-
tral steel in the future. This section describes those 
approaches in detail. One important approach is to 
increase the share of steel from secondary produc-
tion (melting down scrap steel in electric arc furnaces) 
because its carbon emissions are already fairly low 
and requires comparatively little energy.5 If green 
electricity and biomass (biogenic carbon) are used6, 
this route can potentially become carbon-neutral in 
the long term.
A greater challenge is GHG neutrality in primary steel 
production. The main reason is the high level of car-
bon emitted during the blast-furnace process. Below, 
we describe the most important process steps along 
with their carbon emissions.
Reference case (integrated blast-furnace route)
The main process for primary steel production is the 
extraction of iron from iron ore. Iron ore and coke are 
fed into the blast furnace where carbon (C) reduces 
iron ore (Fe2O3 and Fe3O4 ) to liquid pig iron (Fe) in a 
reaction with temperatures as hot as 2,200 °C. The 
main components of the metallurgical gases gener-
ated by the coking plant, the blast furnace and the 
basic oxygen furnace are CO2 and carbon monoxide 
(CO). The CO is then used in other processes of the 
integrated blast-furnace route, where it is ultimately 
converted to CO2 . 
Coke, produced in coking plants from high-quality 
coal, fuels the blast furnace and serves as a reduction 
agent. Fine iron ore is first processed in a pelleting or 
sintering plant to create the particular aggregation 
needed for blast furnaces. 
After the blast furnace, the molten iron passes 
through a basic oxygen furnace, where oxygen 
removes impurities in the material. This results in 
process-related carbon emissions.  Several additional 
steps are needed before the iron ore is finally con-
verted into crude steel. 
Carbon emissions arise at various points along the 
blast-furnace process. Today, total direct CO2 emis-
sions per t of crude steel in most plants in Europe – 
not considering the indirect emissions from elec-
tricity use – amount to approximately 1.7 t7, of which 
some 1.4 t arise at the blast furnace, 0.2 t at the basic 
oxygen furnace, and 0.1 t , in the coking plant.





















Integrated blast-furnace route* 59% 95 Mt Coal 15 GJ* 1.8 tCO₂* 171 MtCO₂ 
Electric arc furnace route** 41% 66 Mt Electricity 2 GJ 0.07 tCO₂ 4.6 MtCO₂ 
Natural gas direct reduction* 0.3% 0.6 Mt Natural gas, 
electricity
13 GJ* 0.5 tCO₂* 0.3 MtCO₂ 
Various steel production processes in comparison in 2017 (EU27) Table E.1
Sources: World Steel, 2018, and internal calculations of the Wuppertal Institute, 2021 *Primary steel routes, 12% scrap assumed in each case
 **Secondary steel route, > 95 % scrap use 
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1.4 tCO₂0.1 tCO₂ 0.2 tCO₂
Possible key low-carbon technologies 
Direct reduction with hydrogen 
The hydrogen-based production of direct reduced 
iron8 is an alternative technology for producing steel. 
In this process, hydrogen (H2 ) substitutes coke as 
chemical reducing agent and therefore eliminates 
CO2 emissions from the process. The only by- product 
is water (H2O). It is also possible to use natural gas 
(CH4 ) as the reduction agent, with increasing propor-
tions of hydrogen over time. A direct reduction pro-
cess that uses mostly green hydrogen as a reducing 
agent will emit around 97 per cent less carbon than 
the blast-furnace route. But green hydrogen requires 
large amounts of renewable electricity for electroly-
sis. In addition, some carbon is needed to facilitate the 
metallurgical process. Biogas can be used to ensure a 
climate-neutral carbon source.
Iron electrolysis 
Iron electrolysis is an electricity-intensive process 
that makes the reduction of iron ore possible with-
out carbon-based reduction agents. As long as car-
bon-neutral electricity is used, iron electrolysis can 
be near zero-carbon. 
HIsarna with carbon capture and storage (CCS)
The HIsarna® process uses coal as an energy source 
and reduction agent, but instead of the blast furnace it 
deploys a special reactor that smelts iron ore at very 
high temperatures. The innovative process is par-
ticularly suitable for combination with CCS because 
its exhaust gas consists of comparatively pure CO2. 
Unlike the blast-furnace route, HIsarna with CCS can 
capture and store up to 86 per cent of carbon emis-
sions from the steel production.
Carbon capture and use of metallurgical gases 
The carbon capture and use (CCU) concept consists of 
recycling various components of the blast-furnace 
route (including CO2 , CO and H2 ) for the production 
of basic chemicals such as methanol and ammonia. 
Moreover, CCU can be added to existing steel smelt-
ing plants. For the complete use of the carbon monox-
ide (CO) and CO2, however, large amounts of additional 
hydrogen are required. As long as all the electric-
ity used to produce hydrogen comes from renewable 
sources, reductions in CO2 of 50 to 78 per cent relative 
to the blast-furnace route without CCU are possible. 
Iron ore
Coking plant:  
0.1  tCO2
Coal




Basic oxygen furnace Crude steelPig iron
CO2
1.7 tCO2  
per t of 
crude steel
Process steps and carbon emissions of crude steel production (integrated blast-furnace route)















With direct reduction, iron ore pellets are reduced in 
hydrogen-based DRI plants. The process results in sponge 
iron (direct reduced iron, DRI) and water. The sponge iron 
(together with scrap, if needed) can then be melted into 
crude steel in an electric arc furnace. If hydrogen is produced 
using 100 per cent renewable energy, this route is virtually 
carbon-neutral. The DRI process requires a certain share of 
(bio)methane as a carbon-containing energy carrier for the 
formation of foamed slag.
Required investment
The required investment in primary steel production by 2030 
must substitute blast furnaces with an annual production 
capacity of approx. 50 Mt of hot metal (approx. 48 per cent 
of total capacity). We have assumed that blast furnaces 
will require significant investment 20 years after their last 
relining.
Technology development
The commercial use of the technology (TRL 9) is technically  
possible before 2025, as the announcements above illustrate. 
Starting with natural gas instead of hydrogen allows reducing 
carbon emissions by around 66 per cent right away. Increasing 
shares of hydrogen can later be blended with natural gas with 
minor adjustments to the plants. 
2.2 Direct reduction with hydrogen and melting in electric arc furnaces 
(instead of the blast-furnace route)
Direct reduction plant using natural gas,  Photo: ArcelorMittal 
steelworks Hamburg, ArcelorMittal
Pilot and demonstration projects
HBIS (Hebei, China) 
Hebei Iron & Steel Group China, Tenova
 Outlook: Production of 0.6 Mt DRI per year 
starts in late 2021.
The Energiron DRI technology will use a mixture composed 
of 30 per cent of metallurgical gases from the existing 
integrated steel plant and 70 per cent of hydrogen from 
external sources. The residual CO₂ will be recovered by a CO₂ 




Outlook: Plant is expected to be completed by 
2025; capacity of 1.2 Mt of hot metal per year. 
The plant for the H2-based production of direct reduced iron 
will be built with an integrated melting unit, a submerged arc 
furnace. This concept of a so-called Blast Furnace 2.0 allows 
to produce hot metal for use in the existing basic oxygen 
furnace. As long as hydrogen is not available in sufficient 
quantities, the plant will operate using natural gas.
Commercial 
HYBRIT project (Lulea, Gaellivare, Sweden) 
SSAB, LKAB and Vattenfall
Status: Hydrogen-based DRI pilot plant with a 
production capacity of 10,000 t per year was 
commisioned in 2020 (TRL 5). 
Outlook: SSAB wants to offer fossil-free steel by 
2026.
The hydrogen needed for the H2 DRI plant will be produced 
on-site, largely by renewable energy. SSAB announced 
to build commercial-scale DRI plants in Gaellivare with a 




 Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness for key low-carbon technologies 
Earliest possible large-scale application (TRL 9)
Initially, DRI will likely use Natural Gas DRI and gradually convert to H2
Status quo:  
Natural Gas DRI: (TRL 8-9)
H2 DRI: (TRL 5-6)




































2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
26.4 (25%) 27.9 (27%)
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
Required investment for replacement or modernisation of existing plants in primary steel production (blast furnaces)
Blast furnace plant lifetime: Total of 50 years with need for relining and repair every 20 years







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
The technology can be market ready before 2025, making significant 
carbon reductions possible fairly early. Green hydrogen can make steel 
production virtually carbon-neutral. Until the large-scale availability of 
green hydrogen, increasing shares of hydrogen can be blended with 
natural gas to make high carbon reductions (> 66 per cent) possible.
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
 →  Carbon contracts or CCfDs 
 → Green public procurement
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
 →  Clean hydrogen support policies
Challenges
For this technology, large amounts of carbon-free electricity are needed 
for the production of green hydrogen (3.3 MWh/t of crude steel or 2.5 MWh 
with partial use of methane). DRI plants are thus more likely to start with 
natural gas before 2025. Converting the current blast-furnace capacity to  
H2 DRI would result in a significant additional electricity demand. 
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 → H2 DRI route (2050): 3.3 MWh/t of crude steel
 → Large-scale hydrogen production
 →  Creation of a H2 infrastructure (consisting of 
pipelines and, if needed, ships and ports)
Steel
Technology
Direct reduction with hydrogen (H2 DRI)
Current stage of development
Announcements of commercial plants 
Expected readiness for use
Before 2025 (possibly beginning with 
natural gas) 
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
66 MtCO2 per year 166 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
60–99 €/tCO2 85–144 €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs
CO2
Central assumptions for determining the range of production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Integrated blast-furnace route Direct reduction with H2
1.71 tCO2 /t of crude steel
-97% 0.05 tCO2 /t of crude steel
Specific emission reduction
391 €/t of crude steel (2019) +36 to +61% 532–630 €/t of crude steel (2050)
Specific additional costs
Assumption Lower range Upper range 
Specific capital costs of crude steel from H2 DRI (DRI plant, E-furnace) € 40/t of crude steel € 40/t of crude steel
Operating costs for use of green hydrogen € 105/t of crude steel € 191/t of crude steel
Assumption: Costs of providing hydrogen (green) € 2.78/kg € 5.04/kg 
Consisting of: Electrolyser and full load hours (FLH) 
Electricity costs
Costs of transporting hydrogen
€ 250/kW – 3,000 FLH
€ 50/MWh
€ 0.35/kg 
€ 500/kW – 6,000 FLH
€ 40/MWh
€ 2/kg (H2 import) 
Operating costs of electricity use in the steel works (incl. substitution of 
lost metallurgical gases)
€ 59/t of crude steel € 71/t of crude steel
Assumption: Electricity price € 50/MWh € 60/MWh
Other costs (work, 17% scrap, alloys, lime, biomethane) € 328/t of crude steel € 328/t of crude steel
Production costs of low-carbon crude steel € 532/t of crude steel € 630/t of crude steel 
2030: Direct reduction with natural gas and a 65 per cent share of green H2
2030:  60 €/tCO2 with 100% natural gas-based direct reduction;





Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).
Technologies in comparison 














In alkaline iron electrolysis, iron ore is reduced to iron in a 
caustic soda solution at a temperature of 110°C and then 
melted to produce crude steel in an electric arc furnace. The 
process does not require a carbon-based reduction agent, 
promising to increase energy efficiency relative to the 
blast-furnace route and to be carbon-neutral, provided that 
renewable electricity is used throughout the process. An 
alternative is to conduct the electrolytic process of molten 
iron ore at high temperatures.
Required investment
The required investment in primary steel production by 2030 
must substitute blast furnaces with an annual production 
capacity of approx. 50 Mt of hot metal (approx. 48 per cent 
of total capacity). We have assumed that blast furnaces 
will require significant investment 20 years after their last 
relining. 
Technology development
If the technology develops optimally, the commercial use 
of the technology (TRL 9) may be possible by 2040. Some 
demonstration plants may exist in Europe before that. 
2.3 Iron electrolysis and smelting in electric arc furnaces  
(instead of the blast-furnace route)
Illustration of the SIDERWIN pilot plant currently in construction in 
Maizières-lès-Metz Illustration: ArcelorMittal
Pilot and demonstration projects
SIDERWIN (Maizières-lès-Metz, France)
ArcelorMittal, CMI, EDF and others
 Status: Development and construction of a pilot 
plant (2017–2022) in northern France (TRL 4).
A consortium led by ArcelorMittal is working on the 
development of an experimental plant for iron electrolysis 
using the electrowinning process. The goal is the 
development and testing of a prototype for an electrolysis 
cell. The project investigates the use of renewable 
electricity through flexible operation and electricity network 
integration. The project also examines whether lower quality 
iron oxide or waste materials containing iron can be used as 
the input material for electrolysis.
Pilot 
Boston Metal (Woburn, USA)
Boston Electrometallurgical Corporation 
 Status: In 2021, the start-up raised 50 million 
US dollars from investors to develop the 
technology (TRL 4).
Outlook: The company is planning to build a 
demonstration plant that produces 25,000 t of 
metal per year.
The start-up Boston Electrometallurgical Corporation (Boston 
Metal; founded in 2012) is working on the commercialisation 
of molten oxide electrolysis, a process developed at MIT 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Iron ore (Fe2O3 
and Fe3O4 ) can be converted directly to its elementary 
components oxygen (O2 ) and molten pig iron (Fe) in a special 
electrolysis cell without a carbon-based reduction agent. 
Pilot/demo
 Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the 
key low-carbon technology 
 
Status quo (TRL 2-4)
Earliest possible large-
scale application (TRL 9)



































2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
26.4 (25%) 27.9 (27%)
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
Required investment for replacement or modernisation of existing plants in primary steel production (blast furnaces)
Blast furnace plant lifetime: Total of 50 years with need for relining and repair every 20 years







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
This technology is a promising long-term option. However, as of 2020, the 
technology is not expected to be market ready until 2040. The technology is 
thus unlikely to contribute significantly to emissions reduction in Europe by 
2050 since most blast furnaces in Europe will require reinvestment before 
2040 when they should be replaced with a key low-carbon technology that is 
compatible with climate neutrality 2050. 
Possible policy instruments
 →  Support for research
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
Challenges
Alkaline iron electrolysis requires large amounts of renewable electricity. 
The extent to which electrolysis can be flexibly implemented amid the 
variability of renewable energy feed-in still requires further study.
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 →  Alkaline iron electrolysis (2050): 2.5 MWh/t 
of crude steel
 →  the construction of a special electricity 
infrastructure may be necessary
Steel
Technology
Iron electrolysis and smelting in electric arc 
furnaces
Current stage of development
construction of a pilot plant (TRL 4)
Expected readiness for use
2040-2045
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050





Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Integrated blast-furnace route Alkaline iron electrolysis
1.71 tCO2 /t of crude steel
-87 % 0.22 tCO2 /t of crude steel
Specific emission reduction
391 €/t of crude steel (2019) +65 to +112 % 645–828 €/t of crude steel (2050)
Specific additional costs
Assumption Lower range Upper range 
Specific capital costs of crude steel using alkaline iron 
electrolysis
€ 154/t of crude steel € 269/t of crude steel
Assumption: CAPEX-ULCOWIN process € 900/t annual iron capacity € 3,350/t annual iron capacity
Assumption: CAPEX electric arc furnace € 128/t annual steel capacity € 128/t annual steel capacity
Operating costs of electricity use in the steel works € 145/t of crude steel € 174/t of crude steel
Assumption: Electricity price € 50/MWh € 60/MWh
Other costs (raw ore, 17% scrap, alloys, lime, coal) € 334/t of crude steel € 371/t of crude steel
Compensation for lost metallurgical gases € 12/t of crude steel € 14/t of crude steel





Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).














The HIsarna® process is an innovative, carbon-
based smelting reduction process that eliminates the 
agglomeration stages (coking plant, sintering/pelleting) in 
steel production. The iron ore, which can be mixed with up 
to 50 per cent scrap, is reduced directly to pig iron in a single 
reactor. The process is particularly suitable for combination 
with CCS because its exhaust gas consists of comparatively 
pure CO2. Carbon reductions of up to 86 per cent are possible. 
The electricity use of the HIsarna process is around 0.5 MWh 
per t of crude steel and hence comparatively low. 
Reinvestment requirement
The required investment in primary steel production by 2030 
must substitute blast furnaces with an annual production of 
approx. 50 Mt of hot metal (approx. 48 per cent of the total 
capacity). We have assumed that blast furnaces will require 
significant investment 20 years after their last relining. 
Technology development
If the technology develops optimally, the earliest possible 
large-scale implementation (TRL 9) will not be until 2030. 
Furthermore, a CO2 infrastructure for transporting and 
storing CO2 would have to be introduced in time. 
2.4 The HIsarna® process combined with carbon capture and storage 
(instead of the blast-furnace route) 
HIsarna® pilot plant, Tata Steel in IJmuiden Photo: Tata Steel
Pilot and demonstration projects
ULCOS (Ijmuiden, the Netherlands)
Tata Steel, ThyssenKrupp, ArcelorMittal,  
voestalpine and others 
Status: Diverse tests carried out on the 
pilot plant (TRL 3-4).
The pilot plant has a nominal annual capacity of 60,000 t 
of crude steel. Four short-term tests for the production of 
pig iron and steel have been carried out since 2011. A long-





Status: Demo plant in planning (TRL 5) 
Outlook: Expected to be completed by 2022.
The construction of a demonstration plant is planned with 
an annual capacity of 400,000 t of pig iron. 
Demo
 
Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 



































2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
26.4 (25%) 27.9 (27%)
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
Required investment for replacement or modernisation of existing plants in primary steel production (blast furnaces)
Blast furnace plant lifetime: Total of 50 years with need for relining and repair every 20 years
Status quo (TRL 4-5)
Earliest possible large-
scale application (TRL 9)







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
HIsarna in combination with CCS enables significant CO2 reductions of 86 per 
cent and could be a comparatively low-cost option. Because the technology 
is not likely to reach the market until 2030 or later, it is not expected to be 
available for the upcoming investment window for approx. 48 per cent of 
blast-furnace capacity in Europe before 2030. Accordingly, the technology 
will only be viable in Europe as a later supplemental option.
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
 →  Carbon contracts and CCfD 
 → Green public procurement
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
Challenges
Although Hlsarna and CCS can reduce CO2 emissions by 86 per cent, the 
remaining 14 per cent still require abatement. For the use of CCS, various 
questions regarding infrastructure for transport and storage of CO2 and their 
public acceptance need to be clarified. Moreover, transnational partnerships 
with EU countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Norway) that are willing to store CO2 
in offshore sites are necessary to facilitate the implementation of CCS.
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 → HIsarna (2050): 0.5 MWh/t of crude steel
 → Construction of CO₂ pipelines
 → CO₂ transport on inland water vessels




Current stage of development
Pilot plants (TRL 4-5)
Expected readiness for use
2030 - 2035
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050





Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Integrated blast-furnace route HIsarna® with CCS
1.71 tCO2 /t of crude steel
-86 % 0.24 tCO2 /t of crude steel
Specific emission reduction






Assumption Lower range Upper range 
Specific capital costs for crude steel with HIsarna reactor € 53/t of crude steel € 53/t of crude steel
Assumption: CAPEX Brownfield Investment HIsarna € 300/t annual steel capacity € 300/t annual steel capacity
Assumption: CAPEX CCS technology at reactor € 128/t annual steel capacity € 128/t annual steel capacity
Operating costs for carbon capture, transport, storage € 38/t of crude steel € 64/t of crude steel
Assumption: Carbon capture, transport & storage € 41/tCO2 € 69/tCO2
Operating costs of electricity use (incl. the substitution 
of lost metallurgical gases)
€ 11/t of crude steel € 14/t of crude steel
Assumption: Electricity price € 50/MWh € 60/MWh
Material costs (raw ore, 17% scrap, alloys, lime) € 324/t of crude steel € 324/t of crude steel
Production costs of low-carbon crude steel € 427/t of crude steel € 454/t of crude steel 
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).














The CCU process captures a portion of the metallurgical 
gases arising from the blast-furnace route and uses them 
for the production of chemicals such as methanol, ethanol, 
synthetic fuels and ammonia. The gases captured in this 
process no longer have to be burnt and their use in the 
chemical industry substitutes the use of crude oil. However, 
the low-carbon production of chemicals such as methanol  
(a raw material for plastic production) requires the additional 
production of green hydrogen, which makes this route very 
electricity-intensive. 
Required investment
The required investment in primary steel production by 2030 
must substitute blast furnaces with an annual production of 
approx. 50 Mt of hot metal (approx. 48 per cent of the total 
capacity). We have assumed that blast furnaces will require 
significant investment 20 years after their last relining. 
Technology development
Because all individual parts of the Carbon2Chem pilot plant 
are essentially ready for large-scale implementation, the 
construction of a demonstration plant is not necessary. If 
the proper regulatory framework is in place, the industrial 
retrofitting of blast-furnace plants could begin in 2025. 
2.5 Carbon capture and use (CCU) of smelting gases from integrated  
blast-furnace works (retrofitting of existing blast furnaces) 
Carbon2Chem® pilot plant, Duisburg Photo: thyssenkrupp AG
Pilot and demonstration projects
Carbon2Chem® (Duisburg, Germany)
Thyssenkrupp, BASF, Covestro, Linde and others
Status: Operation of a pilot plant for the 
production of methanol.
Outlook: As all individual parts of the pilot plant 
are market ready, it is not necessary to build a 
demo plant. 
The primary goal is to use the carbon and hydrogen 
molecules in the metallurgical gases generated by the 
coking plant, blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace as raw 
materials for chemical products. Green hydrogen, methanol, 
ammonia, and higher quality alcohol have already been 
produced on-site from smelting gases in the pilot plant. 
Pilot 
Pilot
Steelanol project (Ghent, Belgium)
ArcelorMittal, LanzaTech
Status: Construction of a pilot plant.
Outlook: CO₂ savings potential is limited 
because the plant converts only the CO in 
smelting gases and leaves the CO2.
In a biochemical process developed by Lanzatech, bacteria 
convert the 25 per cent share of carbon monoxide in the 
smelting gases into ethanol, which will be used as a fuel 
(mixed with petrol).  
Carbon4PUR (Marseille, France)
Covestro, Recticel, ArcelorMittal, Dechema  
and others 
Status: Planned construction of a pilot plant 
with a capacity of 20 t per year. 
The goal of the Carbon4PUR approach is to convert the CO2 
and carbon monoxide elements of the smelting gases in 
the integrated blast-furnace route into raw materials for the 
production of polyurethane. 
Pilot
 Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology  



































2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
26.4 (25%) 27.9 (27%)
18.4 (18%)
31.5 (30%)
Required investment for replacement or modernisation of existing plants in primary steel production (blast furnaces)
Blast furnace plant lifetime: Total of 50 years with need for relining and repair every 20 years
Status quo  
(TRL 4-5)
Earliest possible large-
scale application (TRL 9)







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
CCU approaches should be considered holistically. Since CCU in the steel 
sector consumes high levels of electricity and the CO₂ capture rate is limited 
(50 to 78 per cent max.), CCU is suitable at best as a bridge technology for 
retrofitting the gas collection system in the blast-furnace route. In addition, 
the captured carbon should be stored in materials with long lifetimes  
(e.g. plastics). CCU is a comparatively expensive carbon reduction option. 
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon contracts or CCfDs
 →  Clean hydrogen support policies
Challenges
Generally, CCU makes sense for the blast-furnace route only if it contributes 
to a total reduction in emissions despite the high energy requirements. Given 
the scarcity of renewable energy, CCU concepts should be critically compared 
to other key low-carbon technologies that are available before 2030, such as 
direct reduction with hydrogen. 
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 →  CCU in the blast-furnace route (2050):  
3.6 MWh/t of crude steel
 →  Establishing a H2 infrastructure (pipelines 
and possibly ships and ports)




CCU of smelting gases from the 
blast-furnace route
Current stage of development
Pilot plants (TRL 4-5)
Expected readiness for use
2025–2030
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
26 MtCO2 per year 85 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
231–439 €/tCO2 178–379 €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs
CO2
Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2030)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Integrated blast-furnace route Blast-furnace route with CCU 
1.71 tCO2 /t of crude steel
-50% (-63%)* 0.85 tCO2 /t of crude steel
Specific emission reduction (0,64)* tCO2 /t of crude steel 






Assumption CCU 2030 Lower range Upper range 
Production costs of the conventional blast-furnace route € 391/t of crude steel € 391/t of crude steel
Specific capital costs for CCU retrofitting € 13/t of crude steel € 13/t of crude steel
Assumption: CAPEX CCU (smelting gas, methanol synthesis) € 129/t annual steel capacity € 129/t annual steel capacity
OPEX electricity use for CCU processes (€ 60–70/MWh) € 30/t of crude steel € 35/t of crude steel
Costs of providing H2 for methanol synthesis € 310/t of crude steel € 526/t of crude steel
Assumption: Cost of providing hydrogen (green) € 3.34/kg (see H2) € 5.67/kg (see H2)
Other material costs € 68/t of crude steel € 68/t of crude steel
Proceeds from the sale of methanol € -175/t of crude steel € -175/t of crude steel
Production costs of low-carbon crude steel € 637/t of crude steel € 858/t of crude steel 
2030:  Provided that the CO₂ reduction in the chemical sector (MTO route) 
is completely credited to steelmakers 32 MtCO₂ can be reduced
2030/2050:  Abatement costs seen from a cross-sector perspective 
including CO2 reduction in the chemical sector 
* Provided that CO2 reduction in the chemical sector (MTO route) is completely credited to steelmakers
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).
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2.6  End notes and bibliography
List of end notes
1 Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021, based on Eurostat, 2017.
2 Internal calculations from Wuppertal Institute/Agora Energiewende based on Worldsteel, 2018. 
3 Eurofer, 2018. 
4 Wuppertal Institute, 2021. 
5 In the short to middle term, demand for steel will increase globally, requiring continued primary steel production. Due to the limited amount of high-quality 
scrap steel in the EU, an increase in the proportion of the secondary steel route is possible but limited in the short term. However, the availability of high-
quality scrap steel can be significantly increased through better sorting.
6 With today’s technology, a carbon carrier that oxidises to CO₂ in electric arc furnaces is required to foam the slag. Carbon carriers  
can also be of biogenic origin.
7 Wuppertal Institute, 2021. These emissions are based on the CO₂ emissions of the crude steel production via the blast-furnace route in Germany, which is 
close to the best available technology benchmark. In the EU, the CO₂ emissions of the integrated blast furnace route currently amount to 1.8 tCO₂ per t of 
crude steel. The emissions cover all aspects of crude steel production, but exclude the CO₂ emissions of downstream processes such as hot and cold rolling 
for the production of semi-finished and finished steel products. 
8 The calculations in this part have been carried out based on green hydrogen from electrolysis with only renewable energy. In principle, it is also possible to 
use decarbonised hydrogen from steam reforming with CCS (blue hydrogen) and methane pyrolysis (turquoise hydrogen).
Bibliography
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Based on the Wuppertal Institute database.
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3.1 Chemical sector overview 
The chemical industry manufactures a multitude of 
products that are used in a wide range of applica-
tions. The products range from plastics and rubber to 
fertilisers and specialty chemical products such as 
food additives. Due to high energy requirements and 
the comparatively high CO₂ emissions, the production 
of basic chemicals is particularly relevant for climate 
protection. 
The chemical industry is an important economic sec-
tor in Europe: In 2017, it directly employed around 1.1 
million  people and generated a gross added value of 
143 billion euros.1 Producers of basic chemicals gen-
erated approx. 58 per cent of that gross value added2 
and employed approx. 519,000 people in 2017.3 
The production of basic chemicals is the beginning of 
the value chain in the chemical industry, excluding 
the extraction of raw materials such as crude oil and 
salt. In terms of energy use, the petrochemical indus-
try, ammonia, and chlorine production are the most 
relevant branches. All three make important con-
tributions to the production of polymers – which in 
turn form the main components for the production of 
plastics: While petrochemicals provide the molecular 
building blocks for plastics production, ammonia and 
chlorine are only used in some polymers. In addition, 
chlorine is important as a reactant in the petrochem-
ical industry. Ammonia represents the basis for fur-
ther added-value chains in the production of fertil-
iser, but also for other products such as lightweight 
plastics.
In 2017, the production of High Value Chemicals 
(HVC)4 in Europe amounted to approx. 40.2 Mt.5 
In the EU, the production of basic chemicals is con-
centrated in few locations. The most important CO₂ 
sources in the chemical industry are industrial power 
plants, steam crackers, and hydrogen production via 
steam reforming of natural gas. The industrial power 
plants operated at integrated locations are mainly 
combined heat and power (CHP) plants, since those 
locations demand high levels of process steam and 
electricity for chemicals production.  The steam is 
used both as a heat carrier and for hydrogen pro-
duction. Steam crackers are another important CO₂ 
source in the chemical industry.6 They are the start-
ing point for the petrochemical industry and thus for 
the plastics value chain.7 
The required investment in steam crackers by 2030 
includes plants with an annual production capacity 
of approx. 24 Mt of HVC (approx. 53 per cent of total 
capacity).8 The CO₂ emissions of the EU27 chemical 
industry declined by 52 per cent between 1990 and 
2017 and totalled approx. 129 MtCO₂ in 2017.9
Greenhouse gas-neutral basic chemicals 
The conversion of current production processes to a 
greenhouse gas-neutral (GHG-neutral) production of 
basic chemicals represents an enormous challenge. 
On the one hand, chemicals production has the high-
est energy requirements amongst all industry sectors 
– 573 TWh in 2017 – with 55 per cent of this require-
ment currently covered by the use of fossil fuels 
(63 per cent natural gas, 26 per cent oil and petroleum 
Direct CO2 emissions from the chemical industry in 
the EU27 (+UK) in 2017
129 MtCO2 (+11 MtCO₂ in the UK) 
Chemicals production in the EU27 (+UK) in 2017
40.2 Mt of HVC (high value chemicals) 
(+5.3 Mt of HVC in the UK)
Chemicals demand in 2017 (EU28)
40.7 Mt of HVC 
Reinvestment required in basic chemicals by 2030
Approx. 53 per cent of the total capacity (steam 
crackers with a capacity of 24.1 Mt of HVC per year)
Directly employed in 2017 (EU27)
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products and 11 per cent coal).10  Although the direct 
use of renewable electricity and the electrification of 
process heat (e.g. via power-to-heat) could in prin-
ciple avoid emissions from the combustion of fossil 
fuels, a greater renewable energy generation capacity 
must be built first, in order not to simply transfer CO2 
emissions to the power sector. 
On the other hand, the petrochemical industry cannot 
be decarbonised in the conventional sense, because it 
requires carbon as a feedstock for its products even 
in a GHG neutral world. Therefore, the industry must 
eliminate feedstock based on fossil fuels such as 
crude oil and natural gas and use renewable carbon 
sources instead, as well as avoiding non-CO₂ GHG 
emissions. Because renewable carbon sources such 
as biomass and captured CO₂ from the air are limited 
and expensive, closing the carbon cycles (e.g. through 
chemical recycling) to develop a circular carbon 
economy is paramount to achieving GHG neutral-
ity. Through the use of renewable carbon sources, the 
chemical industry can contribute to the reduction of 
(fossil) CO₂ emissions in other sectors. For instance, 
the incineration of plastic waste that was initially 
produced from renewable carbon sources would 
merely release CO₂ that had previously been removed 
from the atmosphere. 
To illuminate the challenges for avoiding fossil CO₂ 
and to better understand existing technological 
approaches, three of the most carbon-intensive pro-
cesses in basic chemicals sector are described below 
along with alternatives that are mostly CO₂-neutral.  
Reference process (electricity and steam from 
natural gas CHP plants)
For the production of basic chemicals, large amounts 
of electricity, steam and process heat are required. 
In 2017, the low and medium temperature heat 
requirement (up to 500°C) of the EU27 chem-
ical industry amounted to approximately 340 
TWhth.11  We estimate that a significant share of 
this heat requirement (150 to 160 TWhth) is gener-
ated by mostly natural gas-based CHP plants with 
an estimated installed electrical capacity of 22 GWel. 
In total, we estimate that the emissions of the indus-
trial power plants in the EU27 chemical industry 
amounted to roughly 55 MtCO₂ in 2017.12 
Possible key low-carbon technologies
Steam generation from power-to-heat
Power-to-heat (PtH) allows the direct use of elec-
tricity to generate heat and steam. In the process, the 
use of fossil fuels in CHP plants or gas-fired boilers 
can be reduced or replaced. If 100 per cent renewable 
electricity is used in PtH plants, the steam generation 
is carbon-neutral.13 
CO₂ capture in CHP plants 
Existing CHP plants can be retrofitted with car-
bon-capture technologies that can sequester most 
CO₂ emissions. Depending on the technology, a cap-
ture rate of up to 90 per cent is possible.
Another large CO₂ source is the synthesis of ammo-
nia, with emissions of approx. 24 MtCO₂  in 2017.14
Reference process (ammonia synthesis)
For ammonia synthesis, large amounts of hydrogen 
(H₂) are necessary. Today, these are largely produced 
from natural gas and water through steam reforming. 
As a result, process-related emissions of 1.3 tCO₂ per 
t of ammonia arise from the reaction of natural gas 
(CH₄) with steam (H₂O). When heating the hot steam 
to around 400 to 500°C, some of the natural gas com-
busts as well, which produces energy-related emis-
sions of 0.5 tCO₂ per t of ammonia.15
In the next step, ammonia (NH3) is produced via 
ammonia synthesis using the Haber-Bosch process 
from hydrogen (H2) and nitrogen (N) separated from 
the atmosphere. While no direct emissions arise, the 
compression processes require considerable amounts 
of electricity, whose generation produces emissions 
of 0.7 tCO₂ per t of ammonia.16 Ammonia production 
in Europe amounts to approx. 13.4 Mt per year.17
Today, ammonia is used mainly for producing nitro-
genous fertilisers. Part of fertiliser production occurs 
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via the synthesis of urea (CH4N2O) from ammonia 
(NH3) and the CO₂ generated by the steam methane 
reforming process (see Figure E.2). 
When fertilisers are used in agriculture, direct emis-
sions of CO₂ and nitrous oxide (N20) arise as a result.
Two measures are necessary for carbon-neutral fer-
tiliser production in the future18: the use of renewable 
carbon sources for the production of urea (biomass or 
direct air capture ), because only the amount CO₂ that 
was removed from the atmosphere is emitted; and the 
avoidance of CO₂ emissions during hydrogen produc-
tion. 
Possible key low-carbon technology
Hydrogen from electrolysis (green H₂) 
Using water electrolysis, renewable energy can be 
used to split water into its components of hydro-
gen (H2) and oxygen (O2). In this way, the CO₂ emis-
sions released in conventional hydrogen production 
via steam reforming can be avoided. Green hydrogen 
can not only provide an important contribution to 
CO₂ reduction in the chemical industry; it also plays a 
central role in the GHG neutrality of other industries, 
such as steel manufacturing (direct reduc
tion with hydrogen) or heavy transport. Less electric-
ity-intensive alternatives for this are the production 
of hydrogen via steam reforming in combination with 
CCS (blue hydrogen)19 or using the methane pyrolysis 
process (turquoise hydrogen).20
Reference process (plastics value chain)
Alongside technologies for low-carbon steam pro-
duction and green hydrogen for ammonia synthe-
sis, GHG-neutral feedstock will play a key role for 
HVC  and their products such as plastics. Because 
even in a GHG neutral world, carbon will continue to 
be needed for chemical products. In 2017, direct CO₂ 
emissions along the plastics value chain in the EU27 
amounted to approx. 181 MtCO₂21. About 8 MtCO₂ are 
emitted in refineries during the naphtha production 
process, 32 MtCO₂ during the production of HVC in 
steam crackers, 16 MtCO₂ during the manufacture 
of intermediate products and polymerisation, and 
125 MtCO₂22 in the incineration (thermal recycling) 
of plastic waste. Due to the high emissions arising 
from the plastic waste incineration, this step must 
be considered together with the chemical production 
process. It is necessary to understand the integration 
of chemical production and waste disposal to develop 
alternative circular carbon economy models that 
ensure climate neutrality. Below we describe the pro-
cess steps of the plastics value chain along with the 
CO₂ emissions arising from them (see Figure E.3).
Today, the primary basic raw material for plastic is 
crude oil. In this process, emissions of 0.3 tCO₂ per 















Process steps and CO2 emissions from ammonia synthesis 




Total direct emissions:  
1.8 tCO2 per t 
of ammonia
energy-related from electricity use in agriculture (CO2  eq )process-related CO2 emissions: 
0.7 tCO2
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to produce oil and from flaring excess methane. In 
refineries today, a distillation process is used to pro-
duce various products such as naphtha (hydrocarbon 
chains with 5 to 12 carbon atoms). For naphtha pro-
duction,, temperatures in excess of 200°C are neces-
sary, involving emissions of 0.2 tCO₂ per t of plastic 
production. 
Naphtha is the main feedstock in the EU petrochem-
ical industry, with 78 per cent of the total.23 Naph-
tha is broken down in steam crackers into shorter 
chain hydrocarbons. Naphtha is broken down in 
steam crackers into shorter chain hydrocarbons such 
as olefins (ethylene, propylene, and butadiene), and 
aromatics (benzene, toluene and xylene). To run the 
splitting process in the steam cracker, high tempera-
tures of 600–900°C are required. Part of the product 
mix from the steam cracker is burnt to provide the 
required heat. This leads to energy-based emissions 
of 0.8 tCO₂.21
The next step uses steam and heat to process the ole-
fins or aromatics into a wide range of plastics in the 
polymerisation process. These include very different 
plastic types such as polyethylene and polypropylene, 
polyvinylchloride and foam plastics, coatings, rubber 
and many other products. Depending on the prod-
uct, CO₂ emissions also vary; in this step, 1 t of plastic 
generates approx. 0.4 tCO₂.21
After use, most of the products from the chemical 
industry are collected for waste disposal. Only a por-
tion of all plastics – such as reusable plastic bottles – 
are mechanically recycled and reused. In 2017, 30 per 
cent of all plastic waste was recycled.24 More than 
half of the plastic waste is incinerated in waste-to-
energy plants or used as alternative fuel, for example 
in cement production kilns. In the process, 3,1 tCO₂ 
per t of plastic waste are released.21 Although elec-
tricity and heat are generated in the process, which 
replace some fossil fuel use in the power sector, other 
material recycling processes should be developed 
to establish a circular economy with closed carbon 
cycles.
If CO₂ emissions of 0.3 tCO₂ from the electricity 
used in the process are considered, total emissions 
of approx. 5.1 tCO₂ / t plastic (polyethylene) arise. 
However, of that only 1.2 to 1.5 tCO₂ comes from the 
chemical industry (steam cracking, polymerisa-
tion, electricity for various processes), while the rest 
(refining, incineration of plastic waste) is allocated to 
the energy sector. 





CO2 0.3 t 0.2 t 0.3 t* 3.1 t
In total: 5.1 tCO2 per t of plastic
0.8 t 0.4 t








CO2 emissions in other sectorsCO2 emissions in the chemical sector
Process steps and CO2 emissions in the plastics/synthetics value chain
* CO2 emissions from electricity use required in various process steps in the plastics value chain. 
Figure E.3 
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Possible key low-carbon technologies 
Methanol-to-olefin/aromatics route (MTO/MTA)
In this route, green methanol is used as a feedstock 
in so-called MTO/MTA plants for the production of 
olefins and aromatics instead of splitting fossil naph-
tha in a steam cracker. The green methanol is man-
ufactured using climate-friendly hydrogen and CO₂ 
from renewable carbon sources (biomass or direct air 
capture), chemical recycling, or from fossil CO₂ from 
industrial processes (see Figure E.4). In this way, the 
energy-related emissions from the steam crackers 
can be saved. And if the CO₂ comes from non-fossil 
sources, the thermal energy recovery of the plastic 
waste can be (virtually) climate-neutral. 
Chemical recycling of plastic waste
Chemical recycling allows the industry to forgo the 
incineration of plastic waste, which releases large 
amounts of CO₂, and to convert the part of the plas-
tic waste that cannot be mechanically recycled into 
feedstock (pyrolysis oil, methanol) for the chemical 
industry. There are two mature processes for chem-
ically recycling of mixed plastics. In the first, plastic 
waste is pyrolysed, producing pyrolysis oil similar to 
naphtha that can replace naphtha as a feedstock in 
steam crackers. In the second, plastic waste is gasi-
fied along with additional, climate-friendly hydrogen, 
to produce green methanol for the MTO/MTA route. 
Chemical recycling avoids emissions from inciner-
ating plastic waste and manufacturing fossil-based 
naphtha.
Electrification of steam crackers
The electrification of steam crackers using green 
electricity makes it possible to avoid the combustion 
of part of the feedstock (e.g. naphtha or pyrolysis oil 




























Power-to-heat – besides contributing to making the 
electrical system more flexible – enables the direct use of 
electricity for the production of heat and steam. This reduces 
the use of fossil fuels in CHP plants or gas-fired boilers. If 
100 per cent renewable electricity is used, power-to-heat 
can replace them completely. Potential technologies include 
electrode boilers (200–500°C) and high-temperature heat 
pumps, possibly in combination with mechanical vapour 
compression (< 200°C). 
Reinvestment requirement
The required investment for gas boilers CHP is split between 
many operations. The cumulative figure is unknown. The 
standard service life of a gas boiler is around 20 years. In 
certain applications, it is significantly longer. 
Technology development
Electrode boilers have reached technical market readiness 
(TRL 8–9) are available for large-scale commercial 
deployment. High-temperature heat pumps (TRL 7) can be 
rolled out on a large-scale starting in 2025 at the earliest, 
provided that technology develops optimally. Before 2030, 
a complementary operation with CHP plants or gas boilers 
can lead to significant CO2 reductions. 
3.2 Heat and steam production from power-to-heat  
(substitution of fossil steam production in gas boilers and CHP plants) 
Electrode boilers in the combined heat and power plant at the industrial 
park, Höchst, Frankfurt Photo: Infraserv GmbH & Co. Höchst KG
Pilot and demonstration projects
Electrode boiler: (Frankfurt (Main), Germany)
Infraserv Höchst, Parat
Status: Two electrode boilers have been in 
operation since 2014, each with an output of 
20 MW (TRL 8–9).
The 10-kV electrode steam boilers – with an output of 
20 MW each – were supplied by Parat and are operated by 
Infraserv Höchst.System 
testing
Electrode boiler: (Premnitz, Germany)
Enerstorage, Parat
Status: Two electrode boilers have been in 
operation since 2014, each with an output of 
20 MW (TRL 8–9).
The electrode boilers from Parat are operated by 
Enerstorage GmbH, the contracting party for power-to-heat 
plants. The first project is being carried out in partnership 
with EEW Energy from Waste. The Premnitz site is one of  
18 waste incineration plants operated by EEW in Germany. 
System 
testing
DryFiciency project (Uttendorf, Austria)
Agrana Staerke, Wienerberger 
Status: planned demonstration of high-
temperature heat-pump systems.
Outlook: An 80 per cent reduction of energy 
and a 75 per cent reduction of CO2 emissions in 
industrial drying processes shall be shown.
The DryFiciency consortium has the goal of developing 
solutions for upgrading unused waste heat flows to process 
heat flows for temperatures up to 160°C. DryFiciency is 
testing the 400-kW, high-temperature heat pumps (TRL 
7) under real production conditions in industrial drying 
processes in two European industrial companies (Agrana 
Stärke and Wienerberger).
Demo 
Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) describes the maturity of a technology on a scale from 1 to 9 (TRL 9 = ready for market). 
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Unknown Unknown






































Earliest possible large-scale application (TRL 9) 
Starts with complementary operation with gas boilers and CHP
Status quo  
(TRL 8–9)
Market readinessSystem testing Technology export
The expansion of power-to-heat is expected to increase – 
initially as a hybrid solution with gas boilers or natural gas CHP.







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
The steam production from PtH plants can completely eliminate CO2 
emissions from fossil steam production as long as 100 per cent renewable 
electricity is used. Until the electricity mix is completely decarbonised, 
complementary operation with boilers or CHP plants can cut CO2 emissions 
provided that PtH plants are always used when the emission factor in the 
electricity mix drops below 220 g CO2/kWh. 
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
 → Reform of network charges 
 →  Reform of levies and surcharges
Challenges
A broad use of PtH for steam production would take enormous amounts of 
electricity, requiring a rapid increase in renewable energy capacity. If 100 per 
cent of the low- and medium temperature heat demand (up to 500°C) of the 
EU27 chemical industry for 2017 (approx. 340 TWhth) was provided by elec-
trode boilers (65 per cent) and heat pumps (35 per cent), an additional elec-
tricity demand of approx. 260 TWhel would arise. 
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 → Electrode boilers: approx. 1 kWhel per kWhth
 → Heat pumps: approx. 0.33 kWhel per kWhth
 → Improvement of grid connections
 → Distribution grids (if needed)
 → Storage (if needed)
Chemicals
Technology
Steam from power-to-heat (electrode boilers)
Current stage of development
E-boilers: system testing until market readi-
ness (TRL 8–9); heat pumps (TRL 7)
Expected readiness for use
E-boilers (from 2020); heat pumps (from 2025)
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
24.7 MtCO2 per year 76 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
-54–40 €/tCO2 76–131 €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs
CO2
Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2030/2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON2 TECHNOLOGY
Steam from fossil CHP 
or gas boilers
Steam, from PtH (electrode boiler)
223 g CO2 / kWhth
-100%
0 g CO2 / kWhthSpecific emission reduction
3.5 ct / kWhth (2019)
+49 to +83%
5.2–6.4 ct / kWhth (2050)Specific additional costs
Hybrid operation 2030 (assumptions for electrode boilers) Lower range Upper range 
Specific capital costs for electrode boilers € 125/kW € 300/kW
Utilisation in full-load hours (FLH) 2,000 FLH per year 2,000 FLH per year
Average electricity price with 2,000 FLH € 15/MWh € 25/MWh
Production costs of low-carbon steam production 2030 2.3 €-ct/kWhth € 4.4-ct/kWhth
Full operation 2050 (assumptions for electrode boilers) Lower range Upper range 
Specific capital costs for electrode boilers € 100/kW € 250/kW
Utilisation in full-load hours (FLH) 8,000 FLH per year 8,000 FLH per year
Average electricity price with 8,000 FLH € 50/MWh € 60/MWh





Assumption for 2030: Hybrid operation with natural gas CHP 
(PtH: 2,000 hours per year)
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).














By retrofitting carbon capture (CCS) technologies, the 
emissions of existing CHP plants for the production of 
electricity and heat for chemical process can be reduced 
by up to 90 per cent. The CO2 must then be transported 
via a CO2 infrastructure, e.g. pipelines or inland shipping, 
and placed in a suitable storage location (e.g. in depleted 
oil and gas fields in the North Sea). The additional electricity 
demand for carbon capture can be met by electricity that the 
CHP plants produce themselves. 
Required reinvestment
The required investment in CHP plants in the chemical 
industry was not assessed in this project. Usually these 
plants remain in operation for 50 years.
Technology development
The relatively low level of technological maturity of CHP 
plants with CCS (TRL 4) means that commercial application is 
likely to be realistic only after 2030. 
3.3 Carbon capture (CCS) at the CHP plants of the 
chemical industry
Fortum Oslo Varme's CCS pilot plant, Oslo  Photo: Fortum Oslo Varme AS
Pilot and demonstration projects
Fortum Oslo Varme's CCS project (Oslo, Norway)
Fortum
Status: Carbon capture at the waste-to-energy 
plant without sequestration (TRL 4). 
Outlook: Implementation decision for large-
scale realisation is still pending, but the project 
is expected to be launched in 2023 or 2024. 
In the future, around 400,000 t of captured CO2 from 
the waste-to-energy plant in Klemetsrud in Oslo will be 
transported by ship to an intermediate storage site. The 
carbon dioxide is then transported by pipeline to an offshore 
storage site under the sea floor in the North Sea. This will 
accept CO2 emissions from various sources as part of the 
Norwegian Northern Lights project. Due to the biogenic 
element of the waste, this procedure can achieve some 
degree of negative emissions.
Pilot
ADP TA 8001 (Gaojing, China)
Beijing Jiaotong University
Status: Feasibility study (TRL 1-2).
Outlook: The study is complete.
The study investigated the extent to which electricity and 
heat production in China can be ensured by natural gas-
based CHP with CCS. Study
 
Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) describes the maturity of a technology on a scale from 1 to 9. 
Pilot
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
























Status quo (TRL 4)
Earliest possible large-scale application 
(TRL 9) with CCS infrastructure
Demo System testing Technology export
Unknown UnknownUnknownUnknown UnknownUnknown







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
By installing carbon capture systems on CHP plants in the chemical 
industry, up to 90 per cent of the CO₂ arising can be captured. A large-scale 
application is only likely after 2030, however. Once connected to a CO₂ 
infrastructure, biomass-fired CHP plants with carbon capture technologies 
could contribute to negative emissions via Bio-Energy and CCS (BECCS).
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
 → Carbon cotracts or CCfDs
Challenges
The future social acceptance of CO₂ transport and storage is uncertain.  
Transporting CO₂ would be associated with high infrastructure costs (i.e. 
pipeline) for locations without access to a port (transport with ships). In 
addition, the market readiness of the technology is only expected in 2030, 
while there may be some reinvestment requirement before 2030 already. 
 Electricity and infrastructure requirement
 →  Additional electricity requirement for 
changing all natural-gas CHP to CCS: 29 
TWhel
 →  Pipelines or ships for CO₂ transport 
 → Availability of secure long-term CO₂ storage
Chemicals
Technology
CHP plants with CCS
Current stage of development
Pilot plants (TRL 4)
Expected readiness for use
2030–2035
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050





Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON2 TECHNOLOGY
Heat-driven natural gas CHP CHP plant with CCS
297 g CO2 / kWhth
-90 %
33 g CO2 / kWhSpecific emission reduction
7.0 €-ct / kWh (2019)
+17 to +36 %
8.2–9.5 €-ct / kWh (2050)
Specific additional costs
Assumption Lower range Upper range
Electricity production costs for natural gas CHP 7.0 €-ct/kWhth 7.0 €-ct/kWhth
Assumptions: Type of plant GCC GCC
Plant size 20 MW 20 MW
Utilisation in full-load hours (FLH) 5,000 FLH 5,000 FLH
Natural gas price €30/MWh €30/MWh
Operating costs of carbon capture, transport and storage (CCS) € 1.2-ct/kWhth € 2.5-ct/kWhth
Assumption: CO₂ avoidance costs (CCS) € 45/tCO2 € 93/tCO2





Assumption for 2030: CO2 reduction contribution with first demo plants
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).














When producing green hydrogen from electrolysis, electricity 
is used to separate water molecules into hydrogen and 
oxygen. There are various types of electrolysis: alkaline, 
polymer-electrolyte membrane (PEM) and high-temperature 
electrolysis. When the electricity for electrolysis is entirely 
from renewables, the hydrogen production is carbon-neutral.
Required investment
It is nearly impossible to estimate the required investment 
due to the diverse production processes for hydrogen 
electrolysis. It is foreseeable that new investment will be 
needed because the demand for hydrogen from electrolysis 
will increase strongly in the future.
Technology development
If technology develops optimally, hydrogen electrolysis can 
be available for commercial use starting in 2025. Today, 
low-temperature electrolysis and the likely more efficient 
high-temperature electrolysis are at different stages of 
development, at TRL 8–9 and TRL 6–7, respectively. 
3.4 Hydrogen production from renewable energy/electrolysis  
(replacement of steam reforming for hydrogen production) 
GrinHy pilot plant for high-temperature electrolysis, Salzgitter
  Photo: Salzgitter AG
Pilot and demonstration projects
Green ammonia: (Puertollano, Spain)
Iberdrola, Fertiberia and NEL  
Status: Plant commissioning is expected for 2021 
(TRL 6-7). The PEM electrolyser will have a capacity 
of 20 MW. 
Iberdrola is building an integrated system with a 100 MW 
photovoltaic plant, a lithium-ion battery system with a 
storage capacity of 20 MWh and one of the world’s largest 
PEM electrolysers. The green H2 will be used in Fertiberia’s 
ammonia plant to manufacture green fertilisers. 
Demo
Refhyne (Wesseling, Germany)
Shell, ITM Power, SINTEF, thinkstep
Status: Construction of a pilot plant for PEM 
electrolysis with 10 MW (TRL 5–6).
Outlook: Technology will be tested for possible use 
in other sectors.
The refinery in the Rhineland requires around 180,000 t of 
hydrogen annually, most of which currently comes from 
steam reforming using natural gas. The new plant can 
produce an additional 1,300 t of green hydrogen annually. 
The production is completely integrated into the refinery 
process and is used, say, for the desulphurisation of 
conventional fuels.
Pilot
GrInHy 2.0 project (Salzgitter, Germany)
Sunfire, Salzgitter AG, Paul Wurth and Tenova
Status: Operation of the GrInHy pilot plant for 
high-temperature electrolysis until 2019 (TRL 4–5).
Outlook: Operation of the GrInHy 2.0 pilot plant for 
high-temperature electrolysis (TRL 6) until 2022.
GrInHy 2.0 is a pilot high-temperature electrolysis plant 
that will be operated with a capacity of 720 kWel for at 
least 13,000 hours resulting in the production of more 
than 100 t of green hydrogen. It will also use waste heat 
sources from steel production at Salzgitter AG and thus 
reach an energy efficiency of 84 per cent.
Pilot
 
Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) describes the maturity of a technology on a scale from 1–9 (TRL 9 = ready for market). 






















n) Earliest possible large-scale 
application (TRL 9)
Market readiness Technology export
Status quo electrolysis:  
Depending on technology








Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
Besides reducing CO2 by 100 per cent over that of conventional hydrogen, 
green hydrogen can play a key role in decarbonising many industries 
including steel, chemicals and maritime and aviation transport. Due to 
high demand for renewable electricity, the import of green hydrogen from 
non-EU countries with high renewable energy potential makes sense. 
Possible policy instruments
 → Clean hydrogen support policies
 → Green financing instruments
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
Challenges
The production of green hydrogen demands large amounts of additional 
renewable electricity at moderate costs. For climate neutrality in the industry 
sector, we assume a no-regret hydrogen requirement of approx. 270 TWh 
in 2050. For exclusively green H2, approx. 338 TWh of renewable electricity 
would be required. 
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 → 2050: 1.25 MWhel per MWhth of green H2 
 → 2030: 1.4 MWhel per MWhth of green H2 
 →  With central production or import:  
dedicated H2-pipelines are necessary
 → Effect on the electricity network
Chemicals
Technology
Green hydrogen from electrolysis
Current stage of development
Alkaline electrolysis (TLR 8-9); PEM electrolysis 
(TRL 6-7) and high-temperature electrolysis 
(TRL 4-5)
Expected readiness for use
2020–2030
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
75 MtCO2 per year 73 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
170–430 €/tCO2 110–360  €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs 
CO2
Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Steam methane reforming H2 from electrolysis
9 kg CO2 / kg H2
-100 %
0 kg CO2 / kg H2Specific emission reduction
1.8 € / kg H2 (2019)
+56 to +178 %
2.8–5.0 € / kg H2 (2050)Specific additional costs
Assumptions Lower range Upper range
Specific capital costs of electrolyser € 250/kWel € 500/kWel
Conversion efficiency (lower heating value) 82 % 74 %
2050 domestic
Full-load hours; Ø electricity price 3,000 FLH; € 50/MWh 3,000 FLH; € 60/MWh
Cost of provision of green hydrogen 2050 (domestic) € 2.8/kg H₂ € 4.3/kg H₂
2050 import
Full-load hours; Ø electricity price 6,000 FLH; € 25/MWh 6,000 FLH; € 40/MWh
H₂ transport (without distribution) € 1.35/kg H₂ € 2.00/kg H₂





2030: we assume a demand for green/clean H2 in the steel, chemicals 
and refinery sector of 278 TWh. By 2050 total green hydrogen demand 
of these sectors amounts to 270 TWh and refineries will be phased out. 
Calculation of the CO2 abatement costs based on the CO2 reduction 
compared with the reference process of steam reforming 
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1.)














In the methanol-to-olefin (MTO) and aromatics (MTA) route, 
olefins and aromatics can be produced from green methanol 
or syngas (H₂ and CO). These production pathways could 
replace steam crackers and the associated CO2 could be 
saved. For methanol production, we recommend using green 
H2 and, in the long term, CO2 from renewable or recycled 
sources (feedstock from plastic waste, biomass, CO2 from 
direct air capture). 
Required investment
The required investment in steam crackers by 2030 includes 
plants with a production of approx. 24.1 Mt of HVC (approx. 
53 per cent of total capacity). Normally, steam crackers are 
continuously maintained and modernised, rather than replaced 
all at once. Nevertheless, the required investment provides a 
rough idea of the modernisation needs of old plants. 
Technology development
If technology develops optimally (TLR 9), large-scale 
deployment would be possible starting between 2025 and 
2030. Today, the MTO (TRL 8) and MTA processes (TRL 6) are 
already in advanced stages of development. The MTO route 
was originally developed for using coal as a feedstock and is
already in use in other countries (e.g. China).
3.5 Alternative processes such as the methanol-to-olefin/aromatics route  
(MTO/MTA) or electrochemical processes for olefin and aromatic production 
(replacement of olefin and aromatic production in steam crackers)
Pilot and demonstration projects
Carbon2Chem® project (Duisburg, Germany)
Thyssenkrupp, BASF, Covestro, Linde, Evonik, 
Siemens, Fraunhofer-Institute 
Status: Operation of pilot plant for methanol 
manufacture in Duisburg (TRL 4-5), with all the 
individual components (TRL 9).
The cross-sector network of the steel, chemical and 
energy industries seek to establish CCU processes and use 
metallurgical gases (including the CO2 they contain) from 
steel production as a feedstock for chemical products. Excess 




Carbon4PUR project (Marseille, France)
Covestro, ArcelorMittal, Recticel, DECHEMA
Status: Construction of a pilot plant in Marseille 
Fos.
Goals: Obtain polyurethane from smelting gases.
The project develops the conversion of industrial exhaust 
gases with mixed CO/CO₂ flows into polyurethane plastics. 
The process can produce end products such as rigid foams, 
building insulation or coatings.
Pilot 
Rheticus project (Marl, Germany)
Evonik, Siemens
Status: Construction of a pilot plant in Marl.
Vision: Operate a plant with a capacity of up to 
20,000 t per year where exhaust gases from 
industrial processes are converted into special 
chemicals or fuels. 
The first step is the solar-powered electrochemical reduction 
of CO₂ and H₂O to obtain syngas, which is used in the test 
plant to manufacture butanol or hexanol. The manufacture 
of other special chemicals or fuels is also possible. In the 
future, flexibly sized plants could be installed where CO₂ is 







Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
































2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 > 20502050
Required investment in /replacement or modernisation of existing steam crackers




Carbon2Chem® pilot plant, Duisburg Photo: thyssenkrupp AG






Demo System testing Market readiness Technology export







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
In principle, MTO/MTA should be evaluated from a holistic perspective (life 
cycle assessment). Under ideal conditions (100 per cent renewable electricity, 
non-fossil carbon source), MTO and MTA can avoid (virtually) all CO2 emissions 
in the plastics life-cycle (from production to recycling) and thus close the 
carbon cycle. The use of CO2 from industrial processes (e.g. steel, cement) is 
also conceivable during the transition.
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon contracts or CCfDs
 → Clean hydrogen support policies
 → Green public procurement
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
Challenges
For extensive CO2 reductions, methanol-based processes (MTO, MTA) require 
large amounts of renewable electricity. If 100 per cent of current plastics 
production (31.6 Mt of olefins and 8.6 Mt of BTX in 2017) was produced using 
the MTO/MTA route, around 1032 TWh of additional electricity would be 
needed, 978 TWh in the form of green H2. 
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 →  22.7 MWh per t of olefin  
(of which 21.5 MWh for green H2) 
 →  36.5 MWh per t of BTX 
(of which 34.6 MWh for green H2) 




Current stage of development
MTO (TRL 8); MTA (TRL 6) 
Expected readiness for use
2025–2030
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
unknown 181 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
160–355 €/tCO2 84–515 €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs
CO2
Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Naphtha steam cracking + 
Waste incineration plants
Methanol-to-olefin route+ 
Carbon from direct air capture
4.5 t CO₂ / t of HVC
-100 %
0 t CO₂ / t of HVC
Specific emission reduction
842 €/t of HVC (2019)
+45  to +277 %
1,223–3,176 €/t of HVC (2050)
Specific additional costs
Assumptions Methanol import Domestic production
Specific capital costs for direct air capture (DAC) € 248/t of HVC € 248/t of HVC
Specific capital costs of methanol synthesis € 135/t of HVC € 135/t of HVC
Specific capital costs of methanol-to-olefin plant € 19/t of HVC € 19/t of HVC
Fixed operating costs € 138/t of HVC € 138/t of HVC
Costs for H2 supply € 620/t of HVC € 2540/t of HVC
Assumptions: Ø electricity price H₂ production € 25/MWh € 60/MWh
Transport costs for methanol € 31/t of HVC –
Costs for providing electricity (with import only MTO) € 31/HVC € 95/HVC





2050: CO2 reductions incl. waste incineration plants (energy sector)
2030/2050: indicated CO2 abatement costs only apply to MTO
2050: weighted average MTO/MTA: € 122–615/tCO2
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).














Chemical recycling makes it possible to re-use plastic waste 
as feedstock in the chemical industry instead of burning it. 
In the process, the plastic waste is converted to synthesis 
gas (gasification) or to liquid oil (pyrolysis) and then made 
into alternative feedstock that replaces fossil feedstock (e.g. 
fossil naphtha). In this way, the CO₂ emissions from burning 
plastic waste and the use of naphtha as a feedstock can be 
eliminated. In order to create a climate-neutral petrochemical 
industry, chemical recycling must be combined with 
other processes in the long term (electric steam cracking, 
methanol-to-olefin). 
Required investment
The introduction of chemical recycling would require new 
gasification and pyrolysis plants for the conversion of 
plastic waste into feedstock. The extent to which existing 
waste incineration plants or steam crackers can be replaced 
depends on a multitude of factors and cannot be determined 
here.
Technology development
Both pyrolysis and the gasification route exhibit a high 
degree of technology development (TRL 6–7). Both 
processes are therefore expected to be market ready in the 
period from 2025 to 2030. Large-scale use would be possible 
as long as the conditions for chemical recycling in the EU27 
ensure economic viability. 
3.6 Chemical recycling: Pyrolysis or gasification of plastic waste for material 
use (replacing the combustion of plastic waste in waste incineration 
plants and substituting primary feedstock from fossil sources) 
Pilot plant for chemical recycling, Ennigerloh Photo: Recenso GmbH
Pilot and demonstration projects
Cleaning of pyrolysis oil (Geleen, 
the Netherlands)
Sabic
Status: Planning of semi-commercial plant for 
cleaning approx. 15 kt of pyrolysis oil per year.
Outlook: Production to begin in 2021.
The recycled polymers of Sabic will be manufactured from a 
pyrolysis oil-based raw material produced from mixed plastic 
waste. Sabic is introducing this alternative raw material to 
its production facility in Geleen. The resulting polymers will 




Waste to Chemicals Rotterdam 
(the Netherlands)
Air Liquide, Enerkem, Nouryon,  
Port of Rotterdam, Shell
Status: Plant in planning.
The waste-to-chemicals plant will produce methanol from 
residual waste. Up to 360,000 t of residual waste can be 




ChemCycling (various locations, Germany)
BASF, Remondis, Plastic Energy, Recenso
Status: Pilot plant for direct oiling of Recenso 
GmbH in operation (Ennigerloh, Germany).
Production of pyrolysis oils from plastic waste, which can be 
processed in steam crackers. In this way, the use of fossil 
naphtha in the steam cracker can be reduced. In 2018, the 
first products based on pyrolysis oils from the pilot plant 
were manufactured in Ennigerloh.
Pilot 
Pyrolysis
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) describes the maturity of the technology on a scale from 1–9 (TRL 9 = ready for market). 
Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
 
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Earliest possible large-scale 
application (TRL 9)












Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
Chemical recycling is an essential element for building a circular carbon 
economy and thus central to achieving a (mostly) GHG neutral chemical 
sector. As long as 100 per cent of the electricity used is renewable, CO2 
emissions from burning plastic waste and the many manufacturing steps of 
fossil naphtha can be almost completely eliminated. 
Possible policy instruments
 →  Standards for recyclable products
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
 → Green financing instruments
Challenges
The use of pyrolysis oil in steam crackers is already economically attractive, 
but for complete closure of the carbon cycle, chemical recycling must be 
combined with other processes (electr. steam crackers and MTO). Based on 
the availability of waste plastics in 2050, chemical recycling could result in an 
electricity requirement for renewables amounting to approx. 129 TWh. 
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 →  Electricity requirement for integrated 
pyrolysis: 6.8 MWh per t of HVC (2 MWh for 
green hydrogen) 




Chemical recycling (pyrolysis, gasification)
Current stage of development
Demonstration plants (TRL 6-7)
Expected readiness for use
2025–2030 
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
6.2 MtCO2 per year 79 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
-58*–60 €/tCO2 11–49 €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs 
CO2
Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2030)
Assumption of pyrolysis + conv. steam crackers without MTO (2030) Lower range Upper range
Specific capital costs of pyrolysis plant € 14/t of HVC € 14/t of HVC
Specific capital costs of steam crackers € 74/t of HVC € 74/t of HVC
Specific supply costs of natural gas € 20/t of HVC € 20/t of HVC
Fixed operating costs € 40/t of HVC € 40/t of HVC
Specific supply costs of waste € 483/t of HVC € 483/t of HVC
Assumptions: Supply costs for waste (old plastics) € 304/t of waste € 304/t of waste
Specific costs for supply of electricity € 29/t of HVC € 34/t of HVC
Assumptions: average electricity price € 50/MWh € 60/MWh





CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON2 TECHNOLOGY
Naphtha steam cracking+ 
Waste incineration plants
Pyrolysis + electric steam crackers 
+ methanol-to-olefin
4.5 t CO₂ / t of HVC
-93 %
0.3 tCO₂ / t of old plastics
Specific emission reduction
842 €/t of HVC (2019)
+6  to +25 %
890–1,050 €/t of HVC (2019)
Specific additional costs
2050: CO2 reductions incl. waste incineration plants (power sector)
2030: *Non-integrated pyrolysis route; cost depends on naphtha price 
2050: integrated pyrolysis route (incl. electric steam cracker + MTO) 
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).














The electrification of the high-temperature heat can 
completely eliminate direct CO2 emissions from steam 
crackers. The emissions currently arise from burning a part 
of the feedstock (e.g. naphtha) or natural gas in order to 
provide the necessary process heat (600–900°C). electrified 
steacm crackers, the alternativel feedstock from chemical 
recycling (e.g. pyrolysis oil) would not have to be burned, 
which would allow to close the carbon cycle without 
significant losses. (See chemical recycling.) 
Required investment
The required investment in steam crackers by 2030 includes 
plants with a production of approx. 24.1 Mt of HVC (approx. 
53 per cent of total capacity). Normally, steam crackers 
are continuously maintained and modernised, rather than 
replaced all at once. Nevertheless, the required investment 
provides a rough idea of the modernisation needs of old 
plants. 
Technology development
Laboratory scale plants do not appear necessary for market 
readiness because the basic functionality of electric crackers 
is well understood and the challenges lie more in the 
construction of an industrial plant. The construction of a pilot 
or demonstration plant is likely to be possible between 2020 
and 2030.The technology is likely to be market ready (TRL 9) 
starting in 2030.
3.7 Electrification of the high-temperature heat in steam crackers 
(replacement of the burning of fossil raw materials in the steam 
cracker) 
A pilot plant does not yet exist.




Status: Partners applied for funding at the  
EU Innovation Fund and national 
decarbonisation fund. 
The parties are evaluating construction of a multi-mega-
watt demonstration plant of an electrically heatable steam 
cracker at BASF’s Ludwigshafen site, targeted for start-up 
as early as 2023, subject to a positive funding decision. This 
would allow the substitution of fossil fuels that are burned 
today to supply the required high-temperature heat. 
Cracker of the Future (three-country 
cooperation)
BASF, Borealis, BP, LyondellBasell, Sabic, Total, 
Brightlands Chemelot Campus
Status: Testing of the sustainable technical and 
economic possibilities of the technology and a 
prompt implementation. 
Outlook: Roadmap for the development and 
use of electric cracker technology.
A consortium from six petrochemical companies operating in 
the trilateral region of Flanders, the Netherlands and North-
Rhine-Westphalia, led by Brightlands Chemelot Campus, 
is conducting research on the operation of electric steam 
crackers supplied with electricity from renewable energy 
for producing basic chemicals such as ethylene, propylene, 
butadiene and aromatics. The partner companies agreed 
to invest in appropriate research and development and to 
share knowledge. The collaboration is a result of the trilateral 
strategy of the chemical industry between the German VCI, 
the Belgian Essenscia and the Dutch VNCI. 
Laboratory 
 
The Technology Readiness (TRL) describes the maturity of a technology on a scale from 1–9 (TRL 9 = ready for market). 
































Earliest possible large-scale 
application (TRL 9)Status quo (TRL 1-3)
Laboratory Demo Market readinessSystem testing
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 > 20502050
   Pilot     Technology export
Required investment in / replacement or modernisation of existing steam crackers
Steam cracker lifetime: 50 years












Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
This technology makes sense particularly in combination with chemical 
recycling within a circular economy. On the one hand, the emissions at 
the steam cracker can be reduced by 100 percent. On the other hand, it 
would not be necessary to combust part of the carbon contained in the 
alternative feedstock from plastic waste to provide heat, which under ideal 
conditions allows closing the carbon to cycle without significant losses. 
Possible policy instruments
 → Reform levies and surcharges
 → Reform of network charges 
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment:
 → Green financing instruments
 → Support for research
Challenges
By the time the technology is market ready (2030 at the earliest), a large 
portion of the investment in new steam crackers could have already been 
made. As a result, retrofitting electric heating systems and an increased 
flexibility with respect to the feedstock (pyrolysis oil, biomass, etc.) should 
be considered. In addition, the direct electricity requirement would be 
relatively high (2.5 MWh/t of HVC).
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 → 2.5 MWh/t of HVC 
 →  Total electricity requirement for electric 
steam cracking of 40.2 Mt of HVC: 101 TWh
 →  increased expansion of electricity network
Chemicals
Technology
Electrically heatable and feedstock-flexible 
steam crackers 
Current stage of development
Laboratory phase (TRL 1-3) 
Expected readiness for use
2030–2040
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
0 MtCO2 per year 32 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
73–121 €/tCO2 11–49 €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs
CO2
Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
Assumptions Lower range Upper range
Specific capital costs for electric steam crackers € 60/t of HVC € 60/t of HVC
Cost of provision of naphtha € 752/t of HVC € 752/t of HVC
Fixed operating costs € 29/t of HVC € 29/t of HVC
Electricity costs € 127/t of HVC € 152/t of HVC
Assumptions: average electricity price € 50/MWh € 60/MWh
Return on saved fuel – –





CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Naphtha steam cracker Electrically heated steam cracker
0.80 t CO₂ / t of HVC
-100 %
0 t CO₂ / t of HVC
Specific emission reduction
842 €/t of HVC (2019) 
+15 to +18 %
968-993 €/t of HVC (2050) 
Specific additional costs
Assumption 2050: Embedded in a circular economy 
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).
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3.8  End notes and bibliography
List of end notes
1 Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021, based on Eurostat, 2017.
2 The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), 2018. 
3 Eurostat, 2017.
4 “HVC” refers to products from naphtha steam cracking. Ethylene and propylene are the main components, but benzene, toluene, and xylene (BTX) are 
included as well. 1.97 t of HVC contain one t of ethylene.
5 Wuppertal Institute, 2021. Includes HVC production from steam crackers and refineries. 
6 The GHG emissions of steam crackers are only accounted for by the chemical industry if they are being operated by chemical companies. In case they are 
being operated as part of a refinery, their emissions are accounted for by the energy sector. 
7 Apart from steam crackers, catalytic crackers and steam reforming plants within refineries also produce basic chemicals as by-products that are further 
processed in downstream processes.
8 Wuppertal Institute, 2021. Generally, steam crackers are continuously maintained and modernised but not completely replaced. As a result, reinvestment 
expenditure does not happen all at once but is spread over a longer period. Nevertheless, the required investment for the coming years indicates the extent 
to which old plants have to be modernised or replaced by plants with new technologies.
9 European Environment Agency, 2021. 
10 Eurostat, 2017. Includes energy requirements from the chemical and petrochemical industries.
11 Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021, internal calculations.
12 Agora Energiewende/Wuppertal Institute, 2021, internal calculations.
13 Other CO₂-neutral alternatives are the use of biomass or hydrogen for CHP. We do not consider these options because of the limited availability of sustaina-
ble biomass and (for the time being) hydrogen. Moreover, the use of biomass and hydrogen in other applications promises greater benefits to the climate.
14 Internal calculations based on ammonia production from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2017, and on an emission factor of 1.8 t CO₂/t ammonia.
15 Material Economics, 2019. 
16 The required electricity causes an indirect emission of 0.7 tCO₂ per t of ammonia. The emissions must be accounted for by the industrial power plants of the 
chemical industry or the power sector.
17 United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2017. 
18 When using fertilisers that contain reactive nitrogen compounds, considerable nitrogen oxide emissions (including nitrous oxide, an extremely potent 
greenhouse gas) and water pollution can occur. Accordingly, the challenge is not just to replace natural-gas-based ammonia and fertiliser production for a 
route using green hydrogen but also to significantly reduce the use of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers.
19 The introduction of CCS is associated with substantial hurdles for social acceptance. CCS also requires the establishment of extensive infrastructure for the 
transport and permanent storage of CO₂.
20 In the methane pyrolysis process, natural gas is split in a high-temperature reactor into hydrogen and carbon. In the process, solid carbon is produced that 
can either be used for other purposes (e.g. for battery manufacture) or disposed of in landfills. This hydrogen is called turquoise. The process is in an early 
stage of development and it cannot be predicted whether, when and at what cost hydrogen can be produced in large volumes with this method.
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Based on the Wuppertal Institute database.
21 Internal calculations based on data from the Wuppertal Institute for Germany, 2019. According to the calculations and assumptions of the Wuppertal 
Institute, the production of each t of HVC generates 1.4 tCO₂ emissions (0.2 t in the refinery, 0.8 t in the steam cracker and 0.4 t in the polymerisation pro-
cess) as well as 3.1 t CO₂ when incinerated in waste-to-energy plants.
22 Internal calculations of the Wuppertal Institute. It should be noted that the heat and the electricity that are generated in waste-to-energy plants offset GHG 
emissions from heat and electricity generation with primary fossil fuels. As a result, the net emissions for the combustion of plastics in waste-to-energy 
plants are lower than 125 MtCO₂ per year. However, in a future energy system consisting entirely of renewable electricity, this offsetting disappears.
23 Deloitte, 2019. 
24 European Parliament, 2018. 
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4.1 Cement sector overview 
Cement is a binding agent that is an essential ele-
ment of concrete and mortar and ranks among the 
most-used construction materials worldwide. As a 
result, the cement industry holds a decisive position 
in the value chain of the construction industry. The 
cements produced by the cement industry are clearly 
defined in European-wide and national standards. 
The European standard DIN EN 197-1, for so-called 
normal cements, divides the cement into five main 
types (CEM I – CEM V), which are differentiated based 
on the per cent by weight of cement clinker and other 
components (e.g. slag, pozzolan, fly ash) into 27 normal 
cement types.
In 2017, approx. 159 Mt of cement were manufac-
tured in the EU271, generating a gross value added of 
around 5.1 billion euros.2 Compared with steel and 
basic chemicals, the trade intensity of cement is low. 
The cause of this is primarily the high transport costs 
relative to the product price. Accordingly, the main 
part of cement transport happens on the roads in a 
transport radius of up to 250 km, although the impor-
tance of longer transports using (inland) shipping is 
increasing.
The European cement industry includes a mix of 
medium-sized and large companies with a total of 
around 47,000 employees.3 In 2017 cement clinker 
was produced at roughly 190 different sites across the 
EU27.1 Locally available raw materials (limestone, clay) 
and low-cost transport options to reach demand mar-
kets are central factors for cement plant locations.
In 2015, cement usage in Europe broke down as 
follows: buildings (50 per cent), civil engineering 
(30 per cent) and maintenance (20 per cent). Most of 
the cement is processed into ready-mixed concrete 
(approx. 48 per cent), followed by precast concrete 
(28 per cent) and mortars and plasters (24 per cent).4
EU cement production has a high energy cost share 
of 35 per cent per t of cement. Fuels are used mainly 
for the energy-intensive burning of cement clinker. 
In 2017, 54 per cent of the cement industry’s ther-
mal energy use came from fossil fuels. But the cement 
industry also uses alternative fuels such as old tyres, 
waste oil, animal meal, and plastic waste. The share of 
these alternatives has been continually rising since 
the 1990s. In 2017, 46 per cent of the thermal energy 
use came from alternative fuels.5 Roughly 10 to 15 per 
cent of the overall energy requirement comes from 
electricity. The electricity goes primarily to grinding 
raw materials and cement.
The direct specific CO₂ emissions (i.e. without contri-
bution from electricity use) from cement varies across 
Europe and amounts to an average of 0.65 tCO₂/t of 
cement. For the subsequent technology fact sheets the 
average for Germany of 0.61 tCO₂/t of cement was the 
base for the calculations. Overall direct emissions of 
cement manufacture in the EU27 amounted to 112 Mt 
in 2017.1 
Based on the required reinvestment of the  German 
cement industry by 2030 which is estimated at 
30 per cent, we assume the reinvestment requirement 
at EU level to be in a similar range. 
Direct CO2 emissions from the cement industry in the 
EU27 (+UK) in 2017
112 MtCO2 (+6 MtCO2 in the UK)
Cement production in the EU27 (+UK) in 2017
159 Mt of cement in EU27 (+8.6 Mt of cement in the 
UK)
Cement demand in 2017 (EU28)
168 Mt of cement
Reinvestment required for cement by 2030
We estimate that approx. 30 per cent of the total 
 capacity will require reinvestment by 2030
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Greenhouse-gas-neutral cement sector 
 
Decarbonising the cement sector represents a great 
challenge. This is mostly because of the process- 
related CO₂ emissions that arise during the calcina-
tion process, when limestone is heated to produce 
calcium oxide (or lime), the principal ingredient of 
cement clinker. From today’s perspective, the use of 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) and possibly carbon 
capture and use (CCU) technologies are unavoidable. 
A further difficulty is that most cement plants are in 
rural areas close to mining areas for limestone and 
clay. The construction of a comprehensive CO₂ infra-
structure in rural areas would be necessary for trans-
porting the captured CO₂ to offshore storage sites. 
Process-related emissions amount to approx. 65 per 
cent of the emissions per t of cement. The remain-
ing 35 per cent (fuel-related emissions) come from 
burning fossil and alternative fuels to provide the 
high-temperature process heat. In principle, this pro-
portion can be significantly reduced or even com-
pletely eliminated by electrification, green hydrogen 
or other greenhouse gas-neutral fuels such as bio-
mass and synthetic gas. With the use of CCS or CCU6 
for the capture of process-related and fuel- related 
emissions, negative emissions would be possible if 
mainly GHG neutral fuels that do not contain car-
bon of fossil origin are used. Below, the conventional 
cement production process is described in order to 
provide the basis for understanding key low-carbon 
technologies (see Figure E.5.).
Reference process 
For the binding properties of cement, cement clinker 
is the key component. Depending on the type of 
cement, other materials are mixed with the cement 
clinker in varying proportions. The manufacture of 
cement clinker is responsible for a total of 94 per cent 
of the overall (i.e. direct plus indirect) CO₂ emissions 
of cement manufacture.7 The current normal aver-
age proportion of cement clinker in Europe of 74 per 
cent cement (or a clinker factor of 0.74) is used for the 
 following assessment.
Cement clinker is manufactured from a ground mix-
ture of approx. 75 per cent limestone and 25 per cent 
clay. Put simply, its manufacture can be divided into 
two central, energy-intensive steps: The pre-heated 
raw material is initially calcinated at approx. 900°C 
(burned). In modern cement plants, this takes place 
in the calciner, upstream of the rotary kiln. Approx. 
60 per cent of the total heating is required for the 
calcination process, which today is provided by the 
burning of fossil and alternative fuels. In the process, 
an average of 0.13 tCO₂ per t of cement arise from 
fuel combustion. 90 to 95 per cent of the limestone 
(CaCO3) in this process step is already converted to 
burnt lime (CaO) and carbon dioxide (CO₂) (calcina-
tion), resulting in additional, process-related CO₂ 
emissions of 0.36 tCO₂ arising in the calciner. 
In the next step, the material mixture is heated in 
the rotary kiln to 1,450°C where it is fused together 
(sintered) and then cooled in the clinker cooler. 
In the rotary kiln, direct, fuel-related emissions 
arise (0.08 tCO₂ per t of cement) as well as other 
 process-related emissions (0.04 tCO₂ per t of cement). 
In a later step, the cement clinker is ground and pos-
sibly mixed with other main components such as slag 
to produce cement. For one t of cement, direct emis-
sions of around 0.61 tCO₂ result. But this does not 
take into account the indirect emissions for the use of 
electricity in the drying and grinding processes. 
Possible key low-carbon technologies
CO₂ capture with Oxyfuel-CCS
CCS includes the capture, transport and perma-
nent storage of the CO₂ emissions arising from the 
cement clinker manufacture. In the Oxyfuel process, 
the combustion process in the rotary kiln and in the 
calciner is carried out with a mixture of oxygen and 
recycled CO₂ instead of air. This makes the separa-
tion of the CO₂ from the exhaust gas flow easier and 
increases the CO₂ capture rate. In this way, approx. 
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90 per cent of the whole process and fuel-related 
emissions can be captured. If Oxyfuel-CCS is com-
bined with a share of biogenic fuels (BECCS) cement 
works can become climate-neutral (when they use a 
share of around 25 per cent of biogenic fuels - or even 
carbon-negative when they use more than a 25 per 
cent share of biogenic fuels).
CO₂ capture and electrification of the high-tem-
perature heat for the calciner (LEILAC)
In an approach followed by the LEILAC project8, the 
calcination process step is carried out in a special, 
indirectly heatable steel vessel. This allows the pro-
cess-linked emissions to be captured in a relatively 
pure CO₂ flow, which reduces the energy required 
for CO₂ capture and purification. In principle, this 
approach also allows the electrification of calcin-
ers by heating the steel vessel electrically instead of 
with fossil burners. But this approach requires large 
amounts of electricity. With this technology, approx. 
77 to 80 per cent of the total emissions from the kiln 
can be reduced. 
Alternative binding agents
Alternative binding agents allow the manufacture 
of concrete without the use of conventional cement 
clinker. The various existing approaches for alter-
native binding agents differ strongly regarding input 
materials and production processes and therefore 
cannot be discussed in detail here.9 A central aspect is 
reducing the share of limestone to lower process-re-
lated emissions. Some alternative binders are also 
less energy-intensive, because the manufacturing 
process takes place at a lower temperature level, and 
the thermal energy requirement for calcination is also 
lower with reduced limestone content. Being a non-
CCS option, cement produced with alternative bind-
ing agents can lower CO₂ intensity up to 53 per cent 
relative to conventional cement (whose clinker share 
is around 74 per cent).10 Alternative binding agents 
can also be combined with CCS technology. Doing so 
would reduce the electricity requirement for car-
bon capture and transport as a result of the lower CO₂ 
emissions. However, it is expected that the applica-
tion of alternative binding agents will remain limited 
to niche markets in the medium term because some 
of the properties of the final products deviate from 
industrial norms. 
Other promising approaches exist – different 
post-combustion technologies (CCS)11, the recarbon-
ation of building demolition (CCU) or textile-rein-
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Earliest possible large-scale application (TRL 9) 
provided that a CCS infrastructure is available
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The Oxyfuel process is a process for carbon capture for the 
cement clinker burning process carried out using a mixture 
of oxygen and recycled CO2 instead of air. This makes the 
capture of carbon from the exhaust gas flow easier and 
in practice allows the capture approx. 90% of the total 
emissions. The CO2 would then have to be transported via a 
CO2 infrastructure, e.g. pipelines or ships for locations near 
rivers, and ultimately placed in suitable storage locations 
(e.g. in depleted oil and gas fields in the North Sea).
Required investment
By our estimates, the reinvestment requirement in the 
cement industry by 2030 includes plants with a capacity of 
approx. 55 Mt of cement clinker per year (approx. 30 per cent 
of the total capacity). The number was extrapolated from 
German data in absence of a full site-specific dataset for 
Europe.
Technology development
If technology develops optimally, commercial use (TRL 9) can 
be envisaged by 2025. However, carbon capture requires 
a CO2 infrastructure to transport the CO2 away to offshore 
storage sites, which is why retrofitting cement plants near 
the coast and rivers (transport by ship) appears likely as an 
initial step. 
4.2 CO2 capture with the Oxyfuel process (CCS)
Pilot and demonstration projects
Demo
Catch4climate (Mergelstetten, Germany)
Buzzi Unicem-Dyckerhoff, HeidelbergCement, 
SCHWENK and Vicat
Status: Planning to build demonstration plant on  
a semi-industrial scale (TRL 6).
The consortium CI4C (Cement Innovation for Climate) was 
created in 2019 and is cooperating closely with the federal 
state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Their aim is to create the 
basis for a large-scale application of CO₂ capture technologies 
in cement plants enabling the use of CO₂ as a raw material in 
other processes (CCU, CCS). The captured CO₂ will be used to 
produce synthetic fuels such as kerosene for airplanes.
ECRA-CCS project (EU project)
ECRA, HeidelbergCement
 Status: The project is currently in  
phase IV – developing a concept for an 
industrial-scale demonstration plant and 
applying for an EU grant to fund construction. 
The European Cement Research Academy (ECRA) has been 
studying the technical and economic feasibility of carbon 
capture in cement manufacture since 2007. Talks are 
currently being held on a suitable location in Germany for 
the construction of a demonstration plant for an industrial-
scale test operation. 
Demo
CEMCAP project (Hanover, Germany)
HeidelbergCement, German cement works 
association (VDZ)
Results: Evidence for Oxyfuel clinker cooling; 
development of Oxyfuel burner and calciner.
An Oxyfuel cooling system for clinker was successfully 
installed and tested. Laboratory tests have been carried out 
on an Oxyfuel-compatible burner and calcinator. A model of 



































Status quo  
(TRL 6)
Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
Required investment in / replacement or modernisation of existing plants in cement production
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) describes the maturity of a technology on a scale from 1–9 (TRL 9 = ready for market). 
Pilot plant Oxyfuel clinker cooler, cement works Hanover, HeidelbergCement
Photo: Steffen Fuchs, Heidelberg/Germany
Labo-
ratoryPilot Market readiness Technology exportDemo
System  
testing
Plant lifetime: 60 years
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050












Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
A successful further development of this technology can contribute to 
siginificant CO₂ reductions from cement manufacturing worldwide if the 
required CO₂ infrastructure is constructed. With 100 per cent GHG-neutral 
fuels, such as biomass from sustainable sources, negative emissions are 
possible. 
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
 → Carbon contracts or CCfDs
 → Green public procurement
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
 → Reform levies and surcharges
Challenges
The public acceptance of CO₂ transport and storage is uncertain, especially 
for sites far away from potential offshore storage sites. The Oxyfuel process 
demands a some additional renewable electricity. For 50 per cent of the 
EU27 cement production (approx. 80 Mt) the Oxyfuel process with CCS 
would create an additional electricity requirement of approx. 20 TWh.
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirements
 →  0.25 MWh per t of cement (incl. capture, 
purification and compression of CO₂)
 →  CO₂ infrastructure
 → secure long-term CO₂ storage
 →  Oxygen production plant
Cement
Technology
Carbon capture with the Oxyfuel process
Current stage of development
Planned construction of demo plants (TRL 6) 
Expected readiness for use
2025–2030
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050
8.5 MtCO2 per year 101 MtCO2 per year
2030 2050
70–131 €/tCO2 65–87 €/tCO2
CO2 abatement costs 
Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Conventional cement manufacturing Carbon capture with Oxyfuel
0.61 tCO2 /t of cement
-90 % 0.06 tCO2 /t of cement
Specific emission reduction
46 €/t of cement +78 to +104 % 82–94 €/t of cement
Specific additional costs
Assumption Lower range Upper range 
Capital costs for reference cement work € 15/t of cement € 17/t of cement
Specific capital costs of retrofitting Oxyfuel € 7/t of cement € 10/t of cement
Assumption: CAPEX Oxyfuel for 1 Mt of cement clinker per year € 100 million € 130 million
Operating costs of cement production incl. carbon capture in the cement works € 41/t of cement € 46/t of cement
Assumption: average electricity price € 50/MWh € 60/MWh
Costs for CO2 transport and storage € 33/tCO2 € 38/tCO2
This consists of:  CO2 transport costs (inland and seagoing vessels) € 23/tCO2 € 28/tCO2 
North Sea storage € 10/tCO2 € 10/tCO2 
Production costs of low-carbon cement € 82/t of cement € 94/t of cement 
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).














In the LEILAC process, a special, indirectly heated steel vessel 
is used as the calciner. As a result, a pure CO2 exhaust gas 
flow simplifies the capture of CO2. This way captures approx. 
85 to 90 per cent of total process-related emissions. It 
also enables the electrification of high-temperature heat 
production, which eliminates the fuel-related emissions from 
the calciner. The total reduction is around 77 to 80 per cent 
of kiln emissions. 
Required investment
By our estimates, the reinvestment requirement in the 
cement industry by 2030 includes plants with a capacity of 
approx. 55 Mt of cement clinker per year (approx. 30 per cent 
of the total capacity). The number was extrapolated from 
German data in absence of a full site-specific dataset for 
Europe.
Technology development
If technology develops optimally, the large-scale use (TLR 9) 
of the LEILAC technology (in the fossil-heated approach) will 
be possible between 2025 and 2030. The electrically heated 
system can be available by 2030. 
4.3 Carbon capture in combination with the electrification of high-
temperature heat for calciners (electrified LEILAC process) 
Pilot and demonstration projects
Demo
EU project LEILAC II (Hanover, Germany)
HeidelbergCement, Cemex, Calix
Outlook: Demonstration plant (TRL 6-7) is 
expected to be ready by the end of 2023 and the 
overall project will run until 2025.
After the success of the first project phase, LEILAC II is 
now designing a CO₂ capture pilot plant that can capture 
100,000 tCO₂ per year. This corresponds to 20 per cent of 
the cement plant’s capacity. The project design phase will 
be completed in June 2021.
EU project LEILAC (Lixhe, Belgium)
HeidelbergCement, Calix
 Status: The pilot plant in Lixhe has a production 
volume of 10 t of cement clinker per hour and 
was used for the first time in April 2019 (using 
fossil fuels).
The project, which ran until 2020, had the goal of 
developing and testing a special calciner. The raw material 
is indirectly heated and calcinated in a (fossil-fueled or 
electrically heated) steel vessel. The aim was to show that 




Status: Energy and mass balance for an electrical 
cement plant with LEILAC (without CCS).
Outlook: Pilot plant testing for electricity-based 
cement manufacture (plasma technology).
The focus of the project does not lie on LEILAC but on 
plasma technology. A recent study produced an energy 
and mass assessment for a completely electrified cement 
plant using the LEILAC technology in cement clinker 
production.
Concept
 Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
 
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) describes the maturity of a technology on a scale from 1–9 (TRL 9 = ready for market). 
Pilot plant of the LEILAC reactor in the Lixhe cement plants, HeidelbergCement 
Photo: Paul Poels, Meerlo/the Netherlands
Earliest possible large-scale application (TRL 9) 



































Required investment in / replacement or modernisation of existing plants in cement production
Pilot Market readiness Technology exportDemo System  testing
Plant lifetime: 60 years
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
This technology enables the capture or avoidance of approx. 77–80 per 
cent of total emissions from cement production. When combined with 100 
per cent GHG-neutral fuels for rotary kilns, the technology can eliminate a 
total of 90–93 per cent of emissions. An advantage of electrifying calciners 
is that they obviate the need for scarce or expensive GHG-neutral fuels 
(biomass, synthetic methane). 
Possible policy instruments
 →  Carbon price and border carbon adjustment
 → Carbon contracts or CCfDs
 → Green public procurement
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
 → Reform levies and surcharges
Challenges
The public acceptance of CO₂ transport and storage is uncertain, especially 
for sites far away from potential offshore storage sites. The electrification 
of high-temperature heat production demands a significant amount of 
additional renewable electricity. For 50 per cent of the EU27 cement 
production (approx. 80 Mt) the electrified LEILAC process with CCS would 
create an additional electricity requirement of approx. 43–57 TWh.
Renewable electricity and infrastructure 
requirement
 →  Electricity requirement of the electrified 
LEILAC process: 0.54-0.71 MWh per t of cement
 → Electricity network expansion, if needed
 → CO₂ infrastructure
 →  Availability of secure CO₂ storage
Cement
Technology
Carbon capture and electrification of high-
temperature heat for the calciner
Current stage of development
Pilot plants (TRL 4)
Expected readiness for use
2025–2030
Maximum CO2 reduction in the EU27
2030 2050




Central assumptions for determining the range of the production costs (2050)
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Conventional cement manufacturing LEILAC with electrification 
0.61 tCO2 /t of cement
-77 to -80 % 0.12–0.14 tCO2 /t of cement
Specific emission reduction
46 €/t of cement +74 to +119 % 80–101 €/t of cement
Specific additional costs
Assumption Lower range Upper range 
Productions costs for reference cement plants € 46/t of cement € 46/t of cement
Capital costs of the LEILAC calciner and CO2 purifying and compression plant € 0.8/t of cement € 3.8/t of cement
Assumption: CAPEX-LEILAC calciner in addition to regular investment € 0 € 40 million
Assumption: CAPEX-CO2 purifying and compression plant € 9.5 million € 9.5 million
Operating costs for electricity use € 27/t of cement € 42/t of cement
Assumption: Electricity price € 50/MWh € 60/MWh
Saving of primary fuels through the use of electricity € -5/t of cement € -5/t of cement
Costs for CO2 transport and storage € 33/tCO2 € 38/tCO2
Production costs of low-carbon cement € 80/t of cement € 101/t of cement 
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).











































Alternative binding agents enable the manufacture of 
concrete without the use of conventional cement clinker. 
A lower share of limestone can reduce process-related CO₂ 
emissions. The production processes of some alternative 
binding agents are less energy-intense than those of 
conventional cement. Because the alternative binding 
agents are in different stages of development and market 
introduction, future market share, production costs and CO₂ 
reduction potentials cannot be estimated with certainty.
Required investment
The application of alternative binding agents is currently 
limited, and will probably remain so in the medium term. 
Until 2030, a limited amount of cement clinker production 
could be transferred to the production of alternative binding 
agents or be replaced by plants that produce them. 
Technology development
Alternative binding agents are in different stages of research 
and development or are in a very early stage of market 
introduction. 
4.4 Alternative binding agents
Autoclave in the Celitement pilot plant Photo: Markus Breig, © KIT
Pilot and demonstration projects
Celitement (Karlsruhe, Germany)
Schwenk Baustoff- Group, KIT
 Status: Pilot plant in Karlsruhe in operation since 
2011, producing up to 100 kg/day.
Outlook: Industrial reference plant in planning.
CO2 reduction potential: Up to 50 per cent 
compared with Portland cement (PLC), whose 
clinker proportion is greater than 95 per cent.
The Celitement binding agent has nearly the same 
hydration properties, strength development and final 
strength as conventional cement. The same raw material 
can be used in production, but the production process is 
more complex.
Pilot
Solidia Technologies (Piscataway, New Jersey)
Status: Recently entered the market for non-load-
carrying components such as paving stones and 
roofing tiles.
CO2 reduction potential: 30–70% relative to PLC.
Because the hardening takes place in a CO₂-rich 
atmosphere and not through contact with water, the 
products work as a CO₂ sink. But this also means that the 
technology is primarily suitable for precast elements that 





Status quo: The EU project EU-Binder successfully 
produced wall panels in Ternocem.
CO2 reduction potential: 20–30% compared to PLC.
Ternocem is a cement containing mostly belite and includes 
more aluminous raw materials and ferrite than Portland 





Required reinvestment and earliest possible market readiness of the  
key low-carbon technology 
Required investment in / replacement or modernisation of existing plants in cement production
 
Status quo:
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
































) Plant lifetime: 60 years
Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown







Evaluation of compatibility with Paris climate agreement
Alternative binding agents represent a non-CCS option for a significant 
reduction of specific CO₂ emissions (up to 53 per cent) and can be regionally/
globally important if CCS cannot be implemented. The high degree of 
uncertainty regarding future scaling potential, areas of application and 
market penetration rates is a problem. 
Possible policy instruments
→  Changes in construction and product 
standards
→ Green public procurement
 → Quotas for low-carbon materials
 →  Carbon price with border carbon adjustment
Challenges
The properties of alternative binding agents deviate somewhat from those 
of conventional cements, which makes extensive tests and standardisation 
processes necessary. There is still need for research regarding the long 
term and regional availability of raw materials and their effects on the 
environment. 
Infrastructure requirement




Replacement of conventional cement clinker 
with alternative binding agents
Current stage of development
Various; depends on product
Expected readiness for use
2020–2030 (depending on product) 






Costs and cost factors of alternative binding agents
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY KEY LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
Conventional cement manufacturing Alternative binding agents
0.61 tCO2 /t of cement
in % unknown
Specific emission reduction
46 €/t of cement in % unknown
Specific additional costs
Alternative binding agent Information on (today’s) costs and cost factors
Calcium hydrosilicate binder (e.g. Celitement) Reduced lime and energy requirement. But the manufacturing process 
is more complex.
Carbonated calcium silicate (e.g. Solidia) Costs are comparable with conventional cements.
Belite-ye’elimite-ferrite cements (e.g. Ternocem) Costs for raw materials lie above those required for Portland cement.
Ye’elimite cements Commercially available in China for 40 years. Due to the high proportion 
of aluminium-rich raw materials, more expensive than conventional 
cements.
Source: Compiled by the Wuppertal Institute based on various sources. (See the reference to the publication in Part E.1).
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